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CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM: QUASINEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTHS
TIMOTHY ZICK*

The absence of neutrality and objectivity in constitutional
decision-making has vexed scholarsand courts. In this Article, the
author describes and analyzes "constitutionalempiricism," a trend
instituted by the Rehnquist Court, which is characterized by
judicialreliance in constitutionalreview on empirical and scientific
conventions and processes. Courts have generally relied upon
traditional sources, such as text and history, to interpret
consititutionalpowers and rights. In its search for neutrality and
objectivity, however, the Court has recently turned not only to
social science and other data, which are fast becoming common
sources of interpretation,but also to the precepts and methods of
scientific and empirical inquiry. Constitutional empiricism is a
method of constitutional interpretation which seeks to imitate
scientific inquiry. Empiricism boasts, for example, the ability to
distinguish, by reference to empirical observation, "real" from
sham legislativepredicates. It is used to empirically test legislative
hypotheses, predictions, theories, and causal claims. Beyond this,
empiricism is also manifested in the Court's efforts to "quantify"
normative constitutional provisions as disparate as the Due
Process Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, among others. Drawing upon
ongoing debates in the philosophy of science discipline, the
Author argues that constitutional empiricism does not provide
long-sought neutral methods and principles for constitutional
interpretation. Empiricism is based upon a host of subjective
choices that affect not only which questions will be answered
empirically, but also the collection, categorization, and ultimate
interpretationof data. Thus, the precepts of empiricism do not, as
would appear,function as a set of "neutralprinciples." In fact, the
Author argues, far from propelling constitutional interpretation
into the twenty-first century, empiricism has been utilized, thus far,
*Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., 1989, Indiana
University; J.D., 1992, Georgetown University Law Center. I am indebted to Erin
Albritton, Brian Tamanaha, Robert Vischer, and Philip Weinberg for their helpful
comments and suggestions.
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to draw attention away from a return to the sort of formalism and
conceptualism that characterized early eras of constitutional
interpretation. More generally, the Author contends that empirical
methods are ill-suited to the discovery of constitutional meaning.
Because it filters evidence, fails to provide standardsfor separating
"good" empirical results from "bad" results, and demands that
hypotheses be legally "correct," constitutionalempiricism does not
advance constitutional knowledge in the same manner that
empirical methods advance scientific knowledge. The Author
argues that perhaps the most disturbing issue is that finding
constitutional truths empirically threatens to further sterilize and
compress constitutionaldiscourse.
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INTRODUCTION

Constitutional scholars tend to be more enamored with unifying
theories than the study of the building blocks of constitutional
foundations, those things which are usually lumped together as facts
and largely ignored, or at least not examined in any systematic
fashion.' The preference for high theory and overarching principles is
1. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Against ConstitutionalTheory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
4, 21 (1998) (noting that "[c]onstitutional theory today circulates in a medium that is
largely opaque to the judge and the practicing lawyer" and that "the lack of an empirical
footing" is the "achilles heel of constitutional law"). "Facts" have not been entirely
ignored in constitutional scholarship. But, the treatment has not been in any sense
systematic. Some scholars have focused solely on the Supreme Court's use of social
scientific data in certain cases. See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional FactFinding": Exploring The Empirical Component of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 541, 550 (1991) (criticizing the Supreme Court for misinterpreting scientific
data, and changing legal rules to avoid data); Deborah Jones Merritt, ConstitutionalFact
and Theory: A Response to Chief Judge Posner, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1287, 1291-93 (1999)
(asserting that social science "can't resolve constitutional issues"). Several commentators
have focused on the facts relating to federal civil rights and Commerce Clause legislation.
See, e.g., Samuel L. Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court
Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337, 343 (1984) (criticizing the expansion of Congress's
enforcement powers through its fact finding abilities); Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of
Facts: The Illusion of Certainty, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1723, 1732 (1995) (examining the role
of "political" and "scientific" facts in judicial review of federal legislation). Still others
have recently examined the Supreme Court's new "legislative record" scrutiny in cases
involving civil rights legislation. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone,
Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On The Record" Constitutional
Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 392-93 (2001) (critiquing the
Supreme Court's treatment of the "legislative record" for legislation enacted under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Shapiro,
Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 119 (2001) (same); Ruth Colker & James
J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 80-83 (2001) (same); Philip P.
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unfortunate and somewhat misguided. Constitutional law, like many
other areas of law, is becoming an empirical enterprise. Most federal
judges, including most members of the Supreme Court, do not adhere
to any overarching normative theory of constitutional interpretation.
A pragmatic bench increasingly looks instead to data and scientific
conventions for objective measures of constitutionality.
Constitutional law is now in the throes of a widespread empirical
turn, a quantitative mood swing that is consistent with a more general
societal turn toward all things scientific. 2 There are, wherever one
looks, judicial attempts to quantify, for example, legislative purposes
and predicates, constitutional powers, and even explicitly normative
constitutional concepts. Constitutional issues are just as likely to be
examined with reference to empirical methods-collections of data,
putative correlations and causative principles, and arguments over the
nuances of sampling methodology and results-as they are with
reference to text, precedent, and history, the traditional sources of
constitutional construction. Questions that in the past were answered
conceptually, or even with reference to purported judicial common
sense, are now routinely addressed empirically. The now-ubiquitous
data run the gamut from rigorous social science and medical research,
to lighter survey fare and data compilations, to collections of
anecdotal accounts.'
Constitutional empiricism is more than a judicial reliance on
data-it is the process by which constitutional issues are routinely
engaged as empirical propositions. Empiricism is both a method of
constitutional interpretation and a judicial perspective on the proper
mission of the courts in constitutional cases. It is, for the Rehnquist
Court, a logical outgrowth of, and replacement for, the economics

Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, The CongressionalProcess,and the Federalism
Cases: An InterdisciplinaryCritique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1719 (2002) (same).
2. See MICHEL SERRES & BRUNO LATOUR, CONVERSATIONS ON SCIENCE,

CULTURE AND TIME 87 (1995) (noting the ascendancy of the scientific method and the
growing perception that science "has all the power, all the knowledge, all the rationality").
3. I am using both "scientific" and "empirical" in a broad sense. "Scientific
knowledge" is "a sensory-based, empirical process of testing statements about the world
through observation and experimentation." Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Epistemiology and Legal Process,15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2192

(1994). An empirical approach "begins with the assumption that direct observation and
experience provide the only firm basis for understanding nature." JOHN M. NEALE &
ROBERT M. LIEBERT, SCIENCE AND BEHAVIOR:

AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS OF

RESEARCH 2 (2d ed. 1980). A rational approach, by contrast, "rests on the belief that
people can understand through reason and intuition alone." Id. Empirical research
"refers to any activity that systematically attempts to gather evidence through
observations and procedures that can be repeated and verified by others." Id. at 7.
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and utilitarianism utilized by the Burger Court.4 Empiricism is the
new sibling of conventional modes of constitutional interpretation
like textualism, structuralism, and historicism. In the past, empiricism
has operated in the background, under the rubric of judicial "factfinding" in constitutional law.5 Increasingly, however, constitutional
empiricism is how constitutional law is being made.
A sampling of recent issues that have received empirical
treatment demonstrates the breadth and significance of this empirical
turn. The following issues of constitutional interpretation, among
many others, have been treated as empirical propositions: whether
Congress had sufficient data to support its prediction that a market
intervention with respect to cable programming was necessary to
avoid the evil of broadcast station failures;6 whether Congress could
demonstrate empirically its theory that imposing civil penalties for
surreptitiously intercepting wireless communications would dry up
the downstream market for initial interceptions;7 whether legislative
outputs demonstrate that execution of the mentally retarded is "cruel
and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment;8 whether
statistics regarding the public funding of religious education through
4. See Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic
Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 592 (1985) [hereinafter Tribe, ConstitutionalCalculus]
(noting the "recent Supreme Court trend toward discharging the federal judicial mission in
the manner of an economic manager armed with hard-edged tools of cost-benefit
analysis"); Id. at 599-614 (discussing cases regarding, among other constitutional
provisions, the Due Process Clause, the Establishment Clause, and guarantees relating to
criminal procedure). For a critique of the Burger Court's utilitarianism, see generally
Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through A PseudoScientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155 (1984) [hereinafter Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins].
5. Scholars have long debated whether there is a meaningful distinction between
See generally Henry P. Monaghan,
constitutional "fact" and constitutional "law."
ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985) (explaining the differences and
confusion between fact and law). The empirical turn addressed in this Article supports the
view that "law" and "fact" cannot be differentiated in any meaningful sense in
constitutional adjudication and construction.
6. See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). The Turner cases are discussed infra notes 270-86
and accompanying text.
7. See generally Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (invalidating portions of
Title III, the federal wiretapping statute). Bartnicki is discussed infra notes 287-94 and
accompanying text.
8. See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (invalidating legislation which
provided for the execution of the mentally retarded, based primarily on the Court's
finding of a state legislative "consensus" that such punishment was deemed cruel and
unusual). Whether capital punishment for juvenile defendants violates the Eighth
Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual" punishments is subject to a similar empirical
analysis. That issue remains open as of this writing. Atkins is discussed infra notes 315-26
and accompanying text.
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vouchers demonstrate a violation of the Establishment Clause;9 and

whether there is a numerical point at which the disparity between
compensatory and punitive damages violates the guarantee of due
process. 10

The broad empirical turn presently occurring in constitutional
law is due, at least in part, to the ever-expanding pool of data
available to courts. The courts are literally awash in data, and seem

constantly to be clamoring for more. More importantly, as evidence
of all sorts has made its way into the judicial process, courts have, at
the Supreme Court's instruction, taken on a more aggressive
gatekeeping role with respect to scientific and other technical data."
Indeed, the empirical turn in constitutional law coincides with the
Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 2 in which federal judges were instructed to
make their own assessments of scientific and technical data.

As empirical gatekeepers, courts examine and interpret the now
readily available mass of data at their disposal. Data are, in a sense,
both inescapable and highly attractive, especially to judges in search

of some objective grounding as they ponder highly divisive political,
moral, and social issues.
Empirical methods and scientific
conventions are an attractive alternative to judicial "puke tests"13 and

other "soft," explicitly normative interpretive methods. One of the
most vexing problems for constitutional interpreters and adjudicators
is the lack of "hard," objective, neutral principles and techniques for
giving meaning to constitutional concepts. Empirical precepts and
conventions-measurement, formulas, equations, causality, and
simple ratios-seem to promise the neutrality and legitimacy that

constitutional

interpretation

requires.

In sum, constitutional

9. See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding voucher
program despite data indicating that ninety-six percent of public funds were used for
parochial school tuition). Zelman is discussed infra notes 332-40 and accompanying text.
10. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003)
(invalidating punitive damages award of $145 million where compensatory award was $1
million). State Farm is discussed infra notes 351-58 and accompanying text.
11. This Article examines Supreme Court cases primarily, but also points out that
empiricism has filtered down to the lower courts as well.
12. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Kuhmo Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
148-49 (1999) (expanding Daubert approach to all technical evidence); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997) (addressing standard of review for trial judge's
gatekeeping function when admitting scientific testimony).
13. See Richard A. Posner, PragmaticAdjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (1996)
(explaining the "puke test," which calls for invalidating a statute on constitutional grounds
if no reasonable person could defend it). The test originated in Justice Holmes's dissent in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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empiricism is the result of the confluence of several factors: the
difficulty in locating elusive neutral constitutional principles, a

growing dissatisfaction with constitutional doctrine and conventional
methods of interpretation, and the rise of a judicial pragmatism that
14

has settled upon empiricism as a next-best alternative.
Constitutional jurisprudence has experienced a number of
historical and jurisprudential shifts, from early natural law
groundings," to the now-disfavored conceptualism of Lochner v. New
York, 6 to the realism which characterizes the wildly popular (with

judges, anyway) construct of constitutional balancing. After the dark
formalist period associated with Lochner, the Constitution was
ostensibly opened to the influence of external sources and

observations. The Court has been at the task of defining and
managing these various externals ever since. It has been harshly
criticized in some well-known instances, including Brown v. Board of

Education,7 and Roe v. Wade, 8 for its reliance on social and medical
science.19 More generally, constitutional balancing, the Court's first
widespread empirical turn in constitutional interpretation, has been
consistently criticized for its apparent indeterminacy.20
Constitutional empiricism is a budding interpretive process.

Broad questions concerning the wisdom of this second empirical turn
in constitutional interpretation should be raised now, at its inception.
It would appear that courts have made the turn, in part, in order to
mechanize further the balancing construct, with the goal of producing
14. This is by no means to suggest that courts always make the empirical effort. See
Posner, supra note 1, at 13-21 (criticizing recent Supreme Court equal protection
precedents relating to gender and sexual preference discrimination for basing decision on
normative values and failing to include consideration of scientific and social-scientific
data). As Judge Posner notes, empirical evidence is not always available, a circumstance
he lays in part at the feet of current constitutional scholars, who tend to focus on theory to
the exclusion of empirical knowledge. Judge Posner asserts that where data is scarce or
non-existent, courts will continue to rely on their normative judgments and judicial
temperaments. See id. at 21-22.
15. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388-89 (1798) (suggesting that there
were implied natural law-based limits on state legislative power).
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 167-68 (1955)
(criticizing Brown's reliance on social science data that has an "uncertain expectancy of
life").
20. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 972-94 (1987) (criticizing how balancing has transformed constitutional
law); Tribe, Constitutional Calculus, supra note 4, at 607-08 (criticizing the Supreme
Court's cost-benefit calculus generally, and specifically as applied to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule and its exceptions).
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more objective and determinate constitutional decisions. They have
also turned to things like simple formulas and ratios in order to attain
more objective interpretations of open-ended constitutional
provisions. But is a "science" of constitutional law possible? Will it
lead to more accurate and objective constitutional decision-making
and interpretation? Or is constitutional empiricism merely a new
formalism in disguise, one that, as balancing did, falsely promises
objective adjudication and constitutional truths, while leading us back
toward Lochner?
This Article describes and critiques constitutional empiricism as
a method of constitutional adjudication and construction. Part I
clarifies the concept of constitutional empiricism by placing it in an
admittedly abbreviated and necessarily simplified jurisprudential
context. The recent turn toward empiricism has a historical and
jurisprudential pedigree that stretches back to the demise of
Lochnerism, which was followed some time later by the birth of
constitutional balancing. Constitutional empiricism is the second
general empirical turn in constitutional law, post balancing.
Part II examines constitutional empiricism's various forms and
functions. Empiricism encompasses a range of these methods.
Empirical methods, such as statistics, are now directly relevant to a
number of constitutional claims. Medical and other empirical
evidence is utilized as background with regard to highly contested
constitutional rights, such as the "right to die."2 1 Social statistics and
other evidence are also sometimes relied upon in choosing among
competing constitutional rules.22 These are empiricism's foundational
Because these empirical functions operate in the
functions.
background and are not dispositive of constitutional issues, they are
The recent judicial penchant for testing
uncontroversial.
congressional outputs as if they were regulatory "hypotheses" is more
controversial. Where the Supreme Court has viewed legislative
hypotheses, predictions, theories, and claimed causal relationships as
novel or implausible, it has applied a heightened empiricism, one
which demands evidence of a real harm or evil and seeks to quantify
The Court has also sought to
the legislative predicate.23
quantification, and ratios,
equations,
simple
through
operationalize,
constitutional guarantees such as the prohibition on "cruel and
unusual punishments" under the Eighth Amendment, religious

21. See infra note 148.
22. See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part II.B-C.
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coercion under the Establishment Clause, and the right to due
process.24
Part III examines and critiques constitutional empiricism as a
method of judicial review in constitutional cases. Empirical and
quasi-scientific methods-data compilation, hypothesis testing,
falsification of causal claims, equations, and ratios-are merely the
latest iteration of purportedly neutral principles of constitutional
decision-making. From the outside and from a distance, the empirical
approach looks objective and determinate.
But, constitutional
empiricism is rooted in an antiquated, positivist view of science and
scientific methods, one that does not account for external influences
on both the data being examined and the methods by which the
courts are performing empirical functions. Drawing on the ongoing
debates concerning the objectivity of empirical and scientific
methods, this Article posits that empiricism is institutionally and
doctrinally situated and constrained, and that it masks a new
conceptualism in constitutional adjudication and interpretation.
Empiricism is the new face of formalism in constitutional law, an
approach to constitutional questions which conceals strong
conceptual biases within quasi-neutral and quasi-scientific processes.
Rather than move courts beyond rigid concepts, empiricism actually
reinforces existing categorical constructs.
Finally, Part IV addresses the inherent incompatibility of
empiricism and the search for constitutional "truths." Generally,
because science and law are driven by fundamentally disparate
processes and goals, empiricism can bring us only as close to
constitutional truths as the narrowness of law and legal processes will
permit. Part IV contains some suggestions for improving empiricism;
but even if empiricism could get beyond the new formalism it
currently manifests, there are significant obstacles to discovering
constitutional truths empirically. There are still further reasons to be
skeptical of an empirical approach in constitutional law. Empiricism
narrows constitutional discourse, as data increasingly edge out
broader considerations of value and justice in the search for empirical
constitutional truths.

I.

JURISPRUDENTIAL FOREBEARS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
EMPIRICISM

An exhaustive survey of American jurisprudential history is
beyond the scope of this Article. Insofar as this Article contends that
24. See cases cited supra notes 8-10.
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the courts have taken an empirical turn, however, it is instructive to
view the turn through the lens of past efforts to make law, particularly
constitutional law, a more objective, more scientific, enterprise. The
discernible patterns in the conventional jurisprudential accounts,
from Langdellian legal science 25 to the apparent promise of legal
realism's "scientific" approach, then back again to new shades of
light on the latest empirical turn in
formalism, shed valuable 26
constitutional jurisprudence.
A.

Early Formalism

Accounts of the path to modern legal thought sometimes begin
with the pre-modern period, which spanned the country's framing
through the Civil War. 27 During this period, legal commentators
relied heavily on natural law principles.2 8 These principles focused on
universal truths, divinely inspired, which courts were to apply in
construing the Constitution or any other organic law.29 The difficulty
in uncovering these truths in an objective manner is apparent. From
the beginning, more determinate foundations were sought for
constitutional and other principles.
Conventional accounts of modern legal thought invariably begin
with some discussion of legal formalism, which followed on the heels
of the Civil War. The formalists, like some of their pre-modern
forebears, believed that law could be objectively grounded. Early
formalists, led by Dean Langdell of Harvard, counted precedents in a
Langdellian formalists
manner then believed to be "scientific." 3
principles-a logically
axiomatic
set
of
precise
as
a
conceived of law
LAW AND
25. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS:
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 13-16 (1995) (describing Langdell's effort to create
a legal science).
26. See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)
(providing a comprehensive account of jurisprudential patterns).
27. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM 49-82 (2000) (discussing "first stage" and "second
stage" premodern legal thought).
28. See id. at 49-52 (discussing the influence of natural law principles in early legal
thought); see also Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1127, 1132 (1987) (noting that during the framing period, "[tihe idea that certain
fundamental rights could not be ceded away also colored the American view of
fundamental law").
29. See generally Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993) (describing the influence of natural law during the
framers' generation).
30. See FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 94 (noting that "two central features of
Langdellian legal science were a positivist focus on the decided cases and the use of
inductive reason to discover legal principles").
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coherent and utterly closed system of rules derived predominantly
from appellate opinions.3 ' As Langdell proclaimed in the preface to
his Contracts casebook: "It is indispensable to establish at least two
things, first, that law is a science; secondly that all the available
32
materials of that science are contained in the printed books.
Through the abstract reason and inductive logic of opinions,
Langdellian formalists attempted to derive universal legal truths and
right answers from a system of rules.3 3 Langdellian conceptualism
conceived of law as a system of rules scrubbed clean of its context, 34
a
principles.
immutable
purportedly
of
compilation
scientific
Langdellian science thus had no use for concepts like values or
justice.35
For some, this formalism brought discipline to law and legal
thinking by demanding that concepts and rules be properly
categorized
and
classified
to
demonstrate
their
logical
interconnection. 36 Because they viewed law as fixed in nature,
however, early formalists eschewed sociological, empirical, and other
outside concerns and observations.3 7
Legislative purpose, in
particular, was not a subject for empirical demonstration, but was to
be "determined from the natural and legal effect of the language
employed."3 8
For these conceptualists, pure logic controlled
decisions, no matter what social scientific or other data might
indicate.39 Decided cases were the only data that really counted.
Langdellian formalists paid scant attention to the academic study
of constitutional law, which they viewed as too political and vague to

31. FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 94 (asserting that with Langdellian science,
"analytical or logical soundness was the sole criterion for proper legal reasoning").
32. C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECrION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACrS, i-v
(1871).
33. See MINDA, supra note 25, at 13.
34. See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1627, 1632-62
(1991).

35. Id. (explaining that the Langdellian jurist was not to consider the justice or
injustice likely to flow from a decision).
36. See MINDA, supra note 25, at 13 (discussing how Langdellians believed their
orthodoxy satisfied "the legal norms of objectivity and consistency").
37. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITr. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1983)

(comparing the early formalistic application of the law to the application of a geometric
theorum).
38. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,64 (1905).
39. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 182 (1986) (noting "[t]he
result is Platonism: the idea that concepts exist 'out there,' like trees or rocks, rather than
are created").
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be studied scientifically.4" Nevertheless, the early twentieth century
Supreme Court was decidedly formalist in its approach to
constitutional adjudication and interpretation. Lochner and its illfated progeny epitomized the narrow constitutional conceptualism of
the era.41 The liberty of contract the Court vigorously protected,
indeed froze into constitutional law in the early part of the twentieth
century, preserved a private sphere of activity the Court treated as
beyond governmental encroachment. Any activity that fell within
that sphere was artificially cordoned off from government
interference; conversely, any activity the Court determined was not
within the imagined sphere of individual autonomy was fair game for
the State.4 2 To the constitutional formalists it did not matter that
social realities cut against the conception of individual autonomy.
The formalists were not swayed by empirical evidence that there
were, for example, inequities of bargaining power.4 3
There is a temptation, however, to read Lochner too broadly as
adverse to all state regulation. There were indeed judicially approved
spheres in which the State was permitted to regulate, even if this
meant substantial restrictions on individual autonomy. For example,
the Court was more than willing to defer to the State on matters of
public health, especially where medical and scientific opinion was
divided. Thus, an early challenge to a compulsory vaccination law
failed despite compelling theories and data from medical
professionals who attached no value to vaccination, or indeed could
even demonstrate with some authority that the vaccination harmed
From the Court's perspective, there was high medical
patients.'
authority to the contrary, and the State was entitled to choose as
The formalist
between two sets of conflicting data or theories. 4
Court of the time actively avoided taking sides in such empirical
debates. As Justice Harlan then put it: "Upon what sound principles
40. See FELDMAN, supranote 27, at 101.
41. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1915) (invalidating state legislation
outlawing "yellow dog" contracts); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 48-49 (invalidating state
maximum hour laws for bakery employees); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590
(1897) (invalidating marine insurance statute).
42. See FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 100-01 (finding that "the [Lochner] majority
assumed that there was a preexisting field or sphere of private activity and that any
conduct that fell within that sphere was categorically protected from governmental
interference").
43. See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 8-9 (refusing to consider inequality of bargaining power
between individuals and corporate persons).
44. See Jacobson v. Commonwealth, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905) (upholding compulsory
vaccination law).
45. Id.
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as to the relations existing between the different departments of
government can the court review this action of the legislature?"46
This was not simply a matter of judicial restraint or sterile
formalism. The early Court simply did not believe the state, or the
courts, should be bound by the then-existing state of scientific art.
While it was common knowledge that vaccination reduces disease by
some measure, that was the end of the matter so far as the judicial
branch was concerned.47 The possibility that the legislature was
wrong, and that science may yet show it to be wrong, was immaterial.
The legislature was entitled to act according to common belief, and
courts had no right to insist that the government make any empirical
demonstration.4" In other words, in the pre-empirical, and prebalancing, eras, legislatures were entitled to deference concerning the
side they took in empirical debates.49
Early legal science-Langdellian and Lochnerian-was, thus, a
science of logic, precedents, concepts, and rules. This formalism
dominated early constitutional law, as Lochner and its progeny
enshrined conceptualism as a science of constitutional interpretation.
The state of the world "out there" was not permitted to upset the
order of an internal system of rules based on logic and precedent.
The next generation of scholars and judges would take legal "science"
in a different direction.
B.

Realism and the Post-formalist "Science" of Law

By any measure, there was indeed an abundance of conceptuallyinspired judicial second-guessing during the Lochner era. Legal
realists revolted against this formalism, in both its Langdellian and
Lochnerian forms.5" Realism, which by most conventional accounts
held sway in the academy in the 1920s and 1930s, was viewed as
promising a way out of the formalist straightjacket."s
46. Id. at 31; see also Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1912) (upholding "the
right of the state to adopt a policy even upon medical matters concerning which there is
difference of opinion and dispute").
47. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35 (explaining that common knowledge does not require
evidence to establish its existence).
48. Id.
49. See Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 595 (1926) (allowing Congress to enforce
the Eighteenth Amendment by imposing restrictions on prescription of alcoholic

beverages, even though medical opinion was mixed).
50. MINDA, supra note 25, at 25 (noting the conventional account that realism
"revolted against both Langdellian and constitutional law formalism").
51. See Roscoe Pound, The Call For a Realist Jurisprudence,44 HARV. L. REV. 697
passim (1931) (discussing the growth of legal realism). One must be careful with the label
"realist," since few agreed then or now upon who qualified as a realist thinker. I mean to
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Ultimately, as one scholar has summarized the realist mood, the

realists were committed "to telling it-whatever it happened to beas it is."5' 2 In telling it as it is, some early realists were emboldened to
ask why courts should not be looking behind the words and phrases of
statutes to decide their constitutionality. Roscoe Pound, an early
pragmatist, was particularly disturbed that constitutional issues were
decided based upon the sharp, and artificial, line between law and

fact. This formal division required constitutionality, as a legal
question, to be tried by artificial criteria of general application and
prevented effective judicial investigation or consideration of the
situations of fact behind or bearing upon the statutes.53 Here, then,
was one of the earliest recognitions that the "realities" behind

statutes and other governmental actions mattered-that what was
"fact," and what was "law," could not readily be separated. 4
Constitutional realists pointed to Justice Holmes's Lochner
dissent as their early manifesto.5 5 Justice Holmes argued that the

formalism of laissez-faire constitutionalism was not a sound basis for
The Constitution governed a
constitutional decision-making. 56
pluralist society, he noted, and "the accident of our finding certain

opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to
conclude

our

judgment

upon

the

question

whether

statutes

embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States."57 Justice Holmes recognized certain fundamental social
realities; most notably, for example, he asserted that constitutional
rights and powers could not be determined with reference to some

use the term in its broadest, most generic sense, and to limit the label to those with whom
the realist movement has been associated in conventional accounts. See DUXBURY, supra
note 26, at 65-71 (discussing ambiguity of the term realism and philosophical
disagreements among those believed to be in the realist camp); see also MINDA, supra
note 25, at 26 (noting the critique of formalism-bound realists, but asserting that legal
realism "has since remained somewhat of a mystery in the history of modern legal
thought").
52. DUXBURY, supra note 26, at 71.
53. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract,18 YALE L.J. 454, 458 (1909).
54. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908)
(contending that law exists as a means to an end). Pound was among the early pragmatists
who emphatically rejected Lochnerian formalism in favor of an explicitly empirical
approach. See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of SociologicalJurisprudence (pts.
1-3), 24 HARV. L. REV. 591,594 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1912).

55. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 112.
56. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (denouncing
laissez-faire conceptualism).
57. Id. at 76; see also id. at 75 (noting that "the Constitution does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencers Social Statics [sic]").
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hypothetical free economic agent. 8
In other areas, too, there was a backlash against conceptualist
thinking. To realists like Felix Cohen, sterile concepts were merely
"transcendental nonsense."5 9 Realists believed that it was simply
fantastic to suggest that courts could apply Langdellian rules and
concepts in such a way as to definitively answer, for example, whether

a court has jurisdiction over a corporation.

To decide where a

corporation resides, Cohen explained, is a metaphysical question, and

a decision that one has jurisdiction merely provides "a label for a
conclusion somehow reached through other means or methods."'

Nor could courts simply divine a party's contractual intentions, for
example, from rules and formal concepts; the best evidence of such

things lay in objective indicators and participant behaviors.
For realists, then, data and social experience, not concepts, were

to be the foundation for objective judicial decisionmaking.61 Indeed,
realists, unlike their Langdellian predecessors, eagerly engaged
sources of knowledge outside the law; they sought, in essence, to

build a new, post-formalist "science" of law.62 This explains the
realists' affinity for, and popular connection to, Justice Holmes, who
pointed to statistics, economics, and social and other sciences as

holding the key to a more objective science of law.63

Holmes

famously captured the realist sentiment when he declared: "The life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. '
He
58. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 879 (1987)
(describing Holmes's view that the Constitution does not embody a particular economic
theory). Holmes's dissent, of course, ultimately became the majority view, and significant
New Deal enactments were thereafter upheld. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 504,504-506 (1987); see
also FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 110 (remarking that "[a]s many realists became
politically aligned with the New Deal, they supported exactly the type of liberal economic
legislation that the Lochner Court had repeatedly invalidated").
59. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 820-21 (1935) (denouncing formalism and urging application of functional
approach).
60. FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 111 (discussing Cohen's critique of Langdellian
formalism).
61. See Thomas Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 805
(1989) (noting that Holmes and other realists treated law as "situated, rooted in custom
and shared expectations").
62. See MINDA, supra note 25, at 30 (noting that "[p]rogressive realists accepted the
basic tenets of Langdellian jurisprudence that 'law is a science,' but for them law was a
social science" (emphasis in original)).
63. See O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)
(asserting that "the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of
economics").
64. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963).
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recommended consulting "[tihe felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men."65 This was a pragmatic philosophy, based upon the
idea that law was socially constructed, a matter of public policy that
could not simply be discovered in books. 6
The post-formalist
iteration of legal science thus rejected a science based upon rules and
precedents in favor of a science based upon experience and the social
world.
Modern social science became the new basis for controlling and
limiting the open-ended type of policy narratives found in the law.67
Many realists adopted and practiced the empirical scientific method;6"
they studied the law by observing physical phenomena, collecting and
studying masses of data, and drawing various correlative and
causative conclusions. This embrace of scientific methods was most
prevalent with regard to a group of early realists, sometimes referred
to as "empiricists."6 9 Some of these empiricists believed that legal
rules and regulations could be empirically constructed-literally
produced from mounds of data, which were mined using the available
social science conventions.70
There were also empiricists who,
heeding Holmes's call for a scientifically predictive jurisprudence,71
endeavored to predict outcomes based upon empirical observations,
much in the way a chemist might hypothesize outcomes, and then test
the hypotheses in scientific experiments.72 Together, the early
empiricists believed that a true "science of law" had been conceived,
thus legitimating the study of law as objectively grounded, and casting
law, at last, as a true profession.
This empirical turn in the legal academy was part of a much
larger turn toward the empirical in the 1920s and 1930s.73 Social
65. Id.
66. FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 113 (noting that realists turned to experience as the
source of objectivity).
67. MINDA, supra note 25, at 31.
68. Id. at 30.
69. See FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 113 (describing empirical approach to legal
study).
70. See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995) (providing a detailed account of the approach taken

by empiricists).
71. See HOLMES, supra note 63, at 461 (explaining that "[t]he prophesies of what
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law").
72. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 70, at 81-210 (discussing, in detail, the methods and
conclusions of the empiricists).
73. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
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scientists, for instance, began to turn to scientific objectivity as a
benchmark for their studies of culture and society.7 4 Seeking prestige
and legitimacy, scholars sought to incorporate the apparent virtues of
the natural sciences into the social sciences. "Only concrete, scientific
investigations could yield true knowledge," they believed, "and that
knowledge was empirical, particular, and experimentally verifiable."75
Thus, "many scholars insisted that scientific knowledge must be
wholly objective and based on concrete, universally verifiable data."76
"The only way they could build a scientific body of knowledge," many
scholars argued, "was by dealing with observable, physical
phenomena that could be restudied, remanipulated, or remeasured by
anyone who wished to test the conclusions."77
Legal and other scholars of the time believed the values and
preconceptions of the researcher could be eliminated by a narrow
focus on natural, "observable phenomena."78 The scientist's function
was to observe the "facts" and to "separate the verifiable, objective
facts from the confused and subjectively colored interpretations that
men habitually gave them."7 9 As Langdellians vacuumed concepts of
context and data, empiricists emptied law of values and other
supposed subjectivities. The empiricists' "determination to make
concrete empirical facts the touchstone for all analytical concepts
seemed necessarily to exclude ideas of 'ought' in favor of facts about
'is. -80
There were three principal difficulties which ultimately
As this Article will
undermined the realists' empirical turn.
demonstrate, these same three problems also plague constitutional
empiricism.81 First, the realist version of legal science simply replaced
the conceptualism of the formalists with a new conceptualism, one
which treated the concepts and conventions of the social sciences as
objective and universal.8 2 This social science conceptualism, while
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 15 (1973) (noting that by 1920, the "ideal of a
science of society was firmly entrenched in American thought").
74. Id. at 21 (commenting that "[slocial scientists interpreted the concept of scientific
objectivity in different ways, but most of them agreed heartily that objectivity was the goal
of their research").
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 21-22.
78. See id. at 22 (noting that empirical techniques were to place "the criteria of
judgment beyond the scientist's subjective evaluation").
79. Id. at 22-23.
80. Id. at 91.
81. See infra Parts III-IV (critiquing constitutional empiricism).
82. See MINDA, supra note 25, at 30.
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seeking authority outside the law, was blind to the notion that social
science conventions, and the facts which they "discover," are as
socially constructed as realists themselves had exposed the
Langdellian legal concepts to be. Legal realists, ironically, became
83
"the new Langdellian policy analysts."
Second, the legal empiricists and their counterparts in other
disciplines collected heaps of data, but they had difficulty drawing
conclusions from their observations, which often pointed in several
directions at once. 8 With indeterminate data, the empiricists failed to
advance either the rule-determination or predictive realist agendas.
Essentially, empirical stalemates left them with nowhere to go.
Third, and more generally, the realists' wide-open approach to
legal interpretation seemed inexorably to lead to a moral relativism
the realists had not anticipated, one which was particularly unsettling
in the post-war environment. 8 Focusing solely on the methods of
quantification, empiricists essentially passed over "the crucial
problem of the nature of scientific knowledge and its relationship to
human value judgments." 86
The empiricists' ethical relativism
faltered under the weight of the totalitarian crisis in Europe and
increasing pressure from scholars, religious and other, in the United
States.87 Thus, most of the substantial realist agenda, including the
focus on empirical research, had essentially been abandoned by the
1940s, as realism gave way, in the conventional account, to the next
jurisprudential turn or mood, which centered on various "process
theories" of jurisprudence.88
While all of this was going on in the academy, the Supreme
Court remained relatively untouched by legal empiricism.8 9 Early on,
in Muller v. Oregon,9" the Court was receptive to the data presented
in the now-famous "Brandeis" brief, which contained "two pages of
legal argument and well over a hundred of sociological statistics and
83. Id. at 31.
84. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 70, at 211-57 (analyzing reasons for the ultimate
demise of empiricism).
85. See PURCELL, supra note 73, at 159-178 (describing the attack on legal realism).
86. Id. at 40.
87. See id. at 172 (describing charges of ethical relativism in the face of Naziism).
88. See FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 115-23 (describing legal process thought).
89. There were occasional flashes in early cases of empirical constitutional decisionmaking. For example, in some "dormant" commerce clause cases, the Court, in applying a
formalist "direct-indirect" effects test, invalidated state laws based upon their
demonstrated effect on commerce. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S.
310 (1917) (invalidating state law as "direct" burden on ground that it required train to
stop 124 times in 123 miles).
90. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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analysis" designed to establish that long hours of work were harmful
to women.9 1 The brief, and the Court's apparent receptivity to it,
appeared to indicate that the Court was set to make an empirical
turn.
But in all likelihood, Muller did not turn on the empirical
evidence; the justices of the time were not generally inclined to
empiricism, and they appeared to value the brief not as social science
per se, but as evidence for the "widespread belief" that long hours
harmed women. 92 In any event, Lochner's generally formalist
approach did not appear to be much affected by the apparent
anomaly of Muller.
The seeds of constitutional empiricism, however, had been firmly
planted. When Justice Brandeis joined the Court, he immediately
encouraged the majority to consider empirical data in deciding
constitutional issues.93 "Resort to such facts," he said in assessing the
arbitrariness of governmental action, "is necessary, among other
things, in order to appreciate the evils sought to be remedied and the
possible effects of the remedy proposed." 94 Others soon joined in the
view that practical constitutional construction should replace the
mechanical construction of the past.95 Thus, in line with the realist
conception of legal "science" at least some on the Court were
apparently poised to look to experience and social science data to
interpret the Constitution.
C.

ConstitutionalBalancing: The First EmpiricalTurn in
ConstitutionalLaw

The Supreme Court ultimately acceded to the realists'
institutional critique of Lochner, but what then? As early as the
1930s, courts began, without explanation, to engage in a purported
"balancing" of constitutional rights and interests. 96 Members of the

91. See Id. at 419 n.1; PURCELL, supra note 73, at 76.
92.

See OWEN M. FISS, THE TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE 1888-

1910 at 175-76 (1993) (casting doubt upon the significance of the social science evidence in
the Brandeis brief to the outcome in Muller).
93. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 356-57 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(urging consideration of social and industrial context when assessing the constitutionality
of a statute precluding injunction of certain employee strike activity); see also Aleinikoff,
supra note 20, at 954 (discussing changes in Court composition and influx of empirical
thinking).
94. Truax, 257 U.S. at 356-57 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
95. See Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting) (calling
for balancing and consideration of facts in "dormant" commerce clause cases).
96. See Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at 948-49.
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Supreme Court, not content to return to pre-Lochner modes of
construction, began to "question earlier constitutional truths, and
they did so with an eye more to social facts than to abstract
categories."97 This, then, was the beginning of the first empirical turn
in constitutional adjudication and interpretation.
But why turn to constitutional balancing?
As Professor
Aleinikoff has noted, balancing had a "respectable intellectual
pedigree," with proponents like Holmes and Pound.98 More than
that, balancing was attuned to societal change; did not require that
the Court adopt any particular theory of constitutional interpretation;
and, methodologically, imported a "particularistic, case-by-case,
common law approach that accommodated gradual change and
rejected absolutes."9 9 As noted above, balancing was also consistent
with other intellectual movements of the time, which eschewed
universal truths in favor of naturalism and instrumentalism.
"[E]mpirical investigation [became] the undisputed foundation of all
knowledge and the validating criterion of all theory.""
Categorically-derived universals "gave way to culturally-based, small
't' truths, 10°' while "[t]he balancing judge could assume the role of a
social scientist, trading deductive logic for inductive investigation of
interests in a social context.""0 °
Still, there had to be some limits, otherwise judges would be left
free to invoke their personal preferences while purporting to
objectively "weigh" interests. Balancing at least had to answer
certain realist critics who claimed that law, by its very nature, could
not yield "objective" principles or results. As Professor Aleinikoff
suggested, the only way to meet that criticism was to point the
balancing apparatus in the same direction social science had takentoward outward signs and objective indicators of value.10 3 "Just as a
physicist could measure atomic weights without inquiring into values,
so the balancer could discover that free speech outweighed
governmental interests in public order without expressing a personal
view on the result." 1°
Thus externalized, balancing proponents
believed that their method could avoid both the subjective preference
97. Id. at 953-54.
98. Id. at 960.
99. See id. at 959-60.
100. PURCELL, supra note 73, at 61.

101. Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at 961.
102. Id. at 961.
103. See Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at 962-63 (concluding that "[t]he answer lay in
externalizing the balancing process").
104. Id. at 963.
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pitfall of Lochner and the charges of skeptical realists.
Initially so popular that it "entered constitutional law like wild
clover,"' 15 balancing came to consume constitutional law. The
expanse of constitutional doctrine produced by application of the
First Amendment,
balancing construct is truly impressive:
Fourteenth Amendment, Fourth Amendment, procedural and
substantive due process, and Commerce Clause doctrine, to name but
a few."°6 Despite frequent and unrelenting criticism of the "difficult
analytic and operational problems the method presents,"'0 °7 courts
show no sign of abandoning the balancing calculus. Indeed, as this
Article contends, the courts appear to be attempting, through
empiricism, to further objectify the process of constitutional decisionmaking.
Some theories of constitutional interpretation which were being
developed in the academy seemed compatible with the balancing
calculus. With some modifications and caveats, process theorists of
the 1960s and 1970s, for example, believed that "right" answers could
be derived from the balancing calculus. For balancing to do its
intended work, courts would need "a conceptual understanding of the
institutional functions and competency of different governmental
agencies of the legal system."' 18 Assuming such knowledge, process
theorists believed that democratic and judicial processes could
legitimately take the place of relativism, leading to more accurate,
objective, and legitimate decision-making. 0 9
Expanding upon the realists' critique of Lochner, process
theorists emphasized the primacy of institutional roles. As one
commentator has described this aspect of process theory: "According
to legal process, society creates and designates different legal
institutions to resolve different kinds of societal problems. Courts
are, quite simply, different from legislatures. Consequently, judges
are not free to make law in the same way that legislators are free to
do so." 110
The focus on process values and institutions in judicial decision105. Id.
106. See id. at 965-72 (discussing major constitutional areas dominated by balancing).
107. Id. at 972.
108. See MINDA, supra note 25, at 34. See generally Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason:
The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 601 (1993)
(describing the process tradition in American jurisprudence).
109. For a detailed discussion of the legal process movement, see generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV.
2031 (1994).
110. FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 120.
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making compelled courts to -elaborate rational reasons for their

decisions and to treat like cases alike (stare decisis). "Reasoned
elaboration," not scientific convention, would reduce the evil of
subjective judging."' But reasoned elaboration, as process theorists
conceived of it, applied only to the courts; legislatures, for example,
were not required to elaborate reasons. I x2
Process scholars began to examine some of the Court's more

celebrated opinions and quickly found them wanting. The landmark
opinion in Brown, for example, did not reflect well as an elaborative

effort. Many scholars, including those who were morally sympathetic
to its core holding, saw it as an unprincipled, result-oriented opinion,
little better than Plessy v. Ferguson"3 or Lochner itself." 4 Reliance

on empirical evidence, considered by many to be rather flimsy, only
further undermined Brown."5 Indeed, noting the lack of "neutral
principles" in cases like Brown, some prominent scholars suggested

the Court should avoid adjudicating controversial "political" issues
6

altogether."
Much of the academic hand-wringing could be attributed to the

Warren Court's penchant for creating new rights and its enthusiasm
for expanding old ones." 7

Significant "fundamental" rights, both

111. See id. at 121 (concluding that "[r]easoned elaboration requires a judge always to
give reasons for a decision, to articulate those reasons in a detailed and coherent manner,
and to assume that 'like cases should be treated alike' ").
112. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1959).
113. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
114. See Wechsler, supra note 112, at 32-33 (criticizing Brown); see also FELDMAN,
supra note 27, at 148 (noting that many scholars believed that Brown, Roe, and Griswold v.
Connecticutwere "substantively right-almost too right to dispute" (citations omitted)).
115. See generally Kenneth B. Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social
Scientists' Role, 5 VILL L. REV. 224 (1959-60) (supporting the use of social science
evidence in desegregation cases); Stuart W. Cook, Social Science and School
Desegregation: Did We Mislead the Supreme Court?, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 420 (1979) (evaluating the validity of sources cited in Brown in light of subsequent
research); Harold B. Gerard, School Desegregation: The Social Science Role, 38 AM.
PSYCHOL. 869 (1983) (criticizing the science cited in Brown); Ernest van den Haag, Social
Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6
VILL. L. REV. 69 (1960) (criticizing Kenneth Clark's argument).
116. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 184 (1962).
Others, like John Hart Ely,
sought more modestly to alter the focus of the process tradition, urging that deference to
democratically-derived decisions was appropriate unless the decisions resulted from a
malfunctioning or defective democratic process. See generally JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (suggesting ways
to modify the focus of the process tradition).
117. See FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 142-43 (describing the Court's announcement in
Griswold of penumbral rights and zone of privacy).
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stand-alone and "penumbral," blossomed during this period, some
seemingly out of whole cloth. The Court had its defenders, to be
sure." 8 Many of these defenders were concerned that constitutional
adjudication and construction seemed once again to be on the verge
of a return to Lochnerism, as the Court premised constitutional rights
not on any empirical or other "neutral" footing, but rather upon its
own "common sense" view of what seemed to be "fundamental."
In Engel v. Vitale,"9 for example, the Court held that the daily
recitation of a prayer in public schools violated the Establishment
Clause on the ground that the "indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
religion is plain.' 20
In Griswold v. Connecticut,121 the Court
announced a penumbral "right to privacy," while at the same time
attempting to assure observers that it had not overstepped its
institutional role by simply inventing new constitutional rights.'
Griswold, of course, set the stage for the Court's decision in Roe
v. Wade, perhaps the most divisive decision in modern constitutional
law. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Blackmun, began by
candidly acknowledging the emotion and predilections that (still)
suffuse the abortion debate, but insisted nevertheless that the Court
had sought to engage in "constitutional measurement" without
reference to any subjective influences. 2 3
In fashioning a constitutional balance for the right to abortion,
Justice Blackmun, who spent a summer engrossed in empirical
findings and historical texts, placed considerable reliance on then
state-of-the-art medical science and a survey of medical-legal history.
Based on this empirical/legal background, Justice Blackmun
announced the Court's conclusion that the "right to privacy" was
"broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy.' 11 4 Specifically, in addressing the State's interest in
prohibiting abortions, Justice Blackmun relied on medical data which
indicated that abortion in early pregnancies, which had been highly
dangerous in the nineteenth century, when most state legislation
1 25
criminalizing abortion was adopted, had become "relatively safe.'
118. See Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Interpretation of
Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1316 (1979).
119. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
120. Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
121. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
122. See Griswold,381 U.S. at 484-86.
123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
124. Id. at 153.
125. Id. at 149; see also id. at 163 (noting "the now-established medical fact . .. that
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Given that early abortions were deemed "relatively safe," the State
was held to have no interest in regulating the abortion procedure in
the first trimester of pregnancy, although it could regulate in the
interest of maternal health thereafter. 26 Again relying on medical
knowledge, the Court held that the State's "important and legitimate
interest in potential life" becomes compelling at the point of fetal
"viability," after which the State can regulate in the interest of
potential human life.127
Justice Blackmun had seemingly turned balancing outward, but
critics of the Court, perhaps predictably, were not satisfied. As had
Griswold, the Roe decision led to renewed calls for more objective,
neutral principles of constitutional construction.
Despite the
empirical grounding for the Court's trimester framework, many
believed, as then-Justice Rehnquist opined in dissent, that the
trimester framework amounted to "judicial legislation" based on an
improper second-guessing of legislative ends.1 2 After Roe, it seemed
to many that one hundred years of attempts at grounding law in
objective indicators had come to nothing. Despite the apparent
correctness of decisions like Brown, Griswold, and Roe, modernist
scholars found it difficult to defend them on neutral jurisprudential
grounds.1 29 Thus, although the Court had sought, through balancing,
to institute a scientific approach to constitutional interpretation and
adjudication, many condemned the effort as falling short of neutrality
and objectivity.
D.

The ContinuingSearch For Neutrality and Objectivity

By the 1970s, two competing general approaches to
constitutional interpretation had emerged. Interpretivists argued that
judges should stick close to the text and the history, and their fair
implications, and not construct new rights.t 13
Non-interpretivists
noted the inherent ambiguity of these sources and sought interpretive
guidance from a variety of outside sources; different noninterpretivist theories offered diverse sources of meaning and value,
including "tradition, societal consensus, and even natural law."' 31 Still
until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in
normal childbirth").
126. Id. at 149, 163.
127. Id. at 163-64.
128. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. See supra note 114.
130. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971) (setting forth the interpretivist argument).
131. FELDMAN, supranote 27, at 149.
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others, like John Hart Ely, condemned both of these approaches,
insofar as they pretended to be based on objective sources; he pointed
out that all of these supposedly neutral sources were subject to
indeterminacy by virtue of the subjective uses courts and scholars
13 2
made of them.
By the 1980s, the quest for objectivity in constitutional
adjudication and construction had passed through periods of
rationalism, empiricism, and transcendentalism, with no apparent end
in sight. Many scholars seemed to come to a skeptical realist
conclusion that constitutional adjudication was, and always would be,
largely mired in subjectivity.133 A variety of other disciplines have
34
since been brought to bear in support of and against that argument.
Relying on Kuhnian paradigm thought,'35 for example, some scholars,
echoing back to skeptical realists, went so far as to insist that
36
objectivity was an impossible goal in constitutional interpretation.
Other normative constitutional scholars continue to insist that
objectivity and autonomous law are within reach of judges so long as
they select the "best or correct form of reasoning that would yield
distinctive right answers to legal problems."' 37
For present purposes, however, it is more fruitful at this point to
turn to an examination of what the courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, are themselves doing with regard to the search for objective
sources of constitutional interpretation. Part II, which follows,
demonstrates that constitutional empiricism represents the most
recent judicial attempt to establish a "science" of constitutional
interpretation. This empirical turn resembles and is related to
constitutional balancing. Constitutional empiricism represents a
combination of the externalization of early academic empiricism and
132. See ELY, supra note 116, at 50.
133. See FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 153-54 (noting the shift in constitutional and

other legal thought from the quest for objectivity to postmodernism).
134. See Id. at 150-62 (describing various interpretive theories and approaches).
135. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

(2d ed. 1970) (rejecting traditional view of natural science as objective and linear, and
arguing that scientists interpret the world through paradigms, or maps of reality).
136. See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 742-43
(1982) (analogizing the Constitution to an epic poem and discussing literary text analog to
constitutional interpretation); see also Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L.
REV. 373, 377 (1982) (concluding that "[ilf we consider law as literature, then we might
better understand the malaise that afflicts all contemporary legal analysis, nowhere more

severely than in constitutional theory").
137. KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 197 (1992). See generally, BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (defending judicial review on
majoritarian grounds).
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the judicial "science" of constitutional balancing.
II. THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM
Judicial common sense, the purported foundation for decisions
like Engel v. Vitale, hardly qualifies as objective constitutional
interpretation. Natural law principles similarly lack the objectivity
required to settle divisive constitutional debates. Surely then one can
,grasp, as did the realists, the appeal of data and scientific conventions.
Modern courts, led by the Supreme Court, have taken a similar
naturalist tack in deciding constitutional cases.
This Part
demonstrates that constitutional empiricism is, in fact, a new method
of constitutional adjudication and construction, one that turns to
empirical data, scientific methods, and scientific conventions in search
of greater decisional objectivity and accuracy.
This Part begins with a brief description of some basic,
foundational empirical functions-judicial reliance upon statistical
methods and data, judicial reference to empirical data as
constitutional background, and empirically informed choices of
constitutional rules-which are now rather routine in constitutional
contexts. It then considers the core of the empirical turn-the
empirical testing of legislative predicates and the empirical
articulation and composition of various constitutional guarantees.
A.

FoundationalFunctions

There has been a sea change in the judicial attitude toward the
place of science, scientific data, and scientific methods in judicial
processes generally, and in constitutional interpretation specifically.
In Craig v. Boren,38 Justice Brennan stated that "it is unrealistic to
expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to be well
versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique. '139 By
contrast, in his introduction to the latest edition of the Federal
Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence ("Reference
Manual"), published just over two decades after Craig,Justice Breyer
wrote: "In this age of science, science should expect to find a warm
welcome, perhaps a permanent home, in our courtrooms."14 0
Speaking of courts, including his own, Justice Breyer went on to state
that judicial decisions "should reflect a proper scientific and technical
138. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
139. Id. at 204.
140. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 2

(2d ed. 2000) (Introduction by Associate Justice Stephen Breyer).

HeinOnline -- 82 N.C. L. Rev. 140 2003-2004

2003]

CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM

understanding so that the law can respond to the needs of the
public."141
Indeed, knowledge of scientific methods and principles is now an
unavoidable judicial necessity in a variety of constitutional contexts.
The Court's pronouncements in Daubert and its progeny underscored
that federal courts are no longer to act as passive recipients of
scientific and other technical data. The Court practiced what it
preached. In his Introduction to the Reference Manual, Justice
Breyer noted several representative examples from the Court's recent
docket. He stated that in recent years, the Court has frequently been
called upon to examine the correlation between race and partisanship
in redistricting cases,"' the reams of statistics in school desegregation
cases, 143 and the validity of statistical procedures used in taking the
decennial census. 144
As a result, the Court has begun to gain expertise in statistical
methods and processes. 145 It has used that expertise in a growing
number of contexts and is now a more sophisticated consumer of
polling and other survey data. 46 None of this is to suggest that judges

141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1999) (discussing statistics
presented by parties in dispute concerning North Carolina congressional redistricting
plan).
143. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 475-82 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub.
Sch. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 89, Okla. County, Okla. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,242 (1991). See
generally James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern
Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659 (2003) (analyzing the Supreme Court's use of
social science evidence in desegregation cases and expressing doubt as to whether social
science evidence affects outcomes in desegregation cases).
144. See Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 479 (2002) (upholding "hot-deck imputation"
statistical method); Dep't of Commerce v. United States H.R., 525 U.S. 316, 321 (1999)
(invalidating use of statistical sampling).
145. The Court's approach in the voting rights and redistricting cases has involved
courts in considerably complex statistical analyses. Courts have been called upon to
determine the extent to which racial identification is correlated with political affiliation, to
master the intricacies of "boundary segment analysis," Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,
243, 251 (2001), to determine whether registration is a "poor indicator of party
preference," id. at 252, and more generally, to decide whether statistics can ever
demonstrate to a mathematical certainty that a district has been drawn solely by racial
preference. Id. at 243.
146. See, e.g., Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 172 (2000) (rejecting polling data in
a habeas proceeding on numerous grounds, including sample size, population, failure to
inquire as to reasons for responses, failure to provide evidence regarding amount of time
provided to respondents, and lack of evidence that questions "were framed using
methodology employed by reliable pollsters"). Lower courts, as well, have become more
sophisticated in their examination of statistical and other data. See id. at 173 (citing
numerous district court cases in which survey evidence has been excluded from evidence
or been given limited weight).
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or justices have become inter-disciplinary scholars or experts. But
they are fast becoming learned novices, an observation which, as we
shall see, has important implications for other empirical functions in
constitutional cases.
In addition to improving its statistical skill set, the Court has
begun regularly to consult social science and other data as
background in constitutional cases. After Roe, the Court began to
incorporate social science studies into constitutional adjudication in a
variety of contexts, including abortion, sex discrimination, sexual
harassment, and jury selection. 147 Over the course of the past three
decades, scientific and other technical data and information have
been a steady presence in a variety of constitutional contexts. In
determining whether there is a right to die under the Constitution, for
example, the Court consulted data and information concerning state
of the art medical technology available to reduce or control the pain
of terminally ill patients. 148 Similarly, in deciding whether indefinite
noncriminal confinement of sexual psychopaths violates the
Constitution, the Court has examined available scientific and other
medical data and scientific definitions of serious mental disorders like
149
pedophilia.
This turn to science has encouraged lower courts, which have
themselves become more experienced empirical gatekeepers, to
frame constitutional issues with reference to empirical foundations.
In United States v. Quinones,150 for example, a federal district court
held that the Federal Death Penalty Act151 violates the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause because the demonstrated risk of
false positives-wrongful convictions and executions-coupled with
social science data regarding errors and faults in the appellate
process, effectively eliminates defendants' ability to establish
innocence.' 52 In Herrera v. Collins,"3 the Supreme Court implied that
147. See generally ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE DATA IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (1998) (examining use of social science

data in thirty-five Supreme Court cases involving abortion, sex discrimination, and sexual
harassment from 1972 through 1992).
148. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 706 (1997) (upholding state
prohibition on physician-assisted suicide); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997)
(holding that prohibition on assisted suicide does not violate Equal Protection Clause);
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (upholding clear and

convincing evidence requirement for refusing life-sustaining treatment).
149. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359-60 (1997).
150. 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49

(2002).
151. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (2002 & Supp. 2003).
152. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
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the execution of an actually innocent person would offend the
Constitution, but the Court was confident that innocent persons were
not being condemned to die. 15 4 The district court in Quinones was of
the view that the discussion in Herrera was "not informed by the
ground-breaking DNA testing and other exonerative evidence
'
developed in the years since." 155
Scientific advancement, the Court
concluded, had placed the entire discussion "on a new footing." 56
Thus, some courts have begun to realize the utility of framing
constitutional debates with reference to empirical data. Quinones,
which called into question the major premise that innocent
defendants were not being executed, is one of the boldest examples to
date.
Finally, as a foundational matter, courts have used empirical data
to assist them in choosing from among possible constitutional rules of
decision.15 7 This trend is particularly prominent in recent Fourth
Amendment cases. In Illinois v. Wardlow, 58 for example, the Court
examined the implications of flight from the scene on subsequent
detentions. Illinois urged the Court to adopt a "bright-line" rule
authorizing detentions in cases of unprovoked flight. 59 Petitioner, by
contrast, urged a per se rule prohibiting such detentions, given the
array of legitimate reasons one might flee the scene. 16° In choosing
between these positions, the Court examined social science studies
regarding "bystander victimization," a concept which suggests that a
person runs to avoid being killed or injured in the ensuing

153. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
154. Id. at 417 (noting that a persuasive demonstration of actual innocence would

render execution unconstitutional).
155. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 263.
156. Id.; see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 641-42 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J.,

concurring) (noting, in response to government assertion that medical marijuana has no
accepted medical use in treatment, several studies to the contrary).
157. Data not only impact the initial choice of rule; they also sometimes indicate
whether a rule ought to be retained, or at least revisited. When the Court instituted the
good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, for example, it
assumed that the rule would have no appreciable effect on police misconduct. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-21 (1984). Although the Court seemed to leave open the
possibility that if future data should indicate that the rule is having an appreciable negative
effect, the Court might revisit the rule, it has not done so to date.
158. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
159. See id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the State asked the Court to
"adopt a 'bright line rule' authorizing the temporary detention of anyone who flees at the

mere sight of a police officer").
160. See id. (noting petitioners' argument for a rule to the effect that "the fact that a
person flees upon seeing the police can never, by itself, be sufficient to justify a temporary
investigative stop").
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The Court also examined data indicating that minorities

and other persons in high crime areas flee because they believe
contact with the police can itself be dangerous.

62

Although the Court

recognized that "scientific certainty" as to the motives of those who
flee is impossible to achieve, the data convinced it that any per se
rule, whether allowing or disallowing detentions based on flight,

would be unwarranted. Accordingly, the Court retained the "totality
of circumstances" approach it had previously applied.163
In sum, empirical methods and data have become increasingly

important in constitutional cases.

But, these basic foundational

functions were more or less inevitable by-products of a legal system
increasingly presented with empirical claims. The remainder of the

empirical turn the Court has made, by contrast, was not inevitable.
The turn, described below, has returned courts to the empiricism of

the early realists, who looked to scientific conventions for objectivity,
but also, in a sense, to the Langdellian concept of legal science, the
construction of rules from simplistic measuring and counting. The
161. See id. at 131 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Sherman et al., Stray Bullets and "Mushrooms": Random Shootings of Bystanders in Four
Cities, 1977-1988,5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 297,303 (1989)).
162. See Wardlaw, 528 U.S. at 131 n.7 (citing, inter alia, Johnson, Americans' Views on
Crime and Law Enforcement: Survey Findings, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. J. 13 (Sept. 1997));
S. Smith, Criminal Victimization and Perceptions of Community Safety in 12 CITIES 25
(June 1998)).
163. Wardlaw, 528 U.S., at 127 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court took a somewhat
similar approach in Maryland v. Wilson, where the Court decided that an officer may
order the passenger in a lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle. See 519 U.S. 409, 410
(1997). This was an extension of the rule announced in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, allowing
an officer to order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle. See
Pennslyvania. v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per curiam) (establishing the driver exit
rule). The Court concluded that data, which indicated that in 1994 "there were 5,762
officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic stops and pursuits," indicated a weighty
interest in officer safety. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413. Balancing that interest against what it
considered the minor liberty interest of the passenger, the Court held that passengers
could be ordered from a lawfully stopped vehicle. See id. at 415. The dissenters did not
contest the data, but did contest what, if any, probative value it had. They noted that the
statistics "do not tell us how many of the incidents involved passengers"; nor did the data
indicate how many assaults occurred after the passengers exited the vehicle, or whether
there was a correlation, if any, between local practices with regard to ordering passengers
out of the vehicle without suspicion and passenger assaults. Id. at 416-17 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the dissenters concluded, "the statistics are as consistent with the
hypothesis that ordering passengers to get out of a vehicle increases the danger of assault
as with the hypothesis that it reduces that risk." Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., dissenting). They
also pointed to data which supported the proposition that officers would benefit from the
Court's rule in only a "minuscule portion" of total traffic stops, while passengers would be
significantly burdened. Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that the rule would
be of "some possible advantage to police in only about one out of every twenty thousand
traffic stops in which there is a passenger in the car").
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Supreme Court, which appointed lower courts to act as empirical
gatekeepers, apparently has confidence that courts can accurately and
objectively incorporate empirical methods and their products into
constitutional decision-making.
B.

Quantifying Governmental Interests and Purposes

Roscoe Pound and other early realist scholars suggested that
courts should look behind legislative enactments, to the predicates
supporting legislative decisions. This Section examines how state
interests, governmental purposes, legislative predictions, and
regulatory theories all have recently been subjected to empirical
treatment. This empirical phenomenon cuts across a range of
constitutional text. But, there has been a unified approach in the
Supreme Court. As the Court expressed its new empiricism in one
context: "The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy
heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or
down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised." 6 4
Novelty and plausibility are new empirical benchmarks for legislative
predicates of all types.
1. Measuring State Interests in Health and Safety
As noted, Roe launched the courts on a path that now expressly
requires that courts consider medical and scientific advancements
with regard to fetal viability and abortion procedures 6 5 The State's
interest in the potentiality of human life is scaled depending upon the
stage of fetal development and must be balanced against the woman's
right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.166 This scaling of interests
is now, more than ever, empirically operationalized.
The intersection of constitutional and scientific principles came
to pass most recently in Stenberg v. Carhart,167 where the Court
examined the constitutionality of Nebraska's ban on so-called "partial
birth" abortions. Nebraska's statute did not contain any exception
relating to the health of the mother, a circumstance the Court

164. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,391 (2000) (emphasis added).
165. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860
(1992) (remarking that "[w]e have seen how time has overtaken some of Roe's factual
assumptions: advances in maternal health care allow for abortions safe to the mother later

in pregnancy than was true in 1973 ...and advances in neonatal care have advanced
viability to a point somewhat earlier" (citations omitted)).
166. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (describing when a state has a
compelling interest in the health of the mother).
167. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).

HeinOnline -- 82 N.C. L. Rev. 145 2003-2004

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

apparently found to be novel.168 The State argued that "partial birth"
abortion procedures were not necessary to preserve maternal health,
a proposition the Court apparently deemed implausible. 69
The perceived novelty and implausibility of the government's
interest led, as it now generally does, to heightened empiricism. The
majority opinion reads like an obstetrics manual, complete with
lengthy technical descriptions of abortion methods. 70
After it
examined in finite detail the various methods of aborting fetuses, the
Court proceeded to assess the available medical data concerning the
safety of partial birth and a host of other abortive procedures. The
Court compiled, examined, and analyzed voluminous data and studies
concerning the number of abortions performed annually in the
United States; the risks of mortality and complication from the
various procedures; and, to the extent available, the number of partial
birth abortions that had actually been performed.171
With all of this data at hand, the Court concluded that the
empirical "upshot" was as follows: "a District Court finding that [the
procedure in question] significantly obviates health risks in certain
circumstances," a "division of opinion among some medical experts
over whether [the procedure] is generally safer, and an absence of
controlled medical studies that would assist in resolving the medical
questions."'7 2
Given this record, the Court concluded that the
standard for whether a maternal health exception was requiredwhere it is necessary in appropriate medical judgment' 73-embodied
"the judicial need to tolerate responsible differences of medical
opinion. ' 174 Ultimately, however, the majority was convinced that a
"significant body of medical opinion" supported a conclusion that the
175
procedure may bring greater safety than the alternatives.
The "upshot," to use the Court's term, was that the State could
not empirically demonstrate its interest in banning this particular
abortion procedure, particularly without a maternal health exception.
Where medical authority was in dispute-a common circumstancethe tie was to go to patients and abortion providers. And because
168. See id. at 921-22.
169. See id. at 931-32 (arguing that a ban on partial birth abortions would create no
risk to the health of women).
170. See id. at 924 (describing dilation and evacuation procedure).
171. See id. at 923-30 (describing procedures and studies).
172. Id. at 936.
173. Id. at 937 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 879 (1992)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Nebraska could not convince the Court that a health exception was
"'never necessary to preserve the health of women,' " the Court held
176
that the statute interfered with the right to privacy.
Roe essentially forced future courts to measure state interests
empirically. But, it did not preordain that where empirical evidence
was in conflict, the state necessarily fails to meet its empirical burden.
Even during the decidedly non-deferential Lochner era, the Court
was willing to defer to states so long as there was some medical
evidence to support their restrictions. 7 7 The Court did not wish to tie
states' discretion, or its own, too closely to the state of the medical
art. Stenberg signals the extent to which this particular empirical
framework has shifted.
2. Empirical Proof of "Real" Harms
Outside the weakest form of rationality review, it has never been
enough for the government simply to posit a legitimate purpose for
legislating. Courts exercising healthy judicial skepticism sometimes
question legislative predicates. 17 Far more frequently, they focus on
the fit between the means chosen by the government and its ends or
purposes.
With regard to legislative purpose, courts have
traditionally relied upon legislative history-findings regarding the
evil to be regulated or prohibited, as well as evidence gathered in a
variety of ways, including through committee and subcommittee
hearings. 179 This evidence is often gathered in response to a host of
176. Id. at 938 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioners) (emphasis added).

Justice

Kennedy, who authored the principal dissent, accused the majority of "[clasting aside the
views of distinguished physicians and the statements of medical organizations," not to
mention the expressed views of the Nebraska legislature. Id. at 964-65 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). He accused the majority of viewing the procedure and the data "from the
perspective of the abortionist, rather than from the perspective of a society shocked when

confronted with a new method of ending human life[,]" thereby failing to give Nebraska's
substantial interests their due. Id. at 957-58 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). After canvassing
the evidence and finding no basis for the conclusion that the partial birth abortion

procedure offered any real safety advantages, Justice Kennedy opined that "[c]ourts are
ill-equipped to evaluate the relative worth of particular surgical procedures" and that

legislatures have "superior factfinding capabilities in this regard." Id. at 968 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). States, he wrote, are permitted "to take sides in a medical debate, even when
fundamental liberty interests are at stake." Id. at 970. Nebraska, in his view, had
presented "substantial and objective medical evidence" for its conclusion that the ban
would not endanger the health of any woman. Id. at 969 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. See Jacobson v. Commonwealth, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905) (upholding compulsory

vaccination law in face of conflicting medical evidence).
178. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 393 (2000) (describing

evidence to support state interest in campaign contribution limitations).
179. See, e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n., 494 U.S. 1, 4-17 (1990)

(referring to congressional reports and other legislative history in evaluating the
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variables and concerns, including interest group and constituent
pressures. This informal fact-gathering, coupled with institutional
expertise, has generally been given substantial weight, even where
heightened judicial scrutiny applies. 180 Courts have not generally
challenged legislative predicates empirically.
Judicial review of governmental predicates has taken on a new
form, an increased vitality, with the empirical turn. Now, when courts
find a legislative predicate either "novel" or "implausible,"
empiricism is scaled sharply upward. In these circumstances, the
traditional conception of legislative history-committee reports, floor
statements, findings, and the like-tends to fall short of the new
empirical standards. Instead, legislative predicates and judgments
must be empirically proven, with reference to studies and data. It is
no longer uncommon for courts to demand that the government
confirm suspected harms empirically.18'
In the simplest context, the government points to a single,
existing evil in support of legislation. The Telecommunications Act
of 1996,182 for example, required cable operators who provide
channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming"
either to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block" those channels or
to limit their transmission to hours when children were unlikely to be
viewing."'
As the Court noted in United States v. Playboy
EntertainmentGroup, Inc.,1"4 the provision was enacted to address the

phenomenon of "signal bleed," by which households that did not pay
constitutionality of a federal statute); see also Neal Devins, CongressionalFactfindingand
the Scope of JudicialReview: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1178-80 (2001)

(describing the legislative factfinding process). For a general survey of the elements of
legislative history, see Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and
the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 298-306
(1982).

See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON

LEGISLATION:

STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 937-1012 (3d ed.

2001) (examining judicial use of legislative history).
180. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (upholding, under strict

scrutiny, restrictions on activity near a polling place largely on the basis of history and
state experience with elections).
181. This is not always the case, of course. Some governmental purposes require little

empirical foundation.

We know, for example, that the predicate for the Uniting and

Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT ACT"), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.A.), enacted in response to the

terrorist attacks, is quite real. But this is an extreme example; most statutes are based on
more speculative harms and not-so-obvious evils.
182. Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 136 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 561).
183. 47 U.S.C. § 561(a)-(b) (2000).
184. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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to receive these channels "may happen across discernible images of a
sexually explicit nature."' 85
In Playboy, the Court invalidated the signal bleed provision on
the ground that there was no "hard evidence" of a real harm to
support the legislation.'86 Specifically, the Court noted the absence of
empirical evidence demonstrating the nationwide scope of the signal
bleed problem. 87 At trial, the government introduced an expert's
spreadsheet which estimated that "29.5 million children had the
potential to be exposed to signal bleed. ' 188 Dissatisfied with mere
estimates, the Court indicated that the government bore the further
burden of "confirm[ing] the accuracy of its estimate through surveys
or other field tests .... 89 It stated that "[w]ithout some sort of field
survey, it is impossible to know how widespread the problem in fact
is, and the only indicator in the record is a handful of complaints.' ' 9°
The statistics the government had presented, in other words, were
considered insufficient to demonstrate the statistical likelihood that
any particular child would be exposed to signal bleed.' 9'
Because there is no way to predict with certainty which
predicates will be deemed novel or implausible, it always behooves
government to make a substantial empirical showing. In Edenfeld v.
Fane,'192 for example, the Court invalidated a Florida ban on in-person
solicitations by certified public accountants because there was no
empirical evidence to support the state's predicates-fraud,
overreaching, and loss of independence. 93
In contrast to cases like Playboy and Edenfeld, however, the
Court has sometimes relied on empirical evidence as if it has
conclusively demonstrated the existence of the predicate evil. In

185. Id. at 808.
186. Id. at 819.
187. See id. at 823 (stating that "[t]he government has failed to establish a pervasive,
nationwide problem justifying its nationwide daytime speech ban").
188. See id. at 820.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 821.
191. Notwithstanding the empirical requirements, the Court was quick to point out that
its disposition was "not to suggest that a 10,000-page record must be compiled in every
case or that the Government must delay in acting to address a real problem; but the
Government must present more than anecdote and supposition." Id. at 822.
192. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
193. See id. at 771 (noting that the State had presented no studies that suggest personal
solicitation of prospective business clients by certified public accountants creates the
dangers of fraud, overreaching, or compromised independence that the Board claims to
fear).
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Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,194 for example, the Supreme Court
upheld Florida Bar rules prohibiting lawyers from using direct mail to
solicit personal injury or wrongful death clients within thirty days of
an accident. 95 The Bar defended its rules on the ground that they
were necessary to protect the privacy and tranquility of personal
injury victims.19 6
In concluding that the Bar identified and
demonstrated a non-speculative harm, the majority relied primarily
upon statistical data contained in a 106-page summary prepared by
the Bar, which was based upon a two-year study of the effects of
lawyer advertising and solicitation.197 This was sufficient to satisfy the
19 8
Court's empirical standard.
Thus, the Court has treated empirical evidence, or its absence, as
dispositive with regard to certain governmental predicates. In most
cases, legislatures are well advised to make an empirical showing,
given the amorphous "novelty" and "plausibility" benchmarks. But,
there are some exceptions to this rule. In certain circumstances, the
Court steadfastly refuses to engage its empirical compass at all. This
Article will limit the discussion to two examples: the refusal to treat
governmental claims of "secondary effects" empirically and the
uneven application of empiricism to Fourth Amendment "special
needs" searches and seizures.
If there is a governmental predicate which cries out for empirical
treatment, it is the "secondary effects" rationale for zoning,
regulating, and dispersing establishments based upon the effects
government claims to be associated with them-prostitution, drug
use, declining property values, public safety, and the like. 19 9 Many of
194.

515 U.S. 618 (1995).

195. Id. at 635.
196. See id. at 624.
197. See id. at 626.
198. Not all of the justices were impressed with the rigor of the Bar study. The same

summary was denigrated by four dissenters as "noteworthy for its incompetence." Id. at
640 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Among other things, the dissenters criticized the summary
because it "includes no actual surveys, few indications of sample size or selection
procedures, no explanations of methodology, and no discussion of excluded results."

Id.

There was, in addition, "no description of the statistical universe or scientific framework"
to inform judicial use of the summary. Id. For the dissenters, who agreed that the
government bore an empirical burden, these qualitative and quantitative flaws rendered
the summary empirically useless. Id.
199. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 55 (1976) (stating that "[i]n the

opinion of urban planners and real estate experts who supported the ordinances, the
location of several such businesses in the same neighborhood tends to attract an
undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes an
increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and businesses to move
elsewhere").
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So far,
these effects would appear to be readily quantifiable.
however, the Supreme Court has maintained its position that local
governments need not "conduct new studies or produce evidence
independent of that already generated by other cities" to demonstrate
the problem of secondary effects, "so long as whatever evidence the
city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem
that the city addresses. 2 °0 Apparently, most on the Court do not
view as novel or implausible the assertion that adult establishmentsof whatever nature-bring with them a host of undesirable secondary
effects. °1
The Court has been similarly reluctant to test the predicates for

200. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986). In City of
Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., the Court's most recent secondary effects decision, a
plurality concluded that a city ordinance which prohibited more than one adult business
from operating on the same premises validly targeted existing secondary effects. See 535
U.S. 425, 430 (2002). The ordinance was upheld even though the city had failed to study
whether multiple-use adult establishments were in any way correlated with secondary
effects. See id. at 430-31 (describing a 1977 study relied upon by city). The plurality
permitted the city to extrapolate secondary effects correlated with multiple-use
establishments from an earlier study of concentrations of individual adult establishments,
and to rely upon extra-jurisdictional precedents involving disparate secondary effect
restrictions. See id. at 440 (asserting that the city "is in a better position than the Judiciary
to gather and evaluate data on local problems").
201. This empirical pass in secondary effects cases does not appeal to all of the Court's
members. Justice Souter is the principal proponent on the Court for a heightened
empirical requirement for secondary effects claims. He worries that deference to localities
on secondary effects claims allows regulation of the content of speech, or of viewpoint,
under the guise of effects regulation. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 457 (urging that
zoning regulations at issue be labeled "content correlated"). The risk of viewpoint
discrimination, in Justice Souter's view, is easily avoided by demanding that the city:
show by empirical evidence that the effects exist, that they are caused by the
expressive activity subject to the zoning, and that the zoning can be expected to
ameliorate them or to enhance the capacity of the government to combat
them ... without suppressing the expressive activity itself.
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 457 (Souter, J., dissenting).
He makes the common sense and straightforward point that the predicate secondary
effects are "amenable to empirical treatment." City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277,
315 n.3 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The government can
readily make its case through, for example, crime statistics, police reports, and studies of
property market value. Justice Souter argues that the Court's precedents require that the
government "make some demonstration of an evidentiary basis for the harm it claims to
flow from the expressive activity, and for the alleviation expected from the restriction
imposed." Id. at 313 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter
candidly admitted that in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), in which a
plurality of the Court upheld a similar ordinance, he did not require any such evidentiary
showing. Erie, 529 U.S. at 315-17. He stated: "I should have demanded the evidence
then, too, and my mistake calls to mind Justice Jackson's foolproof explanation of a lapse
of his own, when he quoted Samuel Johnson, 'Ignorance, sir, ignorance.' " Id (citations
omitted).
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special needs searches under the Fourth Amendment. These searches

implicate government interests beyond the need for law enforcement,
and are permitted without any showing of probable cause, and
without a warrant. 202 Thus far, special needs have been found to
support random, suspicionless drug testing of railroad personnel,2 3
customs officers, 2°4 and public school students engaged in

extracurricular activities.
The Court has held that the "special need" upon which searches
are predicated must be "substantial. ' 20 6
This does not mean,

however, that the empirical showing itself must be substantial. The
Court has been satisfied, in most instances anyway, with a minimal
empirical demonstration of a real harm.2 7 Further, the Court has
never required proof that random testing actually deters drug use
among students or other groups.20 8 It has been content to allow the
government to proceed as if this causal relationship exists.
Most recently, in Board of Education of Independent School
District v. Earls, °9 the Court relied on statistics and other data
demonstrating a "nationwide drug epidemic" to uphold suspicionless

drug testing of students engaged in extracurricular activities such as
band and 4-H.210

In Chandler v. Miller,2 1' by contrast, the Court

202. A search unsupported by probable cause nevertheless may be consistent with the
Fourth Amendment "when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.' " Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
203. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
204. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
205. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No.92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 837 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
206. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997). According to the Court, the need
must be "important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
individualized suspicion." Id.
207. See Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 648-50 (relying on district court findings,
based on a few disciplinary reports and a scattering of other slim anecdotal evidence, that
student athletes, who were subjected to random drug searches, were among the leaders of
the drug culture); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607-08 (citing record evidence indicating some
railroad employees used drugs).
208. Recent empirical evidence suggests that drug testing of the sort undertaken in
Earls does not deter students drug use. See Greg Winter, Study Finds No Sign That
Testing Deters Students Drug Use, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2003, at Al, (describing study
which found drug use just as prevalent in schools with testing as in those without it).
209. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
210. Id. at 834; see also Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
675 (1985) (concluding that "[it is sufficient that the Government have a compelling
interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive societal problem from spreading to the
particular context").
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refused to rely upon empirical evidence of a national drug problem,
invalidating a Georgia law requiring candidates for elective office to
submit to and pass a drug test because the state failed to produce any
empirical evidence of a localized special need for the searches.2 2
In sum, "novelty" and "plausibility" benchmarks have produced
inconsistent results. Some harms are apparently so evident to the
Court that no empirical showing need be made, while others require a
marshalling of considerable data. Cable signal bleed and professional
corruption are harms which are subject to heightened empiricism,
while secondary effects and drug abuse generally are not. In a variety
of constitutional contexts, the Court acts much like a scientific panel,
picking and choosing which predicates to examine and which
evidence to credit in the course of that examination.
3. Quantifying "Substantial Effects," "Congruence," and
"Proportionality"
Constitutional empiricism is also increasingly utilized to test the
predicates underlying laws enacted pursuant to the express powers of
Congress. This has been a particularly noteworthy empirical turn.
Congress ordinarily is not required to demonstrate an empirical basis
for its predicates under the deferential rationality standard of review
which applies to exercises of the commerce, spending, and other
express powers. In recent cases, however, the Court has indicated
that when it construes Congress's constructions of its own power to
legislate as "novel" or "implausible," empirical proof is required to
uphold them.
The empirical turn in this context can be traced to United States
v. Lopez,213 where the Court refused to defer to Congress's judgment
that possession of a handgun within a school zone "substantially
affected" interstate commerce.2 14
Congress had not made any

211. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
212. Id. at 319-20. One might argue that the different contexts-education and public
elections---call for different levels of deference to decision-makers.
Educators in
particular receive substantial judicial deference to pursue their mission. But the fact

remains, as an empirical matter, that there is no evidence of a "special need"-a "drug
problem"-in either of these local contexts. And whatever deference is due to schools in
matters of curriculum or educational mission, they surely have no greater expertise in
determining whether a drug problem exists than do the nation's legislatures. The Court
has yet to elaborate the distinction in any event.
213. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
214. See id. at 567 (noting that "[t]he possession of a handgun in a local school zone is
in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially

affect any sort of interstate commerce").
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findings to this effect.2 15 The Court agreed with the government that

"Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the
'
substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce. "216
Where such burdens of effects were not apparent to the "naked eye,"
however, the Court at least reserved the right to require findings.217
including a history of
Mere institutional expertise or experience,
2 18
regulation of firearms, would not suffice.

Whereas the Court has, at least for the moment, stopped short of
full-blown empiricism in the commerce area, perhaps requiring
findings only in close cases, it has consistently engaged empirical
benchmarks under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19
Section 5 is an express grant of power to Congress to enact all
"appropriate" laws to enforce the rights guaranteed under Section 1
22
of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the equality guarantee. 1

The Court has consistently maintained that "[i]t is for Congress in the
first instance to 'determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed

to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and its
conclusions are entitled to much deference. '22 ' But the Court has, at
the same time, refused to grant any deference to a congressional
determination concerning what constitutes a constitutional violation,

noting that Section 5 gave Congress only the power to enforce rights,

215. See id. at 562-63 (noting lack of congressional findings).
216. Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 563.
218. Id. at 563. Issuing findings, or even compiling a record, will provide no guarantee
of legislative success where the legal theory that Congress proceeds upon is, itself,
considered novel or implausible. In the course of passing the Violence Against Women
Act ("VAWA"), Congress compiled a vast empirical record in support of its detailed
findings that violence against women has a negative impact on commerce and the national
economy. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (describing record).
The Court conceded that the record was extraordinary in the breadth of its findings, and
the data compiled in support of those findings, but held that all of this effort was for
naught. Id. at 614-17. The mountain of data which supported VAWA included reports
on gender bias from twenty-one states; data demonstrating the pervasiveness of domestic
violence against women; and studies concerning the incidence and effects of rape. Id. at
630-34 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing findings and evidence). Congress's exercise of the
commerce power rested on the aggregate effects such violence had on economic activity, a
theory of regulation the Court said it had rejected in Lopez. See id. at 615. The dissenters
argued in vain that although "the methodology of particular studies may be challenged,"
the evidence before Congress amply supported the rationality of VAWA. Id. at 634
(Souter, J., dissenting).
219. See supra note 216.
220. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
221. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
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not to affirmatively change them.222 To ensure that future exercises of
the Section 5 power are within the permissible enforcement realm,
the Court recently announced that measures enacted pursuant to
Section 5 must exhibit a "congruence and proportionalitybetween the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end. "223
In several recent cases, the Court has invalidated measures
enacted pursuant to Section 5 based upon a lack of empirical support
for the legislative predicate.22 4 Where the Court deems Congress's
predicate for regulation to be either novel or implausible, in light of
the Court's precedents, it regularly insists upon an empirical
demonstration of "congruence" and "proportionality. ' 225 Section 5
empiricism takes the form of heightened scrutiny of what the Court
views as Congress's legislative record. Statements on the floor or in
committee reports, as well as legislative findings, are relevant to this
inquiry, but they are not sufficient. There must, in addition, be
substantial data-surveys, studies, anecdotal accounts-to satisfy the
Court that Congress is within the parameters of the congruence and
proportionality standard. In a recent series of cases, the same bare
majority of the Court has found the empirical evidence lacking, while
the remaining justices have expressed satisfaction with Congress's
226
empirical showing.
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett22 7 is
perhaps the best example of the heightened end of the Court's
empirical scale. In Garrett, the Court invalidated the state-suit

222. See id. at 519.
223. Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
224. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 644-46 (1999) (invalidating an attempt by Congress to abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity to enforce the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act, finding little proof of "widespread and persisting" patent violations and

almost no evidence that Congress even considered the issue of state remedies); see also
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) (invalidating 1974 extension of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 authorizing federal damage suits by state

employees against the states as sovereigns as "an unwarranted response to a perhaps
inconsequential problem"); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000)
(invalidating VAWA under Section 5 in part because the record failed to indicate that

discrimination against victims of gender-motivated crimes existed in all, or even most,
states). But see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1979 (2003) (relying
on 1990 Bureau of Labor statistics in upholding Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993).
225. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 640 (noting that there was little to no evidence

that state patent infringement was a widespread problem).
226. See cases cited supra note 224.
227. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 2 8 The
Court began with an analysis of the "metes and bounds of the
Under the Court's equal
constitutional right in question. '229
protection precedents, discrimination against the disabled was subject
Insofar as Congress purported to
only to rationality review.230
remedy employment discrimination by the states against the disabled,
it faced a decidedly uphill battle. Conducting an admittedly "close
review" of the voluminous legislative materials, the Court purported
to find only six real instances of unlawful state action, as opposed to
arguably unlawful action by private parties. 23 1 The Court stated that
even if these examples had not been "described out of context" by the
dissenters, a mere six examples did not rise to the level of the pattern
of unconstitutional activity required for Congress to legislate under
Section 5232
228. Id. at 360.
229. Id. at 368.
230. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)
(reviewing discrimination against mentally disabled under rationality standard).
231. Garrett,531 U.S. at 869-70.
232. Id. at 370. The majority dismissed the dissent's contention that the record
contained evidence of a host of incidents of unlawful discrimination, dismissing these as
"unexamined, anecdotal accounts" of adverse treatment not even cited by Congress itself
in its findings. Id. at 370; see also id. at 370 n.7 (dismissing statements concerning "around
50" incidents of discrimination in employment on the ground that "most of them are so
general and brief that no firm conclusion can be drawn"). Absent a more systematic
demonstration of remedial purpose, the Court refused to sanction suits against the states.
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, in concurrence, expressed their own empirical doubts.
They believed that if state discrimination against the disabled were a "real" problem,
confirming judicial documentation in the form of extensive litigation and other evidence of
constitutional violations would have been presented. Id. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The dissenters accused the majority of blurring the separation of powers with its empirical
standards, and of treating the legislative record "as if it were an administrative agency
record." Id. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, in addition to
detailed findings of societal discrimination against the disabled, Congress compiled a "vast
legislative record," which included a voluminous task force report and several studies
demonstrating adverse treatment of persons with disabilities in employment and other
contexts. Id. at 377-78. The dissent noted that Congress had held thirteen hearings, and
had relied on "its own prior experience gathered over forty years during which it
contemplated and enacted considerable similar legislation." Id. at 377. Finally, the dissent
also pointed to what it described as "roughly 300 examples of discrimination by state
governments" in the record. Id. at 379. These examples were collected and presented in
an appendix. Id. at 391-424 (Appendix C). Of course, the dissenters acknowledged that
many of these examples were anecdotal in nature, and not contained in rigorous empirical
But "Congress, unlike courts, must, and does, routinely draw general
studies.
conclusions-for example, of likely motive or of likely relationship to legitimate needfrom anecdotal and opinion-based evidence of this kind, particularly when the evidence
lacks strong refutation." Id. at 380. Nor, the dissent noted, has the Court "traditionally
required Congress to make findings as to state discrimination, or to break down the record
evidence, category-by-category." Id.
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Garrett represents the typical outcome in recent Section 5 cases.
But, the Court does not invariably find Congress's Section 5
legislation to be based upon novel or implausible predicates. In
Nevada Departmentof Human Resources v. Hibbs,233 the Court's most

recent Section 5 case, the Court upheld provisions of the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 authorizing state employees to sue their

employers in federal court for discriminatory application of family
leave benefits."'

The Court, purporting to work within the same

empirical framework it utilized in Garrett and other recent Section 5
cases, concluded that Congress in fact had the requisite empirical
evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations on the part of the
states in this area.235 The majority purported to find such evidence in
surveys of private sector employees regarding their leave policies,

anecdotal evidence regarding public sector leave policies, and
inferences of discriminatory impact where leave policies vested
discretion in employers.2 36 The relatively lenient empiricism in Hibbs

suggests that state gender discrimination is not considered to be as
novel or implausible as state discrimination against the disabled.
Thus, where the Court is comfortable with Congress's predicate, it
scales empiricism downward.
Empiricism would appear to be ill-suited to judicial review of
Congress's exercise of its express powers, which have traditionally
been reviewed deferentially. But, the Court has expressed a desire
for findings in "close" cases under the Commerce Clause. It has gone
even further in Section 5 cases, sometimes requiring a detailed

empirical showing of congruence and proportionality under some
form of heightened scrutiny. As Hibbs demonstrates, however, the
empiricism is scaled depending upon the Court's view of the novelty

233. 123 S.Ct. 1972 (2003).
234. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, § 102(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1)(C).
235. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978-80.
236. See id. at 1979 (citing study indicating that thirty-seven percent of private
employers had maternity leave policies). This time the dissenters, in a rare reversal of
roles, argued that the Court had given "superficial treatment" to the Boerne requirements.
Id. at 1987 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Court's "simple recitation of a general history of
employment discrimination against women" did not satisfy the dissenters that Congress
had proceeded based upon a sound empirical record. Id. at 1987. The dissenters cited
Garrettfor the proposition that private sector discrimination, while relevant, could not be
dispositive under Section 5. Id. In addition, the dissenters noted that the Court's
empirical evidence of disparate impact was the product of conjecture based on data
relating to federal employers. Id. at 1988. In sum, the dissenters concluded that "the
evidence fails to document a pattern of unconstitutional conduct sufficient to justify the
abrogation of State's sovereign immunity." Id. at 1991.

HeinOnline -- 82 N.C. L. Rev. 157 2003-2004

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

and plausibility of Congress's legislative predicate.

4. Empirical Demonstration of Invidious and Remedial Purposes
Smoking out "invidious" governmental purposes is a complex
endeavor.37 To enforce the guarantees of the Equal Protection
Clause, courts need to know whether the government was motivated

by a desire to take real differences into account, or whether its
purpose was more invidious, perhaps to discriminate on some

forbidden basis. In undertaking this sensitive inquiry, the Supreme
Court has treated as inherently novel and implausible the proposition
that purpose can be inferred from discriminatory or differential
impact. 238 Accordingly, the Court has applied a heightened empirical

requirement to such claims.

At the same time, the Court has

generally treated as novel and implausible government claims that it
must use race affirmatively, to remedy the effects of past racial
discrimination. This proposition has also generally been subjected to
a heightened empirical requirement.

Disparate impact alone, the Court has held, is not a sufficient
basis for inferring invidious purpose, although it may lend some
support to an inference of discrimination. 239 Apparently, only a stark

statistical pattern, one that is "irresistible, tantamount for all practical
purposes to a mathematical demonstration ' 240 will satisfy the
empirical standard. McCleskey v. Kemp 24 1 is the quintessential
example of the impossible empirical hurdle that applies to disparate
237. This is apparent in cases like Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), where the Court
expressed doubt concerning judicial competence to base equal protection decisions on
statistical data. Id. at 204. Justice Brennan was particularly concerned that the statistics
themselves might be an artifact of gender discrimination. Id. at 203 n.14. He concluded
that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one
that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 204.
238. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing and
critiquing the Court's treatment of disparate impact claims under the Equal Protection
Clause).
239. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (explaining that
"[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not
trigger the rule, that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and
are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations" (citations omitted)).
240. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (declaring that the administration of an ordinance prohibiting
operation of 310 laundries housed in wooden buildings without permits whereby all but
one white operator, but none of over 200 Chinese operators, received permits,
demonstrated invidious purpose).
241. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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impact claims under the Equal Protection Clause. The core issue in
McCleskey was whether "a complex statistical study that indicates a
risk that racial considerations enter into capital sentencing
determinations" demonstrated that petitioner's capital sentence
violated the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. 4 2
The "Baldus Study," which consisted of a 230-variable
examination of more than 2,000 murder cases in Georgia during the

1970s, was offered as proof of invidious, purposeful discrimination. 43

The study demonstrated that imposition of the death penalty was

strongly correlated both with the race of the defendant and with the
race of the victim. 2" The study concluded that defendants who killed
white victims were 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to death, and
that black defendants were 1.1 times as likely as other defendants to
be sentenced to death. 245 Taken as a whole, the Baldus Study
concluded that "black defendants ...who kill white victims have the
greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty. '24 6 The Court held

that the study's findings and conclusions were insufficient to
demonstrate purposeful racial discrimination in the administration of
the death penalty.247

The Court continues to subject to heightened empirical scrutiny
statistics that are offered in support of disparate effects challenges. It

has held, for example, that minority defendants are not entitled to
discovery regarding the prosecution's decision to seek the death
penalty unless they empirically demonstrate both discriminatory
effect and discriminatory intent.248 In United States v. Bass,249 the
242. Id. at 282-83.
243. Id. at 286-87.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 287.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 297. The Court sought to distinguish contexts in which it had accepted
similar statistics as proof of invidious purpose, such as jury venire and Title VII cases. Id.
at 350. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 386-87 (1986) (per curiam) (accepting
multiple regression analysis to prove Title VII violation); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 495 (1977) (invalidating jury selection where there was 2-to-1 disparity between
Mexican-Americans in county population and those summoned for grand jury duty). The
Court refused to accord the statistics in the Baldus Study similar weight, indeed any
weight, nominally because there were a greater number of decision makers involved in the
decision to impose the penalty, and far more independent variables relevant to the
challenged decision. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294-95. Under the circumstances, according
to the Court, it was inappropriate to draw any inference at all with regard to purpose. Id.
248. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (stating that "[tihe
claimant must demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory
effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose' " (citations omitted)).
249. 536 U.S. 862 (2002) (per curiam).
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Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's ruling in favor of discovery, which
was based upon nationwide statistics demonstrating that "[t]he
United States charges blacks with a death-eligible offense more than
twice as often as it charges whites. '' 25° In this context, the Court held
that nationwide data could not be used to demonstrate any
particularizedharm to the defendant.25 '
In addition to disparate effects challenges, the Court has
indicated on several occasions that heightened empiricism applies to
claims that the government must take race into account in distributing
benefits or burdens to remedy past discrimination. This proposition
is also generally considered novel and implausible.252 The Court has
250. Id. at 863 (quoting United States v. Bass, 2001 Fed. App. 03408, 266 F.3d 532, 53839 (6th Cir. 2001)). The data relied upon by the Sixth Circuit was reported in U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL SURVEY (19882000) (Sept. 12, 2002).
251. Bass, 536 U.S. at 864.
252. The Court's recent affirmative action rulings concerning the University of
Michigan admissions process do not implicate this empirical rule. See Gratz v. Bollinger,
123 S.Ct. 2411, 2427 (2003) (invalidating university admissions process which assigned
numerical advantage to minority applicants); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325,
2347 (2003) (upholding law school admissions process which consisted of "a narrowly
tailored use of race" to achieve the compelling interest of increased diversity). The law
school did not claim that it needed to utilize race in order to remedy a history of past
discrimination, but rather that it had a compelling interest in student diversity. Id. at 2339.
Relying on Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Court agreed.
Id. at 2341. Although the Court cited some social science evidence to support its
conclusion, it apparently concluded that the need for diversity was neither a novel nor
implausible predicate. See id. at 2340 (citing social science literature discussing diversity).
By and large, the Court deferred to the university's assertion that diversity was a
compelling interest in the educational context. See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2341. It thus
avoided the heated empirical debate which had occurred in the Sixth Circuit concerning,
first, whether social science evidence supported the claim that diversity was a compelling
interest, and, second, whether the university had utilized a "quota" in making admissions
decisions. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 748 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing Patricia
Gurin, Reports submitted on behalf of the University of Michigan: The Compelling Need
for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363 (1999)). The majority relied
on the study, and a concurring judge characterized the evidence as a "major study," which
"encompassed a wide scale analysis of the effects of a diverse learning environment".
Grutter, 288 F.3d at 759-60 (Clay, J., concurring). Thus, for some on the court, the
empirical data was strong enough to proclaim the benefits of diversity as "statistically
proven." Id. at 763 (Clay, J., concurring). The dissenters characterized the same "major
study" relied upon by the majority as "questionable science." Id. at 803 (Boggs, J.,
dissenting). The dissent criticized the "profound empirical and methodological defects" of
the study, including insufficient quantification of the claimed benefits of diversity and the
"subjectivity" of the data, which was based on student self-reporting. Id. at 804 (Boggs, J.,
dissenting). The dissent went so far as to attack the study's regression analysis for failing
to "examine the statistical link between having a more diverse student body and the
benefits that it claims." Id. at 804 (Boggs, J., dissenting). As of this writing, social
scientists continue to measure the benefits of diversity to the university environment. See
Greg Winter, Study Challenges Casefor Diversityat Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2003,
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held, for example, that there must be a "strong basis in evidence for
action was necessary. 253

[the government's] conclusion that remedial

In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, s4 the Court dismissed as
irrelevant data indicating the presence of general societal

discrimination against minorities and concluded that the City had
failed to identify specific instances of past or present

racial

discrimination in the local contracting industry.
The Supreme Court has yet to apply the "strong basis in
evidence" standard to any affirmative action program.

But, lower

courts have apparently taken the empirical hint. Although it recently
made yet another appearance before the Court, Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta256 was disposed of on standing grounds,

thus relieving the Court of the task of considering the detailed
empirical record that had been compiled on remand. 27 The Tenth
Circuit, which did have occasion to apply the "strong basis" standard,
interpreted Croson and Adarand as requiring a strong empirical

demonstration.2

8

The court thus meticulously examined the

evidence-anecdotal, direct, circumstantial, pre-enactment, postenactment-as well as evidence of private and public discrimination,

not only in the specific area of government procurement contracts,
but in the construction industry generally. 259 The court's opinion
rivals McCleskey in its comprehensive treatment of empirical data.
Adarand involved a Department of Transportation ("DOT")
program designed to provide highway subcontracts to disadvantaged
at A28 (describing study whose findings concerning the benefits of diversity conflicted
with the Michigan study).
253. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (quoting Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,277 (1986)) (emphasis added).
254. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
255. See id. at 498 (noting that general claims of discrimination in a particular industry
provided "no guidance"). The Court did leave the empirical door slightly ajar, however,
noting that the existence of a significant "statistical disparity" between the number of
qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform the work and the number
actually utilized could give rise to an inference of discriminatory exclusion. Id. at 509. On
the record before it, the Court found it was clear that minority subcontractors had suffered
discriminatory treatment, but that it was "sheer speculation" to guess at how many firms
there might have been absent the discrimination. Id. at 499.
256. 534 U.S. 103, 105 (2001) (per curiam). The case was originally decided in 1995.
See Adarand Constructions, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
257. Id. at 107.
258. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000)
(noting that "[b]oth statistical and anecdotal evidence are appropriate in the strict scrutiny
calculus, although anecdotal evidence by itself is not enough" (citing Concrete Works of
Colo., Inc., v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1994))).
259. See id. at 1167-1176 (citing studies, reports, and other evidence of discrimination
in contracting industry).
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business enterprises.2 60
Based on the data, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that there was indeed a "strong basis" in evidence for
Congress's conclusion that there existed extensive public and private
discrimination in the award of highway contracts under the DOT
program and in the construction industry generally.261 The court
placed heavy reliance upon statistical and other social science data
contained in a DOT federal register notice entitled The Compelling
Interest for Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement26 2 ("The
Compelling Interest"), which was prepared in response to the
Supreme Court's first Adarand decision. The Tenth Circuit believed
that it could not simply rely upon legislative history and statements by
legislators concerning the effects of past and present discrimination.263
In light of Adarand and Croson, it was critical that empirical data be
found to support the government's assertion of a compelling interest.
In addition to a summary of the numerous congressional
hearings on the subject, The Compelling Interest contains a summary
of numerous outside studies containing statistical and anecdotal data
regarding discrimination in federal procurement. Again and again,
the court pointed to these studies and data to demonstrate that
discrimination and minorities' lack of success in the construction
trades were causally related."6 In addition, following Croson, state
and local governments conducted their own statistical studies to
determine whether minority-owned businesses were under-utilized in
government contracting.265 According to the government, those
studies and others like them produced an aggregate thirteen percent
disparity between minority enterprise availability and utilization.2 66
While conceding that the disparity was not overwhelming, the court
deemed it constitutionally significant, especially when considered in
light of the numerous other studies regarding under-utilization of
minority enterprises.267
260. See id. at 1160-61 (describing program).
261. Id. at 1172.
262. 61 Fed. Reg. 26,050 (May 23, 1996).
263. Adarand, 228 F.3d at 1167 (stating that "[wie cannot merely recite statements
made by members of Congress alleging a finding of discriminatory effects and the need to
address those effects").
264. See id. at 1168 (noting barriers to minority business formation and exclusion from
construction trades); see also id. at 1169 (discussing racism by trade unions); id. at 1170
(illustrating barriers to competition experienced by existing minority enterprises).
265. See id. at 1172-73.
266. See id. at 1174.
267. Id. Although a number of amici curiae urged the court to reject all of the disparity
studies as biased and/or insufficiently reliable, the court refused to do so, noting that "the
conclusions of virtually all social scientific studies may be cast into question by criticism of
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The lesson of cases like McCleskey and Adarand is that both
discrimination claimants and government officials will be held to a

rigorous empirical standard with regard to race-based predicates.
This may at first glance appear warranted, since strict judicial scrutiny
applies to such claims. As in other contexts, however, the Court does

not always translate strict scrutiny into heightened empiricism.

It

chooses, based on its own notions of novelty and plausibility, which
purposes require an empirical showing. Thus, affirmative action in

local contracting requires heightened empiricism, while affirmative
action in universities does not.268 There is also the matter of the
empirical burden itself. Claimants are subject to an impossible
empirical standard insofar as they rely upon statistics to demonstrate
purposeful discrimination; the notion that disparate impact is a proxy
for purposeful discrimination appears inherently implausible to the

Court. Similarly, the government, insofar as it wishes to use race as a
factor in contracting and other benefits decisions, must come forward
with a strong basis in evidence for doing so. The Tenth Circuit's
empirical examination in Adarand foreshadows the empirical rigor

that will apply to future affirmative efforts to take race into account.
C.

Implausible Governmental Predictions

The foregoing legislative predicates represent only a portion of
the Court's turn toward rigorous empirical analysis of legislative
purposes. Even legislative predictions, such as those which routinely
form the basis for proactive and prophylactic legislation, are now
empirically tested. Legislative predictions have traditionally received
substantial judicial deference, particularly where scientific or other
technical data are in conflict. 269 Today, by contrast, a novel or
their choice of assumptions and methodologies." Id. at 1173 n.14. General criticism of the
studies, as opposed to specific evidence undermining their reliability, was not sufficient to
sway the court. Other lower courts have also addressed the "strong basis" test empirically.
In Wittrmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997), for
example, Chief Judge Posner allowed experts on behalf of the Illinois Department of
Corrections to extrapolate from social scientific studies to demonstrate a compelling need
for a limited racial preference in staffing a boot camp populated mostly by black inmates.
Id. at 920. Judge Posner conceded that the social scientific literature relied upon by the
experts did not focus specifically on boot camps. Id. at 920. He credited the studies
nonetheless, stating: "If academic research is required to validate any departure from
strict racial neutrality, social experimentation in the area of race will be impossible despite
its urgency." Id.
268. See supra note 252 (discussing recent University of Michigan affirmative action
cases).
269. Thus, for example, in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), Congress was not
required to demonstrate the empirical validity of its prediction that an insanity acquittal
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implausible governmental prediction that a harm will eventually come

to pass is considered an appropriate subject for empirical analysis.
Empirical testing of governmental predictions originated in
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC ("Turner I" and "Turner

I1").270 In the Turner cases, the Court examined whether Congress
had sufficient evidence to support its prediction that "must-carry"
provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and

Competition Act of 1992271 ("Cable Act") imposed on cable operators
were necessary to preserve local broadcasting. 27 2 The Cable Act was

enacted after three years of hearings on the structure and operation
of the cable television industry.273
Congress's conclusions and
27 4
statute.
the
in
forth
set
were
detailed findings

Congress's stated purposes in enacting the must-carry provisions
were three-fold: (1) "preserving the benefits of free local broadcast
television," (2) "promoting the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources," and (3) "promoting fair
competition in the market for television programming. '275 The Court
had no trouble accepting that Congress's asserted interests, based
upon its market predictions, were important or substantial in the
abstract.276 But in Turner I, a plurality of the Court would not simply
accept Congress's prediction that the must-carry rules would in fact
advance any or all of the government's stated interests. 7 Rather, the
supported an inference of continuing mental illness, thus permitting continued
confinement. See id. at 364 n.13 (declaring that "[w]e do not agree with the suggestion
that Congress's power to legislate in this area depends on the research conducted by the
psychiatric community").
270. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner 1];
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). Except where the intent is to refer
to one or the other of these opinions, they will hereinafter be referred to collectively as
"Turner."
271. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 609
(2000)).
272. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 534(b), (h) (describing must-carry rules).
273. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 632.
274. See id. at 632-34 (summarizing detailed congressional findings). Congress found,
inter alia, "that the physical characteristics of cable transmission, compounded by the
increasing concentration of economic power in the cable industry, are endangering the
ability of over-the-air broadcast television stations to compete for a viewing audience and
thus for necessary operating revenues." Id. at 632-33. The must carry provisions were
intended to correct for this market imbalance and ensure that broadcast stations remained
economically viable.
275. Id. at 662.
276. See id. at 662-63.
277. See id. at 664 (explaining that "[w]hen the Government defends a regulation on
speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more
than simply 'posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured' ") (quoting Quincy
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plurality held that the government must "demonstrate that the recited
harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in
fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way. ' 278 Thus, for
the first time, the Court declared that
legislative predictions must be
' 279
supported by "substantial evidence.
The plurality in Turner I did not find substantial evidence to
support Congress's prediction in the voluminous testimony, statistics,
and studies in the record.2 8 ° Without a more detailed elaboration of
the "predictive or historical evidence upon which Congress relied, or
the introduction of some additional evidence to establish that the
dropped or repositioned broadcasters would be at serious risk of
financial difficulty," the Court asserted that it could not determine
whether Congress targeted a "real" threat.28 1
After a remand "to permit the parties to develop a more
thorough factual record,2 82 the Court in Turner H indicated it was
now convinced of the merit of Congress's 1992 prediction.2 83 The
Cable TV, Inc., v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
278. Id. The government argued that Congress's finding that local broadcast television
was in jeopardy was entitled to great deference, particularly given the highly technical
interrelationship between two rapidly changing industries---cable and broadcast television.
The Court agreed that it must "accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of
Congress." Id. at 665. Institutional considerations, such as the perceived relative
competency of Congress as a factfinder, led the Court to conclude that Congress was in a
better position to make predictions concerning the continued survival of industries. Id.
That Congress was perhaps the more competent predictor in this context was not a
sufficient basis for judicial deference to its logic and findings, however, as the remainder of
the plurality opinion demonstrated. The Court believed it was entitled to make an
" 'independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law.' " Id. at
666 (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989)). That
independent judgment, while it did not include a license to reweigh legislative evidence de
novo, served to ensure that Congress had drawn reasonable inferences based on
"substantialevidence." Id. (emphasis added).
279. Id. at 666 (asserting that a judicial role in cases implicating First Amendment
rights is "to assure that in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence").
280. See id. at 667 (concluding that "[w]ithout a more substantial elaboration in the
District Court of the predictive or historical evidence upon which Congress relied, or the
introduction of some additional evidence to establish that the dropped or repositioned
broadcasters would be at serious risk of financial difficulty, we cannot determine whether
the threat to broadcast television is real enough to overcome the challenge to the
provisions made by these appellants").
281. Id. at 667-68.
282. Id. at 668.
283. Eighteen months of additional factfinding followed the Court's remand, "yielding
a record of tens of thousands of pages" of evidence. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC 520
U.S. 180, 187 (1997) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 755 (D.C. Cir.
1995)). No longer "constrained by the state of the record," id. at 195, which now included
not only the materials gathered during Congress's three years of pre-enactment hearings,
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Turner cases thus culminate in a rather bizarre empirical conclusion.
According to the Court, Congress's "supplemented" record
supported its predictive judgment, originally made in 1992, that the
must-carry provisions furthered important government interests and
were adequately tailored.2 84 In effect, the Court held that the
government had now proven, based on subsequently developed
empirical evidence presented in court several years after the
legislative prediction, that Congress had ample evidence, at the time
of its prediction, to reasonably predict that harm would come to
broadcast stations if cable was not restrained.285
The Turner cases, which some see as indicative of judicial
deference to Congress,28 6 are actually anything but deferential.
Insofar as the cases indicate that even legislative predictions are
empirically testable, they place a swath of legislation in jeopardy.
Congress often acts prophylactically, and it does not often have the
sort of "substantial evidence" a court might require to support
predictive enactments.
Predictions are based upon legislative
judgments and experience, and although empirical evidence can
sometimes be found to support them, more often it will be the case
that the legislature is acting in the face of an unknown, and perhaps
empirically unknowable, harm or evil.
D. Implausible Governmental Theories and Causal Claims
Empiricism also now functions as a check on "novel" or
"implausible" governmental theories and causal claims. Theories and
causal claims are similar to predictions, in that they are based in part
on judgments concerning how the world will appear at some point in
the future. The theories and causal claims discussed here, however,
are often merely extrapolations from prior governmental predictions
and causal claims that seemingly gained judicial acceptance. In a
break from past practice, the Court has empirically tested the
"plausibility" of these governmental predicates as well.

but also "additional expert submissions, sworn declarations and testimony, and industry
documents obtained on remand," id. at 187, the Court finally agreed that Congress had
identified a "real" threat. Id. at 196.
284. Id. at 200.
285. Remarkably, at the same time, the Court disclaimed any intent to interfere with
Congress's policy-making function: "We need not put our imprimatur on Congress's
economic theory in order to validate the reasonableness of its judgment." Id. at 208
(emphasis added).
286. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment,
99 MICH. L. REV. 281,302 (2000) (characterizing the Turner standard as deferential).
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In Bartnicki v. Vopper,2 87 for example, the Court invalidated
certain provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, as amended, the federal wiretapping statute,
which created civil penalties for intentional disclosure of illegally
intercepted wireless communications.2 8 Congress theorized that civil
penalties for future disclosure of intercepted communications would
deter initial interceptions by effectively "drying up the market" for
the initial interceptions. 28 9 The government, in defending the statute,
contended that the identity of the interceptor was often unknown,
and that only by deterrence of this nature would the government be
able to serve its important interest in maintaining the privacy of
innocent wireless communicators.29 °
The Court found this theory implausible. It expressly rejected
the government's "dry-up-the-market" theory on the ground that it
lacked sufficient empirical support. 291 The Court noted, first, that
there was scant evidence that the identity of the interceptors was
unknown.292 The Court also found "no empirical evidence to support
the assumption that the prohibition against disclosures reduces the
number of illegal interceptions. '29 3 The majority pointed to a "dearth
of evidence in the legislative record" in support of the government's
theory, and it further noted that what little post-enactment evidence
existed cut against that theory.294
More recently, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,295 the Court
rejected two separate governmental hypotheses on empirical grounds.
Congress reasoned, in its findings supporting the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996296 ("CPPA"), that pedophiles might utilize
287. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
288. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(c), (d) (1993).
289. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 531 n.17.
290. See id. at 529-31.
291. See id. at 531 n.17.
292. See id. at n.15 (noting that in only five of 206 cases was identity of interceptor
wholly unknown).
293. Id. at 530-31.
Although they appeared to be applying the Turner
294. Id. at 531 n.17.
"substantiality" standard to the legislative judgment, the majority did not cite Turner or
mention its newly announced standard. The Court did not explain why the dry-up-the-

market theory, which forms the basis for a number of accepted legal proscriptions,
including the Court's own Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, was deemed implausible
under the circumstances. Indeed, the Court had previously accepted the same theory
without any empirical demonstration of its accuracy. In New York. v. Ferber,458 U.S. 747,
760 (1982), the Court upheld a law prohibiting the distribution of child pornography based
upon the same dry-up-the-market theory it rejected in Bartnicki.
295. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
296. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009-26 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
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virtual images of children engaged in sexual acts to entice children to
297
participate in sexual activity and to whet their own sexual appetites.

The Court first rejected the government's theory that "virtual" child
pornography, 298 like actual child pornography, may lead to sexual
abuse of children. The Court found Congress's claimed causal link
between virtual pornography and child abuse to be "contingent and
indirect. '299 The Court stated: "The harm does not necessarily follow
from the speech, but depends upon some unquantified potential for

subsequent criminal acts. ''3 °
The Court also rejected as
"implausible" Congress's "hypothesis" that the market for virtual
images and the market using actual children are sufficiently linked
that virtual images must be prohibited to dry up the market for actual
child pornography.3"1 Given the result in Bartnicki,it is likely that the
Court would have rejected the diminished market theory in any
event. The Court simply circumvented the inquiry by finding no
support for Congress's purported link between the two pornography
markets.302
§ 2251 (2000)).
297. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241-45 (discussing congressional findings).
298. "Virtual" in the sense that sexually explicit images appear to depict minors but

were produced without any real children. See id. at 241.
299. Id. at 250.
300. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 253-54 (concluding that "[wlithout a
significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may not prohibit speech
on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal conduct").
301. Id. at 254.
302. Even causal links which have been accepted in the past are subject to rigorous
empirical examination. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), for
example, the Court found sufficient empirical support for the government's theory that
product advertising stimulates demand for products, and that suppressing advertising has
the opposite effect. In Lorillard, Massachusetts had imposed various restrictions on the
sale, promotion, and labeling of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. See id. at 532.
The advertising-consumption link was hardly novel; indeed, it had been accepted in prior
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993) (citing
"immediate connection between advertising and demand" in upholding ban on radio
advertising of state lottery near state border). The Court nonetheless reviewed the
empirical evidence carefully. The Court pointed to an array of data relied upon by the
Massachusetts Attorney General, including several studies cited by the Food and Drug
Administration in its proceedings regarding regulation of tobacco, which demonstrated a
link between product advertisement and consumption of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 557-61 (citing FDA proposed and final rules, data
from surgeon general reports and National Cancer Institute, and other studies, including
Pierce et al., TOBACCO INDUSTRY PROMOTION OF CIGARETTES AND ADOLESCENT
SMOKING, 279 JAMA 511, 514 (1998)). With regard, specifically, to cigars, the Court
noted that data which had recently emerged in the form of a National Cancer Institute
Monograph indicated that "the rate of cigar use by minors is increasing" and that other
"[s]tudies had also demonstrated a link between advertising and demand for cigars." Id. at
560-61. Also at issue in Lorillard was a ban on advertising of tobacco products within
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In sum, like legislative predictions, legislative theories and causal
claims have also come under heightened empirical examination.

Theories like market diminution, which have been accepted without
empirical support in the past, have been treated as implausible,
judicially tested, and found wanting. Causal claims which would be
difficult, at best, to empirically demonstrate have been rejected for

lack of empirical support. The clear trend is to treat legislative
predicates as empirically falsifiable propositions.
E.

EmpiricalProxies

The judicial penchant for turning constitutional inquiries into
empirical propositions extends beyond the measurement of legislative
interests, purposes, predictions, theories, and causal claims. More

and more, the Supreme Court and other courts have been turning to
formulas, ratios, equations, and other scientific conventions to map
the contours of constitutional rights. This Section describes four
constitutional constructs for which empirical proxies have recently
been crafted or suggested: "cruel and unusual punishments" under

the Eighth Amendment; sectarian "coercion" under the
Establishment Clause; symbolic "establishment" of religion under the
Establishment Clause; and "due process" as it relates to the
imposition of both criminal and civil penalties.
1. Measuring Evolving Societal Standards
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and
unusual punishments. '3 3 The Supreme Court has struggled to

develop a method for identifying punishments that fall within this
normative prohibition. History has been one guide. Thus, at least
those punishments considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill

1,000 feet of any school. The majority found the 1,000-foot rule to be insufficiently
tailored. See id. at 561-66. Justice Stevens, however, would have remanded on this issue,
finding the "dearth of reliable statistical information as to the scope of the
ban ... problematic." Id. at 602 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). He noted that the parties were in dispute as to
the percentage of urban areas affected by the ban. Finally, Justice Stevens was troubled
by the lack of information as to alternative avenues of communication left open to the
tobacco companies. He concluded that "depending on the answers to empirical questions
on which we lack data, the ubiquity of print advertisements hawking particular brands of
cigarettes might suffice to inform adult consumers of the special advantages of the
respective brands." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
303. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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of Rights was adopted would appear to be proscribed. °4 Beyond
these few punishments, however, the parameters of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment remain
highly uncertain.
So far the best the Court has managed, in terms of guidance, is to
recognize that the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society" should be considered in determining
which punishments are prohibited."'
A socially insular Court,
particularly one concerned with its own legitimacy, can scarcely
afford to rely on its own perceptions of "evolving" moral, political,
and societal attitudes. Naturally, then, the Court is in need of some
outside measures by which the mores of a "maturing" society might
be identified.3 6 Indeed, the Court, recognizing its constitutional
position, has noted that evolving standards should be determined by
reference to "objective factors to the maximum possible extent."3 7
What kind of objective factors? With regard to the Eighth
Amendment, the Court has reasoned that the "clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation
3 8 Thus, if, in the Court's view,
enacted by the country's legislatures.""
there exists a "national consensus" against a certain punishment, as
represented by existing state legislation, then the punishment would
perforce be prohibited under the Eighth Amendment.3 9 Legislative
outputs, then, are the principal objective measure of evolving
310
mores.
To see how this objective approach to evolving mores works,
consider the Court's recent line-drawing with respect to the execution
of the mentally retarded. In Penry v. Lynaugh,31' the Supreme Court

304. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).
305. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
306. See Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-96 (1982); Coker v. Georgia., 433 U.S.
584, 593-97 (1977).
307. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592);
see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (stating that the type of

punishment imposed is "the most prominent objective factor" in determining the
constitutionality of sentence of life without parole for drug possession convictions).
308. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,331 (1989).
309. Id. at 334.
310. If available, the Court has indicated that it will also examine data concerning the

actions of sentencing juries to determine whether a punishment, in the eyes of
contemporary Americans, is cruel and unusual. Id. at 331; see Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97

(1977) (crediting data showing nine out of ten juries in Georgia did not impose death
sentence for rape).
311.

492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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held that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit such executions.312
In 1989, when Penry was decided, the Court counted only one federal
and one state statute that prohibited execution of the mentally
retarded.3 13 Even generously adding the fourteen states which, at the
time, prohibited all capital punishment, the Court did not believe the
requisite national "consensus" could be found to exist.314
Thirteen years later, however, the Court re-examined the data
and concluded that the requisite quantity of outputs had been
reached. Thus, in Atkins v. Virginia,1 5 the Court drew precisely the
line it refused to draw in Penry, holding that the execution of the
mentally retarded, regardless of circumstance, violated the Eighth
Amendment.3 16 As of June 2002, when Atkins was decided, eighteen
states had passed laws expressly prohibiting the execution of the
mentally retarded in certain circumstances.317 According to the
Court, however, "[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change."3 8 Relying,
in part, on the "well-known fact" that "anticrime legislation is far
more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty
of violent crime," the direction of change convinced a majority of the
Court that societal opinion had changed dramatically since Penry."9
As additional support, the Court cited the aggregate number of
legislators who "overwhelmingly" voted to prohibit execution of the
mentally retarded.3 2° Finally, the Court noted other external evidence
of evolving mores, including polling data, which had been expressly
rejected in Penry, and the assorted views of organizations like the
American Psychological Association, diverse religious groups, and
" '
the European Union.32
312. See id. at 335.
313. See id. at 334 (citing federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1998 and Georgia statute).
314. There was other evidence available, such as data from several opinion polls which
indicated an overwhelming opposition among the American people to the practice of
executing mentally retarded defendants. See id. at 334-35. But the Court rejected this
data outright as lacking sufficient objectivity. Id. at 335. Without a sufficient number of
outputs, the Penry Court refused to adopt mental age "as a line-drawing principle in our
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 340.
315. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
316. See id. at 321.
317. See id. at 313-15 (discussing legislative activity since Penry).
318. Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 316.
321. See id. at 316 n.21. Finding a national consensus is only the first step. According
to the Court, its review function is to determine whether there are reasons to agree or
disagree with the consensus that has formed. See id. at 312-13. Exercising this judgment
in Atkins, the Court first noted the existence of evidence concerning certain deficiencies of
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The dissenters responded with withering criticism of the
majority's empirical analysis. They objected to the empirical sources
relied upon by the majority, specifically opinion polls and foreign
laws.3 2 More than this, however, there was a dispute as to the
majority's basic math. Justice Scalia was particularly incredulous that
agreement among only forty-seven percent of the death penalty
jurisdictions (eighteen states) could amount to a "national consensus"
under the Eighth Amendment.3 3
He was also critical of the
majority's reliance on a legislative "trend" of tender years.324 Finally,
Justice Scalia mocked the majority's reliance on the number of
legislators who voted in favor of legislation. Why not, he asked,
collect data concerning the populations served by those
representatives voting in favor of and against death eligibility for the
3 25
mentally retarded?

The need for objectivity is perhaps nowhere greater than when
broad, normative constitutional prohibitions like that against "cruel
and unusual punishments" are at stake. Legislative outputs can, in
the Court's defense, be readily accounted for and tallied. But Atkins

raises the question whether such simple empiricism provides an
objective basis for such difficult constitutional choices. Despite the
the mentally retarded in terms of their capacity to process information and control their
impulses. See id. at 318-19 & nn.23-24 (citing studies). In light of the medical and
psychological data concerning the capabilities of the mentally retarded to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their conduct, the Court determined that their execution would not
further the principal justifications for imposing the death penalty-retribution and
deterrence. See id. at 319-20. Thus, based on its "independent evaluation" of the matter,
the Court found no reason to disagree with the previously identified national consensus
against execution of mentally retarded defendants. Id. at 321.
322. Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically criticized the majority's reliance on the views
of religious organizations, foreign laws, and polling data. See id. at 325-26 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). With respect to the opinion polls cited by the majority, the Chief Justice
noted that the Court lacked "sufficient information to conclude that the surveys were
conducted in accordance with generally accepted scientific principles or are capable of
supporting valid empirical inferences about the issue before us." Id. at 322. The Chief
Justice noted the many possible methodological errors that could affect the quality of
polling data. See id. He collected and analyzed the various polls relied upon by the
majority in an Appendix to his opinion. See id. at 328-37. He also highlighted the absence
of "comprehensive statistics that would conclusively prove (or disprove) whether juries
routinely consider death a disproportionate punishment for mentally retarded offenders
like petitioner." Id. at 324.
323. See id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia noted, "[t]he
Court... miraculously extracts a 'national consensus' forbidding execution of the mentally
retarded". Id. at 316. Justice Scalia did not even concede that the eighteen states the
majority counted had been counted properly; some of them, he pointed out, did not
prohibit all executions of mentally retarded defendants. See id.
324. See id. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that legislation is "still in its infancy").
325. See id. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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majority's attempt to rest its decision on an objective, empirical basis,

Justice Scalia proclaimed in dissent: "Seldom has an opinion of this
Court rested
so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its
3 26
Members.

2. The Establishment Equation and Religious Symbolism
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause is another openended constitutional provision that has historically caused
interpretive problems.3 27 The clause itself provides no guidance as to
how to mediate the tension between a religious people and a

government which should remain, insofar as possible, free from
sectarian influence. As with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
"cruel

and

unusual

punishments," the Rehnquist Court has
sometimes sought to operationalize the establishment prohibition by

quantifying it.
3 28 for example, the Court narrowly
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
upheld an Ohio funding program that offered public aid recipients the

option of using those funds at private, sectarian schools. 329 Prior to
Zelman, the Court generally declined to invalidate programs that did

not facially discriminate in favor of or against religion, and that left
the choices of where to apply the funds to individual recipients.3 30

This was so even where the overwhelming majority of fund recipients
326. Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327. U.S. CONST., amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion ....
").
328. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
329. See id. at 653. In the "public voucher" context, as in other Establishment Clause
contexts, the question is whether the program is "neutral" with respect to religion, which is
determined by asking whether the aid has the "purpose" or "effect" of advancing or
inhibiting religion. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) (discussing
neutrality requirement). Zelman brought into conflict two lines of authority. When aid is
provided directly to religious institutions, the Court has been vigilant in determining
whether the legislature acted with a forbidden purpose of coercing religious school
attendance, or furthered that prohibited effect. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995) (collecting cases). Where, however, the aid at issue
reaches religious schools as a result of choices made by parents to send their children to
those schools, the Court has been somewhat more flexible in its review. See Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) (upholding Minnesota program authorizing tax deductions
for various educational expenses, including private school tuition); see also Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986) (upholding neutral
state-funded vocational rehabilitation program that provided aid to student studying to be
a pastor); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (upholding federal
aid program that permitted sign language interpreters to assist children in religious
schools).
330. See, e.g., Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 (upholding program even though ninety-six
percent of beneficiaries were parents whose children attended religious schools).
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chose to apply the aid at sectarian institutions.33 But in Zelman, the
debate among the Court's members centered expressly on the proper
equation with which to examine the coercive effect of the Ohio
voucher program. "Coercion" thus became an empirical convention.
In Zelman, it was undisputed that eighty-two percent of the
participating private schools in the Ohio voucher program were
sectarian, and that ninety-six percent of the scholarship recipients
enrolled in religious schools. 332 Because these numbers were so onesided, the majority was not in any position to simply ignore this
facially compelling data. For this reason, the justices in Zelman
haggled mostly over the proper formulation of the "Establishment
Equation"-the proportion of sectarian aid recipients to the total
number of aid recipients, or the total aid distributed to sectarian
recipients versus the total aid available.33 3
The Zelman majority insisted that the dissenters, who relied
upon the ninety-six percent figure, skewed the Establishment
Equation's denominator by failing to count the thousands of children
who enrolled in alternative community schools, magnet schools, and
traditional public schools, where some students received tutorial
assistance under the program.3 34 Adding these recipients to the
Establishment Equation's denominator resulted, by the majority's
calculation, in a reduction of the percentage enrolled in religious
schools from ninety-six percent to just under twenty percent.335
In a concurrence, Justice O'Connor, an influential voice with
respect to the Establishment Clause, sought to buttress the majority's
empirical position. Justice O'Connor constructed an Establishment
Equation of her own, based, however, on more universal data sets.
She noted that the aggregate amount of funding ultimately directed to
sectarian schools under the program was quite small (some $8.2
million) in relation to the total amount of funding disbursed by the
State, and in relation to the numerous and substantial funding
benefits conferred on religious institutions by federal, state, and local
governments.3 36
331. Id.
332. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647.
333. See id. at 658-59.
334. See id.
335. See id. at 659. As the majority pointed out, however, these figures represented
only a snapshot in time. The data indicated that the numbers were subject to fluctuations
from year to year. See id.
336. Justice O'Connor noted that although just over one-half as many students
attended community schools as religious schools, the State spent more than $1 million
more on community school students. See id. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In
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Finally, Justice Souter and the other dissenters argued that it was
the majority which had skewed the denominator of the Establishment
Equation by adding all schools that might be attended, not just those
that are within the funding program at issue.337 Why, the dissenters
asked, if not for the skewed nature of the program, is the
overwhelming amount of funding being directed toward religious
schools?33 Recast in empirical terms, what variables might explain
the resulting distribution of funds, in which over ninety-six percent of
recipients attend religious schools?
The notion that parent
preference explained the disparity was rejected as lacking support in
the data.339 Inferentially, the dissenters also noted that the $2,500 cap
the program placed on tuition was more than $1,000 less than the
tuition for non-religious schools, but far higher than the average
tuition at religious schools.34 ° Thus, according to the equation and the
data, parents looking at the cap apparently had only one "true"
choice; they were unconstitutionally coerced to participate.
This temptation to measure and empiricize is apparent in other
Establishment Clause contexts as well. Whether, and under what
circumstances, to permit the display of religious symbols on public
property have been nearly intractable problems under the
Establishment Clause. In County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union,341 for example, the Court invalidated the display of a
stand-alone crdche in a county courthouse, while upholding a display

addition, the State spent $114.8 million on students attending magnet schools. See id.
Justice O'Connor cited an array of data concerning other aid to religious institutions,
including data on state tax exemptions, Medicare and Medicaid funding, Pell grants, and
other aspects of the broad social welfare system. See id. at 665-68. Although she felt free
to rely upon funding data well beyond the scope of the Ohio program, Justice O'Connor
did not believe that national statistics regarding the cost advantages of a Catholic
education, cited by Justice Souter in his dissent, were at all relevant to the Court's
neutrality inquiry. See id. at 671. Ultimately, she went on to criticize Justice Souter, who
sought to debunk the argument that the non-religious options the majority said were
available were viable alternatives, for "rel[ying] on very narrow data to draw rather broad
conclusions." Id. at 675.
337. See id. at 699 (Souter, J. dissenting) (determining that "[wihen the choice test is
transformed from where to spend the money to where to go to school, it is cut loose from
its very purpose").
338. See id. at 697-98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
339. See id. at 704 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting evidence that two out of three
families using vouchers to send children to religious schools did not embrace the religion
of the schools). See also id. at 704 n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing parental surveys in
which parents overwhelmingly cited educational and safety benefits, not religious
indoctrination, as motives for enrollment in religious schools).
340. See id. at 705 (Souter, J., dissenting).
341. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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featuring a menorah and a 45-foot Christmas tree. 342 The majority
relied mainly on Justice O'Connor's formulation of the endorsement
test, which asks whether the display sends a forbidden message to
insiders of favor, or to outsiders of disfavor, of religious beliefs.343
The endorsement test does not have universal support on the
Court. In Allegheny County, Justice Kennedy argued that the test led
the Court to decide cases based on "marginalia," "using little more
than intuition and a tape measure" to create a "jurisprudence of
minutiae." 3 4" He proposed an alternative approach, which would
focus on whether the display constituted an effort to proselytize or
was "otherwise the first step down the road to an establishment of
religion. '345 This determination could only be made by determining,
among other things, how long the display had appeared, the number
of other symbols displayed with the cr6che, and whether other
religious symbols had been similarly acknowledged.34 6
In other words, Justice Kennedy was proposing a formula for
deciding whether establishment of religion had occurred.347 As the
majority interpreted the proposed proselytization test:
[O]ne could say that his methodology requires counting the
number of days during which the government displays Christian
symbols and subtracting from this the number of days during
which non-Christian symbols are displayed, divided by the
number of different non-Christian religions represented in
these displays, and then somehow factoring into this equation
the prominence of the display's location and the degree to
which each symbol possesses an inherently proselytizing
quality.348
Despite the formula's objective appearance, the majority
contended that Justice Kennedy's approach was no more likely than
the endorsement test to lead to determinate and predictable results.34 9
342. See id. at 602.
343. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring),
reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984).

344.
345.
346.
347.
inquiry

Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 676 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 664 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 664 n.3 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Academics, too, have made proposals to operationalize the Establishment Clause
as it relates to the display of religious symbols. See, e.g., Shari Diamond Seidman

& Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REv. 713, 715-16 (2001)

(arguing that courts should take polling data into account in determining whether an
impermissible message of endorsement has been conveyed).
348. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 607.
349. How, they asked, would the formula resolve whether, for example, the
Establishment Clause would be violated if a city "each year displayed a crdche for 40 days
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The proselytization test has never commanded the support of a
majority of the Court.
In sum, once again in the face of an ambiguous constitutional
command, the modern judicial inclination is to reach for an empirical
solution. Prohibited "establishments" are not self-defining; courts
must interpret the Constitution's commands, draw lines, and flesh out
ideals. This can be uncomfortable ground, filled with indeterminacy.
Equations and formulas are relied upon to diminish the discomfort,
and to bring objectivity to constitutional interpretation.
3. Punishment and Due Process
It is a matter of fundamental fairness that defendants should be
extended every safeguard before a punishment is enforced against
them. There are numerous procedural safeguards designed to ensure
that this fairness principle is respected. In addition, the guarantee of
due process contains some substantive constraints on punishments.
Under the Due Process Clause, substantive protection against
unfair punishment has been far greater with regard to civil penalties,
such as large punitive damage awards, than with regard to massive
criminal fines and lengthy confinements, such as under recent "three
strikes" provisions. 35 ° Indeed, the Court has been particularly vigilant
when it comes to the supposed limits the due process guarantee
places on civil monetary penalties.
Most recently, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Campbell,3 51 the Court held that a punitive damages
award of $145 million, where compensatory damages of $1 million
had been awarded by the jury, violated the Due Process Clause.352 In
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,353 the Court instructed courts
reviewing punitive damages awards to consider three guideposts: (1)
the "degree of reprehensibility" of the defendant's misconduct; (2)
the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil

during the Christmas season and a cross for 40 days during Lent (and never the symbols of
other religions?)"? Id. "[Wihat if there were no cross but the 40-day creche display
contained a sign exhorting the city's citizens 'to offer up their devotion to God their
Creator, and his Son Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the world?' " Id. (citation omitted).
350. See Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1189 (2003) (upholding California's
"three strikes" law).
351. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
352. See id. at 1515.

353. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.354 The State
Farm Court held that the $145 million award was "neither close nor
355
difficult under these principles.
At what numerical point does the disparity between
compensatory and punitive damages become constitutionally invalid?
Noting that it had been reluctant in previous cases to rely on any
mathematical formula, and disavowing any attempt to lay down a
"bright-line ratio, 3 56 the Court nonetheless set down what by all
appearances are mathematical ceilings for punitive awards. The
Court stated that "few awards exceeding a single digit ratio between
35
punitive and compensatory damages ...will satisfy due process. 1
In addition, the Court noted: "When compensatory damages are
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee."358 Thus, the Gore "disparity" factor was empiricized in
State Farm.
As lower courts proceed to measure the "due process" meted out
by juries, they will presumably consult a simple equation: DP = P/C,
where DP is the guarantee of due process, P is the punitive damages
award, and C is the compensatory damages award. After State Farm,
there appears to be a presumptive 9:1 ceiling on punitive awards.
Perhaps even more significantly, where compensatory damages are
"substantial," a 1:1 ratio may mark the outer bounds of the due
process guarantee.
Lower courts have already begun to empiricize the procedural
protections due process affords.
Of course, fundamentally, no
defendant can receive due process unless he remains alive to see the
process through to completion. In United States v. Quinones,
discussed earlier as an example of the courts' foundational use of
empirical data,359 the district court ventured further and held that
publicly reported evidence that twelve "false positives" had resulted
from state death penalty proceedings, along with social scientific
studies indicating numerous errors in the death penalty process,
established conclusively that the federal death penalty could not be
administered in a manner which guaranteed "due process. ' 36 ° In bold
354. Id. at 575.
355. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
356. Id. at 1524.
357. Id.

358. Id.
359. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
360. See United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd,
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empirical terms, the district court claimed to falsify the Supreme
Court's hypothesis in Herrera that the death penalty was not being
administered such that innocent persons were being put to death was
valid. The Second Circuit ultimately reversed; it disagreed that the
due process issue could be empirically settled.36
So there have been, thus far, two attempts to operationalize "due
process," one which marks empirical constitutional ceilings for civil
fines, and the other which relies upon hypothesis testing and proof of
"false positives." The question, of course, is whether these and other
empirical standards will lead to a more objective and neutral
interpretation of constitutional guarantees.
III. QUASI-NEUTRALITY AND THE NEW FORMALISM

Thus far, this Article has demonstrated a second judicial
empirical turn across a range of constitutional text and in an array of
disparate contexts. As the brief jurisprudential summary in Part I
demonstrated, the search for objectivity and determinacy in law has
been thoroughgoing.
As with law generally, constitutional law
eventually came to turn outward, adopting the scientific calculus of
constitutional balancing. Constitutional empiricism is, in part, an
extension of the balancing construct, an effort to measure state
interests prior to placing them on the scale. This is manifiested in the
empirical testing of legislative predicates-suspected
harms,
predictions, theories, and causal claims. Beyond balancing, the
courts, in the same search for objectivity and determinacy, have
increasingly turned to calculation, falsification, formulas, equations,
and ratios in an effort to interpret the meaning of various
constitutional guarantees.
In light of the breadth and significance of the empirical forms
and functions, it would underestimate the empirical turn to

313 F.3d 49 (2002). According to the district court, this empirical evidence indicated that a
"meaningful number of innocent persons, by being put to death before the emergence of
techniques or evidence that will establish their innocence, are thereby effectively deprived
of the opportunity to prove their innocence." Id. at 264-65.
361. The Second Circuit held that Herrera itself precluded the lower courts "from
finding capital punishment unconstitutional based solely on a statistical or theoretical
possibility that a defendant might be innocent." United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49,
68 (2d Cir. 2002), reh'g denied, 317 F.3d 86 (2003). The court reasoned that the anti-death
penalty argument that innocent persons could be sentenced to death was not new, that
Congress legislated with knowledge that false positives were possible, and that, in any
event, the Supreme Court had rejected the empirical argument put forward as
constitutionally insignificant. See id. at 63-65. The district court was apparently out ahead
of the empirical curve.
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characterize it merely as one of increased judicial attention to
constitutional "factfinding" in discrete instances.
Indeed,
constitutional empiricism further exposes the purported distinction
between "fact" and "law" as a "shibboleth. 36 2 To a degree,
empiricism is how courts are presently making constitutional law. It
is a method of constitutional interpretation. This Part seeks answers
to two questions: first, do the precepts of empiricism as it has
developed so far provide the long-sought neutral grounding for
constitutional law; and second, if empiricism does not supply longsought neutral principles, what work does this interpretive method
actually do?
A.

Quasi-neutralPrinciplesand the Empirical Black Box

Scholars like Herbert Wechsler were critical of Brown in light of
the paucity of reasons the Court provided for its conclusion that
separate education was inherently unequal.363 Wechsler argued that
the Court could not act as a "naked power organ," but had to support
its decisions with reference to neutral principles, "reasons that in their
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is
involved. '3 6 According to Wechsler and others, the social scientific
data the Court alluded to in Brown did not provide such neutral
principles.3 65 Roe, the Court's other infamous empiricist decision, has
been subjected to similar criticisms.3 66 Beyond these individual
empirical stand-outs, the balancing calculus, which was originally
conceived as one process-oriented path to neutrality, has come under
sharp and sustained criticism for its methodological and substantive
indeterminacy.3 67
It has been more than half a century since the initial empirical
turn in Brown, and the corresponding initial empirical backlash. In
the interim, science and law have intersected to such an extent that
judicial resistance to empirical conventions and precepts appears to
have substantially faded, if not disappeared altogether. The general
perception that science has "all the power, all the knowledge, all the
362. See Devins, supra note 179, at 1170 (2001) (suggesting that "the law-fact divide is a
shibboleth, something that the Court invokes to justify a conclusion about whether it or
Congress should settle an issue, not something with independent analytical force"); see
also id. at 1172-77 (exploring debate on the law-fact distinction).
363. See Wechsler, supra note 112, at 32-33.
364. Id. at 19.
365. See supra note 116.
366. See FELDMAN supra note 27, at 148 (noting criticism of Roe's methodology).
367. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 20 (providing thorough critique of
constitutional balancing).
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rationality ... all ... plausibility or legitimacy 36 8 is as strong in
constitutional law as it is in other areas, legal and non-legal alike. So,
we might ask, why not enlist the methods and principles of scientific
and empirical inquiry to do the work neutral principles are supposed
to do? If courts must give reasons for their decisions or draw
constitutional lines, perhaps they should express those reasons and
lines in empirical terms-in numbers, charts, appendices, equations,
formulas, ratios, and graphs-rather than solely by reference to
precedent, history, text, structure, or other often indeterminate tools
Perhaps courts could enlist
of constitutional construction.
empiricism's apparent objectivity and neutrality in solving
adjudicative and interpretive dilemmas.
1. An Epistemological View of Empiricism
Whether this can, or should, be the judicial course depends to a
large extent on the judiciary's epistemological view of empirical and
scientific methods and principles. Is science essentially positivist and
value-free, revealing empirically determinate facts?3 69 Is it possible,
as positivists believe, to find an objective truth in the empirical "facts"
of the matter? If so, a naturalist turn in constitutional law might
present a plausible path to interpretive objectivity. Or, as Thomas
Kuhn and others have claimed, is science interest- and culturebounded, an intrinsically imperfect endeavor revealing only socially
Is empirical data, as interpretivists insist,
constructed facts?37 °
371
inseparable from the biases and paradigms of its observers?
Constitutional empiricism, with its emphasis on the proof of "real"
predicates and its reliance on mathematical functions, directly
implicates this long-standing debate.
Constitutional empiricism originated roughly at the same time
the Rehnquist Court, in Daubert and its progeny, was converting
368. MICHEL SERRES & BRUNO LATOUR, CONVERSATIONS ON SCIENCE, CULTURE,
AND TIME 87 (1995).
369. See generally PAUL GROSS & NORMAN LEVITr, HIGHER SUPERSTITION: THE
ACADEMIC LEFT AND ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE (1994) (discussing the concept of
socially constructed scientific findings and data).
370. See KUHN, supra note 135, at 17-20.; JONATHAN POTTER, REPRESENTING
REALITY:

DISCOURSE, RHETORIC, AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

34-35 (1996). For

a

discussion of this issue, see generally IAN HACKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING

(1983).
371. See generally JAMES BOHMAN, NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991)
(discussing the recent treatment of the debate concerning the objectivity of the social
sciences). For a description of the "empirical turn" in the philosophy of science, see
Charles Taylor, Interpretationand the Sciences of Man, in COLLECTED PAPERS, vol. 2, 15,

15-57 (1985).
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federal trial courts from passive recipients of scientific and technical
data into engaged empirical gatekeepers. In 1993, the Court was
taking its first institutional stand on the scientific method and,
indirectly and perhaps unintentionally, joining the debate between
scientific positivists and their constructivist opponents.
Thus,
fortunately, we have a more or less contemporaneous indication as to
the Supreme Court's epistemological view of empiricism in its
statements and the ultimate approach it adopted in Daubert. Daubert
provides some critical insight into the empirical turn in constitutional
cases.

372

Although commentators have advanced both positivist and
373
constructivist interpretations of Daubert,
the weight of the opinion

itself comes down to a rather naive positivism. First and foremost,

the Court was of the view that the concept of science was intrinsically
bound up with empirical testing.374

In addition to falsification by

empirical testing, the Court emphasized such positivist stalwarts as
peer review, publication, and rate of error, all core aspects of an
empirical and positive scientific methodology. 37 What is missing
from the Daubert discussion and core framework is any mention or

recognition

of culture,

institutions, politics, or other widely

recognized mediating factors which complicate claims of scientific
objectivity and universality.376 Daubert's conception of science is
essentially "Popperian"-a linear view of the scientific project which

vests judicial faith in empirical testing as the principal means to
'377
verifiable "truths.
372. Some had predicted that as a result of Daubert,"a number of common practices of
science will become common practices of law, erasing years of heated dispute about the
inclusion of these scientific methods in law." Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Daubert
and the Reference Manual: An Essay on the Future of Science in Law, 82 VA. L. REV. 837,
838 (1996). The authors did not count constitutional adjudication and construction among
the potentially affected areas of law. This Article supports their view that Daubert's
significance goes well beyond its specific holding and context.
373. See Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.:
Epistemiology and Legal Process, 15 CARDoZo L. REV. 2183, 2189-207 (1994) (describing
different interpretations of Daubert).
374. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (explaining
that "[w]hether [a theory or technique] can be (and has been) tested determines whether it
deserves the label scientific").
375. Daubert,509 U.S. at 593-95.
376. The Daubert Court did accept that science was tentative and probabilistic, but this
is not the same as conceding that science, and scientific data, are socially constructed. See
id. at 590 (conceding that "arguably, there are no certainties in science").
377. For a discussion of Karl Popper's philosophy of science, see generally KARL
POPPER,

CONJECTURES

AND

REFUTATIONS:

THE

GROWTH

OF

SCIENTIFIC

KNOWLEDGE (5th ed. 1989). See also id. at 37 (asserting that "the criterion of the
scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability").

HeinOnline -- 82 N.C. L. Rev. 182 2003-2004

2003]

CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM

Constitutional empiricism is similarly positivist in both its
perspective and core methodology. The very language of empiricism,
which boasts generally of the judicial power to discover constitutional
"reality," is positivist. As the Court held in Stenberg v. Carhart,if the
State cannot definitively prove that an abortion procedure never
carries a safety benefit, then the State must provide an exception for
maternal health.378 In a host of cases, governmental interests have
been outweighed or deemed insufficient, not because the courts
interpret the constitution as foreclosing a legislative choice, but
because the government has failed to prove that a real harm exists,
that a prediction comports with empirical reality, that a theory is
verifiable, or that a causal claim is empirically valid. 79 With
empiricism, invidious governmental purposes must be established to a
mathematical certainty. Similarly, affirmative action, at least when it
is remedial in nature, requires a concrete showing of "substantial
evidence" of verifiable past discrimination.
The methods used to adjudicate constitutional claims and
interpret constitutional provisions are similarly positivist in nature.
With empiricism, courts test legislative hypotheses, predictions,
theories, and causal claims in an effort to falsify them. They construct
equations for determining whether the Establishment Clause has
been breached. In Atkins, excessive punishments are defined with
reference to some combination of a numerical "consensus," the
direction of change in the observed legislative outputs, and the
proportion of votes in favor of those outputs. 380 After State Farm, due
process is a fixed ratio, a 9:1 or perhaps even 1:1 empirical limit on
punitive damages. With constitutional empiricism, everything is
grounded in observation and data.
Thus, a significant portion of constitutional review is now
premised upon "the neutrality of observation and the givenness of
experience; the ideal of a univocal language and the independence of
data from theoretical interpretation; the belief in the universality of
'
conditions of knowledge and criteria for theory choice."381
Fundamentally, empiricism is premised upon the belief that there are
"truths" or "realities" out there with regard to legislative predicates
and constitutional guarantees, and that courts can "discover" these
truths by gathering data, testing "hypotheses," and establishing
378. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text (discussing Stenberg's treatment of
the "partial birth abortion" issue).
379. See supra Parts II.B-D.
380. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-13 (2002).
381. BOHMAN, supra note 371, at 2.
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formulas and ratios. In sum, constitutional empiricism has all of the
trappings of positivist scientific method: It looks primarily to external
observations both when examining legislative power and construing
open-ended constitutional provisions; it characterizes legislative
enactments as hypotheses or causal claims; it claims the power to
distinguish "real" from speculative predicates; and it seeks to falsify
legislative theories.
This positivist view of knowledge accounts directly for the forms
and functions of constitutional empiricism.
Where courts see
themselves as constitutional gatekeepers, empirical methods and
principles are logical precepts for constitutional rule-making,
adjudication, and construction. As constitutional gatekeepers, courts
do not exhibit the usual deference to legislative and other fact-finding
and fact-generating communities. Just as Daubert freed courts to be
more skeptical with respect to the conclusions and methods of a
community of experts, constitutional empiricism has liberated courts
to question, test, and falsify the methods and conclusions of legislative
and other governmental bodies.38 2 As a result of the empirical turn,
courts no longer feel obligated to explain decisions solely with
reference to precedent, history, or text. Rather, they often forsake
judicial for laboratory robes, fashion hypotheses, test empirical
claims, and construct empirical equations.
Ultimately, then, empiricism's claim to objectivity purportedly
rests with the data itself. "Real" harms exist or they do not,
depending upon proof and observation. Societal "standards of
decency" are objectively and naturally derived; legislative outputs are
counted and recorded, their direction of change and proportion of
support noted in the experimental record. Religious "coercion" is
discovered by running sets of data through the Establishment
Equation, which itself produces an objective truth. Due process
depends upon a statistical inference of risk, perhaps, or a fixed ratio

382. There is a world of difference between these two gate-keeping functions. It is one
thing, for example, simply to deprive a jury of empirical data about which a court is
skeptical, but something altogether different to purport to measure the scope of
Congressionalpower, or the content of constitutional liberties, with reference to empirical
proofs. The Constitution has never been interpreted to requiredeference to experts, but it
has regularly been interpreted by the courts to require deference to some legislative
predicates, as under Section 5. See, e.g., Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966)
(upholding, under a deferential standard, § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
Constitutional empiricism suspends inter-branch deference in a variety of contexts, even in
situations where deference has long been the default rule. More generally, we are not
talking about mere fact-finding processes here; we are talking, fundamentally, about
defining constitutional powers and guarantees of individual liberty.
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of punitive and compensatory damages. These are no longer matters
of value or justice; they are empirical, verifiable truths.
Of course, the idea that constitutional empiricism can reveal
objective "realities" and constitutional meaning, if accepted, would
mark a radical improvement in constitutional decision-making. For
one thing, adjudicating constitutional claims by means of "scientific"
empirical processes would bypass some very difficult normative
questions. If it is the case that the government has no "real" interest
to protect or evil to target, for instance, constitutional balancing
automatically becomes far more determinate. As Justice O'Connor
has noted: "Balancing is difficult to undertake unless one side of the
3 3
scale is relatively insubstantial.""
Similarly, if meaning can be
empirically and objectively supplied where, as is often the case,
constitutional text is broad and amorphous, there will be far less
hand-wringing concerning judicial "activism," subjectivity, and
indeterminacy where constitutional construction is required. There
would be far less controversy if all there was to constitutional
construction was the development and utilization of simple ratios and
equations.
2. Quasi-neutrality: Inside the Empirical Black Box
Viewed in this manner, as a "scientific" alternative to subjective
and contested constitutional decision-making and construction, much
depends on empiricism's claims to neutrality and objectivity. Careful
analysis demonstrates that constitutional empiricism cannot bear the
weight of those claims.
One of the rhetorical conventions utilized in the "science wars,"
as the debates concerning scientific objectivity and determinacy have
sometimes been called, is the notion of a "black box". It is in this box
that positivists are accused of concealing the socially and
institutionally constructed and mediated realities of the scientific
project.3s8 Constructivists, echoing the early jurisprudential debates
that gave rise to realism, claim to seek an opening of the black box.
Just as legal realists pointed out the constructed nature of legal facts,
scientific realists argue that scientists do not merely "find" facts; they
5
construct them from within vastly mediated contexts.1
383. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 482 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
384. See David S. Caudill, Barely Opening, Then Slamming Shut, Science's "Black Box"
In Law: A Response to Beecher-Monas's Heuristics, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1795, 1796
(2002) (explaining "black box" concept).
385. See generally Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A
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Constitutional empiricism is subject to the "black box" critique.
To begin with, the process of constitutional empiricism evinces the
same limitations and biases as any empirical endeavor. Like scientific
conclusions, empirically determined constitutional decisions are
"based on subjective judgments made at key points ranging from the
through the
initial decision to study a particular phenomenon
3 86
collection, categorization, and interpretation of data.
Indeed, the quasi-neutrality of empiricism inheres in the very
standards by which the Supreme Court has defined the empirical
turn. The decision whether to engage in empirical examination at all
is often based upon subjective, and mostly unarticulated, judicial
views concerning the "novelty" and "plausibility" of legislative
predicates. Signal bleed is a novel or implausible predicate, according
to the Court in Playboy, but secondary effects and special needs
require virtually no empirical proof.3 87 The predicate of state gender
discrimination did not strike the Court as at all implausible in Hibbs;
but congressional action based upon state age or disability
discrimination was subjected to, and failed to meet, a stringent
empirical standard.388 Similarly, not all normative constitutional
concepts are studied empirically. As scientists choose their agendas,
the courts actively choose which among the many normative
constitutional constructs will be defined by empirical proxy. "Due
process," for example, is rather narrowly empirically defined with
respect to civil monetary penalties, but left largely to the discretion of
juries and judges where criminal penalties are involved. Similarly,
"evolving standards of decency" are a subject for empirical proof only
because the Court has recently chosen to make them so.
Why is one legislative prediction or theory considered "novel" or
"implausible," while another is not? Why is it that the government
can prohibit certain types of speech altogether without a scrap of
Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563 (2000) (addressing the situated

nature of "facts").
386. Id. at 1576.
387. See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text (discussing the "signal bleed"
predicate); see also supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text (discussing "secondary
effects").
388. See supra notes 233-36. We might say the same thing with regard to affirmative
action. The Court made plain in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., that a state
program which takes race into account must be supported by a strong basis in evidence.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989). By contrast, in Grutter and
Gratz, the Court required very little empirical proof that student body diversity brought
tangible benefits to the campus environment. See supra note 252 (discussing Grutter and
Gratz). This may have something to do with deference to institutions; but the Court
provides no basis for any differential deference dynamic.
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empirical proof as to a verifiable "real" harm, 89 but must
demonstrate the empirical soundness of other predictions, theories, or
claims by substantial evidence? Why address "coercion" or "evolving
standards" or "due process" empirically, while clinging to traditional
sources of interpretation, like history, in other contexts? The Court
makes no effort to explain these distinctions.
Standards like
"novelty" and "plausibility" and the use of proxies like "evolving
standards," the Establishment Equation, and punitive damages ratios,
are empty vessels. They do not explain why some constitutional
decisions are to be made with reference to empirical benchmarks, and
some are not. That initial decision, from all appearances, is nearly, if
not entirely, a matter of judicial fiat.39
But the origins of empiricism are not all that is being hidden
away in the black box. As in any scientific endeavor, once a decision
to proceed empirically has been made, a host of collection and
categorization decisions must be made. Even before any purportedly
definitive construction is placed on the data, empiricism requires that
qualitative decisions be made concerning which of the array of
empirical sources to consider.391 In other words, there are no
standards for determining what information "counts" for purposes of
the empirical examination. As the discussion of empiricism suggests,
governmental predicates may be supported by empirical proof of a
wide-ranging nature. Some of the evidence will be anecdotal, some
historical, and some will consist of more systematically collected
data.392 If constitutional empiricism is to be based on neutral
indicators, there must be some principled manner by which to
389. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 493 (1957) (upholding obscenity statute),
reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968)
(upholding "harmful to minors" statute); see also Roth, 354 U.S. at 501-02 (warning that
"the very division of opinion on the subject counsels us to respect the choice made by the

State") (Harlan, J., concurring in the result, and dissenting in part).
390. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), is the most recent example of this sort of
empirical indeterminacy. In Eldred, the Court held that Congress acted rationally, and
constitutionally, in extending the duration of copyright protection. Id. at 207. The

majority stated that is was required to "defer substantially to Congress" because the
copyright extension was based upon "judgments of a kind Congress typically makes." Id.
at 205. Justice Breyer, in dissent, disagreed with Congress's empirical basis for extending

copyright protection. See id. at 807-09 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's
empirical assessment of the value of copyright extension was not rational); see also id., at
appendix A (setting the foundation for the empirical analysis relied upon by Justice
Breyer).

Again, no standard was provided by the majority for its determination that

empirical deference was warranted under the Copyright Clause, but not elsewhere.
391. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 385, at 1576-78.
392. See Rogovin, supra note 1, at 1746-62 (discussing various general types of

empirical data relied upon by Congress).
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determine what to collect and categorize, and what to ignore.
These qualitative choices abound in constitutional empiricism, as
they do in other empirical endeavors. Insofar as constitutional
empiricism is concerned, many of these qualitative choices are
matters of what we might call "geographic relevance." Does national
evidence count when considering the existence of a local harm? Does
a federal enactment require proof of a national harm? Is the
Constitution, with respect to societal mores, geographically bounded,
or can courts consider transnational norms? In assigning a value to
the denominator in the Equality Equation, are national funding data
relevant to an inquiry about a local program? Do false positives from
state judicial systems count when considering the constitutionality of
the federal death penalty?
Answers to these and other questions can have a dispositive
effect on constitutional issues. Yet, as the discussion in Part II
demonstrated, when such choices are made, courts do not feel obliged
to explain them. The Court does not tell us why localized "special
needs" searches and local zonings of sexually explicit speech can be
supported by national statistics and extra-jurisdictional studies,
respectively.393 It does not explain why a congressional finding of
nation-wide discrimination against a class does not suffice to support
an exercise of Congress's power under Section 5. Nor are we
informed as to why Congress needs evidence of discrimination from
most states in order to defend a remedial measure, or a national field
survey to prove the existence of a "national" evil.394 Why was
evidence of private employer discrimination irrelevant in Garrett,but
sufficient in Hibbs to form the basis for an inference of public sector
discrimination?395 Why, given the Court's receptivity to national data
in other contexts, are national surveys and statistics considered
irrelevant to the determination whether the government has properly
taken race into account? 396 The Court has developed, over time, a
number of rules of geographic relevance. But, it has not bothered to
explain them in a manner which gives us confidence that these rules
393. See supra notes 200-12 and accompanying text (discussing "special needs"
searches and "secondary effects").
394. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000) (noting that evidence of
state discrimination was not adduced for all states); United States v. Playboy Entm't
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 823 (2000) (concluding that "[t]he government has failed to
establish a pervasive, nationwide problem justifying its nationwide daytime speech ban").
395. See supra notes 227-36 and accompanying text (discussing Garret and Hibbs).
396. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (discounting
Congressional findings of industry-wide discrimination in inquiry concerning local setaside program).
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are being chosen on grounds other than expediency or judicial bias.
Empirical proxies also depend upon a host of antecedent
qualitative choices. Depending upon the judicial view of "choice"
under the Establishment Clause, more or less voucher-eligible
programs, and more or less data concerning funding for parochial
choices, may be appropriately added to the denominator of the
Establishment Equation.
Similarly, in examining symbolic
endorsement or, as Justice Kennedy would have it, "proselytization,"
why is the time of display a relevant variable?397 As the debate in
Atkins demonstrates, international mores and public opinion polls
regarding the execution of the mentally retarded are either relevant
to a consideration of societal mores or wholly outside the bounds of
appropriate inquiry, depending on the justice involved in the
examination.39 8 Further, the choice of legislative outputs as the
empirical proxy for our "evolving standards of decency" itself
represents built-in assumptions regarding the appropriateness of
measuring mores by representation, rather than by some more direct
means. The Court's focus on directional change and its consistency
subsumes still other qualitative choices.39 9 With regard to the
consideration of false positives, the Quinones court explained that it
used state data because the data from the federal system was too
small, and the convictions too recent, to draw any conclusions
therefrom.4"° Why doesn't that conclusion suspend the empirical
inquiry altogether?4 0 1 Finally, the Court never explains in State Farm
why it chooses to use compensatory damages as the denominator. If
the point of the punitive award is to punish and deter, perhaps courts
should look instead at the expected monetary gain from the conduct
that is sought to be deterred.
Thus, the processes of formula fabrication and data collection fail
to provide much-needed neutrality and objectivity. But there are still
other reasons to be skeptical of the notion that empiricism provides
generally applicable neutral principles for constitutional decisionmaking. Construction of the data, it turns out, is neither neutral nor
397. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 664 n.3 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,

dissenting).
398. See supra notes 315-26 and accompanying text.
399. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
400. United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 266 (2002) rev'd, 313 F.3d 49 (2d

Cir. 2002).
401.

The court argued that extrapolating from the state data to federal circumstances

was appropriate because "there is no logical reason to suppose" that federal practices are
any more sound than the state procedures that resulted in the false positives. Id. But that

is only a judicial assertion.
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determinate.
The interpretation of data lacks a neutral grounding. Indeed,
with constitutional empiricism, the black box is doubly deep and
doubly wide. The social and other constructions of the data under
consideration are layered at two distinct levels. As interpretivists and
pragmatists have persuasively argued, the data the Court is
But
considering is itself socially constructed and situated. 4°2
empiricist courts do not simply determine, as under Daubert, whether
the data is of sufficient validity to be considered in the constitutional
In most cases, they reach
calculus or constitutional formula.
dispositive conclusions based upon the data, thus introducing a
second layer of construction based upon judicial preferences,
backgrounds, norms, and beliefs. Empirical data comes to the courts
in a socially constructed package, and the courts then repackage that
same data in the process of making constitutional decisions.
Both of these layers of construction undermine empirical
neutrality. Daubert's influence downplays the construction that
occurs at the first layer, viewing science essentially as a source of
pure, unmediated information. In addition, at the second level, courts
fail to appreciate that even this mediated information becomes
further mediated during the process of interpretation. If empiricism
establishes anything, it is that courts are not merely passive recipients
of empirical data. As the experience of the early realists taught, the
many mountains of data empiricism generates, or would generate,
must be interpreted by someone. The empirical data does not, indeed
it cannot, speak for itself.
Once the black box is fully opened, the embedded construction
of empirical evidence is readily exposed. The process of data
interpretation is no more value-free than the process of data
collection; it is, if anything, even less so." 3 Here quantitative
indeterminacy inheres in the empirical standards themselves. We do
not know how much evidence is "substantial," or "strong," or
sufficient to demonstrate "plausibility," or "congruence," or
"proportionality." In Playboy, for example, potential exposure to
pornography through signal bleed was held not to establish a "real"
harm, but the Court failed to indicate how many children must
actually be exposed to the phenomenon of signal bleed before

402. See, e.g., BOHMAN, supra note 371, at 102-45 (discussing social construction of
data and other issues of interpretation and indeterminacy in empirical inquiry).
403. See Tribe, Constitutional Calculus, supra note 4, at 597 (deriding as "myth" the

argument that empirical techniques "are neutral in regard to matters of value").
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Congress may enact national legislation to alleviate the evil.

The

Court has been similarly unclear with regard to how many instances
of state discrimination would permit Congress to exercise its Section 5
If the courts were to empirically assess
enforcement power.
secondary effects, litigants would need to know how much of a

decline in property values, or increase in crime rates, would justify
restricting free speech. Where the courts are measuring the incidence

of political corruption, they need to elaborate as to how much data
and other evidence is required to demonstrate that large
If a particular abortion
contributions actually corrupt politics.
procedure is the safest alternative in only 10% of cases, why is the

State required to enact a maternal health exception for all cases?
Quantitative standards like "substantial" and "strong" cover

over empiricism's lack of neutrality.

Quantitative issues, like

qualitative ones, are resolved in a mostly ad hoc fashion, usually with
little in the way of reasoned evaluation. Survey evidence, like that
called for in Playboy and examined in Florida Bar, is variously relied

upon as wholly dispositive, or wholly disregarded as irrelevant or
scientifically invalid. Because judges have become somewhat skilled
empiricists, they have little difficulty raising methodological and other

concerns to discredit any data set or collection procedure they do not
see as helpful to a particular position. 5 Thus, at the heightened end
of a sliding empirical scale, courts can easily pronounce a survey or
other study of data as useless, unscientific, and lacking in any
probative value. By contrast, at the lower end of the scale, where the

same study supports some judicial preference or goal, courts can be
quite forgiving of methodological and other empirical weaknesses.
Even as to empirical proxies, where neither data nor

computation is complex, quantitative indeterminacy is substantial. In
Atkins, for example, the majority counted 18 states that enacted
404. Garrett tells us that it must be more than six such instances for Congress to act,
which was all that the majority claimed to find in the massive record. See Bd. of Tr. of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369-70 (2001). But what if, as the dissenters
asserted, there were actually hundreds of observed instances? Id. at 379. This still would
not seem to be very many, considering the scope of the database is nationwide. Perhaps
the Court simply will know the number when it sees it. It certainly has not given more
explicit guidance in the cases.
405. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Atkins is a good example. There, he collects
in an Appendix the public opinion polls the majority relies upon in determining societal
attitudes toward execution of the mentally retarded. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 328
(2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice notes, with respect to these: "An
extensive body of social science literature describes how methodological and other errors
can affect the reliability and validity of estimates about the opinions and attitudes of a
population derived from various sampling techniques." Id. at 326.
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prohibitions on execution of the mentally retarded. a 6 Of course, it is
highly debatable whether these eighteen enactments, considered as a
raw number, actually constitute a societal "consensus."407 They are
plainly not a majority, even if one considers only the population of
states that currently administer a death penalty. Faced with a rather
obvious quantitative dilemma, the Court did what any clever
empiricist would-it changed the relevant quantitative measure. The
Court changed the denominator from all states to only those states
that had enacted legislation on the issue of execution of the mentally
retarded since Penry.4 8 Then, making a second empirical adjustment,
the Court focused not on the number of legislative outputs, which was
still relatively small, but instead on what it described as the consistent
and uniform direction of change.4 9 Since all of the eighteen outputs
moved in a negative direction, prohibiting execution of the mentally
retarded, at least the direction in which societal mores were moving
was evident. Finally, the majority pointed out that the legislative
prohibitions were adopted nearly unanimously. 410 But if an aggregate
measure of individual mores is the proper measure (e.g., one person =
unit of decency), should not we, as Justice Scalia suggested in dissent,
account for constituency differentials when we consider the mores
being represented by a given legislative output? 41' Thus, perhaps a
law in Maine should be "worth" less than a law in New York or
California.
From a safe distance, Atkins looks value-free and precise; it gives
the impression of empirical and mathematical certainty and
objectivity. But, beneath the surface of this proxy is the black box, a
collection of value-based choices that had to be made in order to
interpret the Eighth Amendment. The State Farm punitive damages
ratios are vulnerable to the same criticism. Surely the 9:1 and 1:1
ratios did not materialize out of thin air. Value choices must have
been made in fashioning them, even if the Court is not willing to say
so. Even in seemingly objective, scientific processes, opportunities
for the insertion of subjectivity and bias abound. Empiricism, of
course, does not take place in a staid, sterile laboratory; it is part of a
highly charged adversarial process, one which results in the definition

406. Id. at 314-15 & nn.12-15. (citing legislation).
407. But see id. at 316 n.21 (referring to both a "national consensus" and a "much
broader social and professional consensus").
408. See id. at 314-15.
409. See id. at 315.
410. Id. at 316.
411. Id. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of constitutional rights, powers, and values.
No wonder, then, that the data is massaged, handled, exploited,
and manipulated. Charges of bias abound. The language of charge
and countercharge erupts in opinions. Thus, the determination of
societal mores rests either solely on the data considered by the Court
or, according to Justice Scalia, "obviously upon nothing but the
personal views of its Members. 412 An inference of religious coercion
is dictated by the data, or entirely unsupportable, depending upon
who happens to be holding the calculator."3 Twelve false positives
either conclusively demonstrate that fair administration of the death
penalty is an impossibility or it is a constitutional irrelevancy.41 ' The
upshot is that even assuming some agreement as to what to count,
how to count the data will likely remain hotly contested.
Finally, in addition to the qualitative and quantitative challenges
discussed, there is also the ubiquitous problem of conflicting data, or
empirical stalemates. Evidence almost never points only in one
direction. Science, unlike law, does not aspire to derive absolute
"truths." But, although scientists can afford to declare empirical
propositions a "draw" and move on to the next experiment, the law
admits of no such flexibility. At least on some level, constitutional
law must resolve disputes.
What, then, does constitutional empiricism have to say about
empirical stalemates? The answer is not much, or at least nothing
terribly coherent. In Stenberg, the Supreme Court acknowledged an
empirical stalemate with regard to the relative safety of various
abortive procedures. 415 The majority interpreted the stalemate as
providing an edge to individual autonomy-if the State could not
prove that partial birth abortions never have safety benefits, then the
State would have to provide for a maternal health exception.41 6 The
Stenberg dissenters interpreted the stalemate from the state's
perspective; they resolved the empirical stalemate by deferring to the
State. 7 It rather quickly becomes apparent that perspective is
412. Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
413. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (discussing calculation of
sectarian participation in voucher program).
414. See United State v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 68 (2d Cir. 2002), reh'g denied 317 F.3d
86 (2003) (rejecting argument that capital punishment can be empirically invalidated).
415. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 936-37 (2000) (noting division of medical
opinion).
416. Id.
417. Id. at 968 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that "[c]ourts are ill-equipped to
evaluate the relative worth of particular surgical procedures. The legislatures of the
several states have superior factfinding capabilities in this regard").
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everything where the data cut in more than one direction.
Constitutional empiricism has developed no conventions or rules
for resolving such stalemates. Again, the matter often comes down to
judicial attitudes about the novelty or plausibility of a legislative
choice. Sometimes state interests are given the benefit of the
empirical doubt. In Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Government PA C,4 8 which
examined state campaign contribution limits, some studies indicated
that large contributions to public officials did not result in changes in
candidates' positions, but other studies "point[ed] the other way".4 19
Despite the empirical stalemate, the Court concluded that there was
"little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions will work
actual corruption of our political system, and no reason to question
the existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters. 4 20 There
was "little reason," that is, if you simply ignore all of the studies to the
contrary. Perhaps the proposition that contributions cause corruption
is viewed as more plausible than the state's view as to the safety of
abortion procedures.
The Court simply resolves the empirical
stalemate, without giving reasons for its resolution.
Constitutional empiricism thus confronts, but cannot neutrally
resolve, one of the most basic dilemmas of scientifically-based
decision-making. Conflicting data, the absence of data, or minimal
data only "mean" something insofar as the decision-maker interprets
the conflict, the absence, or the weight of the evidence. Courts
cannot adopt a resolution of empirical stalemates without
approaching them from some perspective or paradigm of, for
example, individual autonomy, as in Stenberg.
In sum, empiricist courts are no more neutral or externally
oriented with regard to their data than social or natural scientists are
in their various research contexts. Indeed, if anything, constitutional
empiricism is less constrained than scientific processes, which are at
least subject to a set of standard conventions. Once the veil of
scientific objectivity is removed, we can see that all of the data being
collected as a result of the empirical turn is subject to the interpretive
constraints and limitations of the more general scientific project.
Further, rather than telling us more about constitutional meaning,
empiricism tells us less: We do not know why predicates are
considered novel or implausible; we do not know the reasons behind
the rules of empirical relevance; we do not know what suffices to
418. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
419. Id. at 394.
420. Id. at 395.
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meet quantitative standards; and we'do not know where ratios and
equations originated, and why. The search for neutral principles
obviously cannot end with empiricism.
B.

Shifting Paradigms: The New ConstitutionalFormalism

If empirical/scientific methods do not serve as valid, neutral
principles, then how is empirical data, or sometimes its absence, being
utilized in constitutional contexts? Why demand and collect data,
and pay such significant attention to empirical matters, if not in
service of the goals of objectivity and neutrality? What work, if any,
is empiricism actually doing?
1. Judicial Supremacy and Skepticism
There is a reason we are only now discussing this phenomenon of
constitutional empiricism. Only now does there exist a critical mass
of empirical decisions. Prior to the early 1990s, empirical markers in
constitutional law were a rarity. To be sure, courts balanced; but they
rarely purported to actually measure legislative predicates. Prior to
Playboy, Congress had not been required to demonstrate a national
evil by field survey; prior to Turner, Congress had not been required
to prove its predictions by substantial evidence; prior to Bartnicki,
Congress did not have to provide empirical proof of the effect on
downstream markets from upstream regulation; prior to Boerne, no
massive empirical record was required to demonstrate "congruence"
and "proportionality" under Section 5; and prior to Croson and
Adarand, a majority of the Court had not sharpened the "strong basis
in evidence" standard as applied to race-based preferences. So, the
trend is new.
Empirical proxies also began to appear during the 1990s. It
occurred to the Court that difficult choices with regard to the death
penalty could be avoided by tallying legislative outputs. Similarly,
with all of the data available regarding the use of vouchers, the
Zelman Court, protestations to the contrary, could hardly avoid going
empirical. The Establishment Equation was born. With data on false
positives now available, the Quinones court could actually purport to
calculate the risk of wrongful execution, something courts could not
do previously, and something that at least the appellate courts remain
reluctant to approve. Finally, the Court simply could not resist laying
down some empirical ceilings for punitive damages. Gore's loose
421
guidelines were thus replaced, in State Farm,with fixed ratios.
421. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524 (2003)

HeinOnline -- 82 N.C. L. Rev. 195 2003-2004

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

In one sense, all of this seems entirely plausible, even quite
natural. We live, after all, in a scientific age. As courts have become
more confident consumers of empirical data, they have enshrined
their newfound faith in data and quantification in constitutional law.
Perhaps we are experiencing something of a realist revival in the
making, an apparent move toward a constitutional law based upon
experience and observation. But as the early empiricists learned, and
the Court is likely all too aware, mere reliance on data does not
remove all judicial subjectivity from interpretation. There must be
more here than a recognition that data exist and might turn out to be
useful. If empiricism were simply a way of deciding constitutional
issues more objectively, we would expect to see it utilized wherever
data can inform decisions. As demonstrated in Part II, that simply
has not been the case.422 Empirical markers and proxies are chosen
and generated purposefully.4 3 Data, or their absence, are being
utilized to advance agendas.
Each of the benchmarks and proxies examined in Part II
represents a portion of the comprehensive empirical turn in
constitutional law. The phenomenon must be viewed as a whole.
Taking a holistic approach, three trends emerge: an ascendant
judicial power informed by increased empirical expertise; heightened
judicial skepticism of legislative initiatives; and shifting doctrinal
paradigms. The product of these three trends, discussed below, is a
refashioned constitutional formalism, one which enforces concepts
empirically.
Constitutional empiricism serves two broad jurisprudential
functions. First, it functions as a wedge allowing courts, in certain
areas, to reclaim some of the power that had apparently been ceded
to other branches, particularly to Congress. Thus, empiricism is in
some sense a means of aggrandizing judicial power.
Second,
empiricism now stands in for robust discourse concerning whether
constitutional doctrine should be altered. When lawyers encounter
bad law, they argue the facts. When courts encounter a doctrine they
wish to discard or alter, they now think, speak, and analyze

(suggesting that 9:1 and 1:1 punitive-to-compensatory ratios comprise constitutional
boundaries for due process).
422. See supra notes 200-12 and accompanying text (discussing "secondary effects" and
"special needs" search cases).
423. It is important to note that this observation is not meant to imply any sort of bad
faith or ill will by the Supreme Court in particular, or the judiciary in general. I do not
claim, for example, that courts intentionally rely upon false data. My assertion, rather, is
that constitutional empiricism is a purposeful turn-it serves ends.
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empirically.
Thus, faced with the fact that the Commerce Clause, as it has
been consistently interpreted for decades, imposes very few
limitations on Congressional power, the Supreme Court suddenly
became empirically skeptical. in Lopez and Morrison, the Court
called for findings to be issued, at least in what it deemed to be
"novel" circumstances, such as where Congress acts at what the Court
In these
believes are the outer "margins" of its powers.424
circumstances, the Court is no longer content to rely on implied
legislative findings, but insists on more directly observable proof of
effects on interstate commerce from the regulated activity.
About the same time it began to look outward under the
Commerce Clause, the Court turned outward under Section 5 as well,
demanding, now under some form of heightened scrutiny, objective
verification of the "congruence" and "proportionality" of Congress's
remedial enactments. Here mere findings will not suffice. Under
Section 5, there must be empirical proof in the legislative record of
the congruence and proportionality of the enactment. One of the
rather evident purposes of Section 5 empiricism is to establish the
of the Fourteenth
supremacy of judicial interpretations
It is now apparent that any congressional
Amendment.
interpretation that does not comport with Supreme Court precedent
will be treated as a "novel" and "implausible" enactment subject to
heightened empiricism.
Commerce Clause and Section 5 cases are only two examples of a
judicial ascendancy expressed in empirical terms. They represent a
more general empirical movement. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
as technological innovation soared, the Supreme Court began to
encounter more proactive legislatures. Legislative predictions and
theories, as in Turner and Bartnicki, were subjected to an empirical
"substantial evidence" requirement.42 6 Affirmative action programs,
which appeared to be gaining a political foothold, were similarly held
to be subject to a "strong basis in evidence" standard.4 2 7 Empiricism
424. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995) (calling for findings when
substantial effects not visible to the "naked eye").
425. See generally Timothy Zick, Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court and the
Power to Say What the Law Is, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839 (2002) (noting decline in the
deference that the Court is willing to give legislative enactments pursuant to the fifth
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the heightened judicial review of
executive agencies' interpretation of the law).
426. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,666 (1994).
427. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (quoting
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).
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effectively cautioned a slower legislative process in these areas. In
each case, the Court conveyed its skepticism through empirical
benchmarks. The Court effectively used empiricism to head off
legislative initiatives it determined had not been sufficiently vetted or
considered by legislatures. It has done the same thing with empirical
proxies, limiting execution of the mentally retarded, for example,
based upon a judicially defined societal "consensus." Finally, when
the Court believed that jury discretion on punitive damages simply
became too expansive, it cabined that discretion in State Farm with
judicially crafted numerical ratios.
Thus, the Supreme Court turned the tables on legislatures, and
sometimes juries, empirically. This is how the Rehnquist Court, in
particular, expresses its disagreement with legislative initiatives and
proposals, with congressional and other interpretations of the
Constitution, and with seemingly out-of-control jury awards. These
areas are now heavily marked and constrained by empirical
boundaries.
2. A Refashioned Constitutional Formalism
As noted, however, the empirical turn is more than a means of
judicial aggrandizement; and it is more than a means of giving voice
to judicial pique. Empiricism does actual work, just not the work we
might suppose from a movement with an empirical and scientific
veneer. As explained, empiricism, as method, does not generate
viable neutral principles for constitutional decision-making. An even
closer study of this method of review shows that the mountains of
data, indeed all of the quantification and measurement, serve a
concrete set of formalist and conceptualist ends.
Empiricism looks outward, not for knowledge of what the law
ought to be, but for evidence to support already formulated
conceptions. Lochner era decisions generally made no pretension to
considering social or other context.
By contrast, the new
constitutional formalism is expressly articulated in empirical,
contextual terms. Empiricism is the new scientific face of Lochnerism; it carves out new spheres of liberty and authority, only this time
with reference to purportedly objective measurements and empirical
precepts. In this sense, the Rehnquist Court has merely repeated the
error of the early realists, who substituted their own infatuation with
empirical methods for Langdellian "science."
"Old" Commerce Clause formalism relied expressly upon
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conceptual categories to determine whether a regulation was within
Congress's power.428 Recent decisions shake off the old formalism of
verbal categorization, only to take on the new, empirically-derived
formalism. Rather than continue on the path of deference charted
between 1942 and 1995, the new formalism essentially reaches the
same ends as the old by insisting on empirical findings that commerce
has been "substantially" affected. Although the Court speaks in
empirical terms, its clear signal, taking Lopez and Morrison together,
is that Congress is not permitted to regulate areas that are, in the
Court's view, reserved for state control.429
This new formalism is more pronounced still under Section 5,
which has been transformed from a once plenary power to one that is
empirically, and hence, categorically limited.430 Although the Court's
view of its own power to interpret the Constitution, and its view of
proper federal-state boundaries, ultimately drive the "congruence"
and "proportionality" examination, note that it is the legislative
record that routinely comes in for judicial criticism. Unless the data
indicate the presence of some undefined but apparently judicially
knowable number of instances of a species of discrimination the
Court itself has previously condemned as unconstitutional, Congress
is wasting its time compiling national or other statistics on
discrimination.4 31
In both the commerce and Section 5 areas, the new formalism,
like the old, categorically limits Congress's power in support of the
Court's concept of federalism. The only difference is that the
categories are being enforced or policed empirically rather than with
reference to formally announced categories. It is far simpler, for the
428. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 642 (describing cases exhibiting
traditional categorical approach to commerce power).
429. Regulation of local criminal or marital matters are considered novel and
implausible interpretations of the breadth of Congress's constitutional powers. When
these areas are implicated, empiricism is the Court's trump card.
430. Section 5 cases must be interpreted in light of the Court's squeeze play under the
Commerce Clause and the Eleventh Amendment. Shifts in the federalism paradigm in
those areas have increasingly forced Congress to rely upon Section 5, while at the same
time the Court has become less and less deferential to Congress. See Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection Law: Federal Anti-discrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. 441, 450-56 (2000).
431. In fact, as Hibbs strongly suggests, the state of the record is nearly
inconsequential. It is the Court's view of the novelty and plausibility of Congress's
constitutional interpretation which controls the outcome in Section 5 cases. The only
categories open for legislation are those the Court has narrowly defined by precedent, and
sufficient empirical demonstrations, as Garrett demonstrated, are quite improbable, if not
inconceivable. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 1, at 1748 (conveying skepticism that a
more robust record would have changed many of the recent Section 5 results).
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Court anyway, to announce Congress's empirical failures than to
justify constitutional categorization or doctrinal change.
More generally, across the constitutional spectrum, "novelty"
and "plausibility" outwardly appear to invite contextual
consideration. But these open-ended standards have only reinforced
the sort of formalist balancing courts have engaged in for many years.
If empiricism were only engaged as a means to avoid conceptualism
and render more accurate and objective context-driven decisions, we
would expect that the Court would embrace empiricism widely,
particularly where it is simple to utilize. Again, that has not been the
case. There are many contexts, or categories, in which the Court does
not concern itself with what the world "out there" can tell us.432
On the other hand, there are circumstances in which
observations and data are considered vital and dispositive, even
where empiricism makes little practical sense. 433 Any regulation of
speech that is communicated over new media-for example, cable
(Turner), the Internet (The Free Speech Coalition), or wireless
networks (Bartnicki)-requires substantial empirical support. By
treating all restrictions in this category as both "novel" (based,
apparently, upon the newness of the media) and inherently
"implausible," the Court has effectively carved out a broad category
of speech regulations that must meet a heightened empiricism.
Empiricism is also an effective control when it comes to limiting
claims of racial inequality and governmental reliance upon race in
classifications. Only a decisive "mathematical demonstration" will
support an inference that government policy is being pursued for
invidious purposes, or that remedial measures based on race are
necessary.43 4 Cases like McCleskey, Adarand, and Croson all indicate
that statistics, although treated as constitutionally relevant, will not
resolve this category of constitutional issues regardless of their
strength or validity. In sum, empiricism serves to protect the Court's
current conception of equality.
Finally, it is astonishing how quickly empirical proxies, which at
432. Contrast the obvious empirical nature of the "secondary effects" inquiry with the
See supra notes 190-192 and
empirical analysis of congressional predictions.
accompanying text (discussing "secondary effects"); see also Part II.C (discussing judicial
treatment of congressional predictions).
433. It is difficult to take empiricism seriously in some contexts; for example, the world
"out there" will rarely contain the sort of mathematical proof required to sustain certain
legislative predicates, especially predictive and proactive ones. All the courts must do to
maintain categorical control over proactive measures is to posit the empirical test, then
proclaim a failure of evidence.
434. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).

HeinOnline -- 82 N.C. L. Rev. 200 2003-2004

2003]

CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM

first glance promise escape from old conceptualism, can be fashioned
into a new conceptualism. "Free choice" under the Establishment
Clause, for example, only means something if we have some
benchmark by which to measure the concept of "coercion." To a
formalist examining vouchers, "free choice" simply means that there
are some educational alternatives to religious schools to which a
voucher may be endorsed. As Zelman demonstrates, the concept of
"free choice," thus manipulated, actually screens nothing out. Once
we count all of these alternatives, no matter how realistic
participation in them might be, the denominator in the Equality
Equation balloons, and the product of the equation suggests a lack of
coercion.4 35
Similarly, as Atkins demonstrates, the same can be said of
present judicial beliefs concerning the content of the "cruel and
unusual punishments" clause. We should be wary of claims to
objectivity where judges with pre-conceived notions of what the law
requires pick and choose not only which inputs to consider, but also
how to measure and characterize the outputs.
As Atkins
demonstrates, societal mores can readily be bent to judicial
conceptions, where a focus on the amount of change in the statutory
environment suddenly becomes a new focus on directional change.
After the experiment, we know less about what "society" currently
believes than what a majority of the Court believes the law ought to
be. Nor are the new ceilings for constitutionally "proportionate"
punitive damages awards self-explanatory. Where lines are drawn, as
often they must be, courts should explain their choices. It is the
height of formalism to simply announce what the ratios are to be and
demand that reviewing courts respect them.
In sum, just as balancing promised, and failed, to lead courts to
more "realistic" and "scientific" constitutional decision-making, so
has empiricism, the latest empirical turn, failed to deliver more
accurate or objective results. Like balancing, empiricism, in the
hands of the courts, has developed into a rigid categorical approach to
constitutional adjudication. Empiricism, at least as it has developed
to this point, does not represent a way out of categorical balancing. It
merely reinforces judicial categories previously chosen by applying a
heightened empiricism to laws the courts view as "novel" and
435. The fact that judges looking at the same voucher program can proclaim that either
as little as twenty percent of pupils, or as many as ninety-six percent, receive state
vouchers to attend religious schools, demonstrates only that "results may shift when a
judge can pick and choose the alternatives to use in the comparisons." Zelman v. SimonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639, 700 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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"implausible," by manipulating data and equations, and by instituting
ratios without explaining their origin or substance. With empiricism,
'
the constitutional "truth" always remains "relative to the theory."436
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTHS

Part I sketched the search for objective manifestations of legal
meaning in general, and constitutional meaning in particular.
Focusing on the world "out there" has been a common theme in the
law, and elsewhere, at least since the early twentieth century.
Empiricism does not provide neutral principles for constitutional
decision-making. Thus far, courts have been putting empiricism to
work primarily to police certain categories of legislation and to
bolster normative interpretations of certain constitutional guarantees.
But just as the realization by scientists that their knowledge claims
are socially constructed does not lead inexorably to the abandonment
of the scientific project,4 37 it does not necessarily follow from the
criticisms of this Article that empiricism fails in all respects to
contribute to our knowledge of context in constitutional cases, or that
it could not do so if courts could move beyond the narrow formalism
which currently characterizes constitutional empiricism.
It is important to appreciate that constitutional law, which
ultimately must resolve disputes, literally cannot afford to become
mired in the deep skepticism of a hermeneutic circle.438 Courts will
undoubtedly continue to adjudicate and construe empirically. Thus,
even acknowledging that empiricism is not now the best possible path
to constitutional meaning, we must ask whether it might still
contribute to understanding and knowledge in constitutional cases.
In making that determination, we should be attentive to the
implications of an empirical approach for the health and vitality of
constitutional discourse. The closing Part of this Article addresses
these issues.
A.

Empiricism as Power Delimiterand Rights Definer

Constitutional empiricism enlists empirical methods primarily to
define the boundaries of legislative power, by distinguishing "real"
436. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Internal/ExternalDistinctionand the Notion of a Practice
in Legal Theory and Sociological Studies, 30 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 163, 170 (1996).
437. See, e.g., BOHMAN, supra note 371, at 124-42 (arguing that situated
interpretation-the "hermeneutic circle"-need not lead to universal skepticism).
438. As one author has described it, the hermeneutic circle provides: "Everything is
interpretation, and interpretation is itself indeterminate, perspectival, and circular." Id. at
113.
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from speculative harms, and to define the content of certain
constitutional rights and liberties. But, of course, constitutional
empiricism is part of a legal process whose methods and purposes for
seeking, acquiring, and identifying truth differ in important respects
from empirical-scientific processes and purposes. An analysis of
constitutional empiricism must take these differences into account.
Conventional accounts of the distinctive methods and purposes
of scientific and legal programs for knowledge acquisition often
include at least the following observations:
law is adversarial,
whereas science is cooperative; law limits the admission of data,
whereas science expands the consideration of data; law is a closed
system, whereas science is an open and continuous process; law is a
deductive system, whereas science is an inductive, continually
growing body of knowledge; law's primary concern is with legal
accuracy, whereas science is concerned also with the rigor of methods,
such that scientists speak in terms of "good" and "bad" empirical
results; and law is based upon "certainties and the absence of
reasonable doubt," whereas science is based, at its best, upon
"probabilities and generalizations."439
'
If empiricism purports to be a more scientific, and more
objective, source of constitutional knowledge, it ought at least to
share some of these scientific attributes. As we shall see, however,
constitutional empiricism, which claims the power to discover
"reality" and rights empirically, somewhat half-heartedly picks and
chooses only certain elements of the scientific program. Empiricism
is based on observations, to be sure, as well as hypothesis testing and
the verifiability of "real" harms. It thus incorporates the language,
simple calculation, and some of the other methods of the scientific
project. But empirical review, as presently utilized, is narrow,
constrained, and less comprehensive than a truly scientific search for
knowledge and understanding. This narrowness negatively impacts
constitutional empiricism's claims to knowledge.
1. Empirical Filters
One of the legal characteristics of constitutional empiricism is the
narrow filter it applies to the reception of evidence. We can see, for
example, that the courts' narrow, disaggregating approaches to
empirical evidence in racial discrimination cases ignores
fundamentally important elements of social context. For example,
national data on racial discrimination is considered wholly irrelevant
439. See ERICKSON & SIMON, supra note 147, at 6.
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to any local preference based upon race. Because the courts are so
narrowly focused on legal remedy and idiographic knowledge, they
fail to consider and utilize the full range of nomothetic data that is at
their disposal. A fuller, more ecologically holistic approach would at
least allow for the reception of data concerning national trends.'
Who can doubt that the generally unequal distribution of benefits like
education and wealth are at least relevant to the current state of
affairs in local contracting contexts? Constitutional empiricism fails
even to consider how discrimination in one context may be connected
to discrimination in other contexts. It uses data as it might precedent,
as a means to dispose of legal claims, rather than as a search for
knowledge about social circumstances. As a result, empiricism's
claim to discovering the truth with respect to remedial and other
predicates is weaker than it might otherwise be.
Similarly, when Congress finds that the disabled have been
subjected to a history of discrimination, both private and public, that
finding should "count" for something in determining whether
Congress has exceeded its authority under Section 5. Under Section
5, however, the precedential filter defines the population of
observations that will be taken into account. Narrowing the relevant
data to specific instances of discriminatory treatment condemned by
specific Supreme Court precedents fails to give anything like a
complete picture of the social context of disability discrimination.
Again, legal standards permit a disaggregation of empirical evidence
that scientific processes expressly reject.
A truly scientific
examination would take into account more than a pre-defined
category of data. It would also be open to other interpretations of
that data, in a way the current Court is not open to congressional
interpretations. 1 Insofar as the empirical process narrows evidence
and cuts off even the consideration of other interpretations, its claim
to "real" knowledge rings false." 2
440. The legal focus on idiographic knowledge is particularly important in the equal
protection area, where the Supreme Court has been reluctant to draw any conclusions
about individual discrimination from broad sociological findings. In this context, the
Court refuses to infer anything about individual behavior from nomothetic knowledge
about the behavior of classes of people. The importance of social context in defining
equality is discussed in Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,
69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).

441. See generally Zick, supra note 425 (critiquing Supreme Court's refusal to share
interpretive authority with Congress).
442. Note that I have not claimed that any of this contextual data is dispositive. There
is force to the argument that a local preference based on race should be based on at least
some evidence of local harm, just as there is force to the claim that judicial interpretations
of the Constitution should, in some circumstances, be dispositive. Where, for example,
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We know that a more open empirical process is possible.
Contrast the legal narrowing in discrimination cases to the empirical
approach in Atkins, in which the majority at least allowed for the
consideration of transnational norms in determining whether our
Constitution should prohibit execution of the mentally retarded. 443
That the mere considerationof this data drew such a visceral reaction
from the dissent is testament to the ultimate narrowness of the legal
program. The dissenters would have narrowed the reception of data

solely to historical circumstance or evidence of jury outputs, rejecting
as irrelevant not only legislative outputs and transnational data, but
also polling data taken inside the United States. 44 We must ask what
harm flows from merely considering global social context. From an

empirical perspective, courts should consider the full range of
information that is available.
A narrow, legally situated empirical approach expressly rejects
the openness of the scientific program and, as a result, often predetermines outcomes without considering relevant data. In this
sense, empiricism does not fail because it considers data and
observations, but because it does not consider enough of them. If

judges wish to be empiricists, they should fully and honestly embrace
the data at their disposal.

Right now, constitutional empiricism is

poorly positioned to advance our knowledge concerning the limits of
governmental

power

and

constitutional

guarantees.

It gives

disproportionate weight to narrow categories of empirical data,
without considering broader contexts. Empiricism cannot appreciate
the "real" scope of the problem the government is seeking to address.

Congress enacts legislation for the express purpose of overturning existing Supreme Court
precedent, the argument for judicial supremacy has force. See generally City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding Congress exceeded its enforcement powers by
enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in direct conflict with prior Court
precedent interpreting the Free Exercise Clause). But where the precedential landscape is
more open, the argument that only the Court may define the substance of constitutional
rights is far weaker, particularly given Section 5's express grant of power to Congress. But
a broader consideration of data demonstrating discriminatory trends and patterns is surely
relevant if the goal is to acquire knowledge about the "real" evil the legislature proposes
to remedy. And expanding the scope of relevant Section 5 observations will at least
respect the notion, set forth in Constitutional text and accepted in scientific inquiry, that
there is more than one interpretation of "truth." A scientific approach would not
interpret the data before it has even been collected.
443. See supra text accompanying note 321 (noting the Atkins court's reliance upon
views of countries in the European Union).
444. See supra note 322.
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2. "Good" Versus "Bad" Empirical Results
As mentioned, science proceeds with reference to certain
accepted rules for assessing the accuracy and objectivity of research
results. Taking into account the dilemma that knowledge claims are
socially and institutionally situated, scientists routinely emphasize and
assess their methods in order to smoke out bias and construction in
their results and conclusions. Constitutional empiricism, as a method
of judicial review, does not include any similar standards or
methodological critique. This has allowed for the rise of a new
constitutional formalism. Masking judicial bias and formalism with
empirical results is possible in part because there is no agreed upon
way to distinguish "good" and "bad" empirical results. Observers,
including legislators, do not have any means to draw conclusions
about the accuracy and objectivity of the courts' empirical
determinations, or their own. Nor can they learn from any empirical
mistakes, since the Court has not provided meaningful empirical
guidance.
Although scientists are attentive to methods, this particular
dilemma is far from resolved in the scientific community. Thus, we
can expect that a set of standards governing claims about the accuracy
and objectivity of empirical findings in constitutional cases will not be
readily agreed upon. We can, however, at least begin by identifying
the problem, and by offering some observations.
One specific observation is that empiricism should, at a
minimum, choose the relevant geographic locus as its starting point
for empirical examination. If a problem is local in scope, then the
locality ought to be the starting point for the empirical inquiry."5
Courts cannot possibly know whether a locality has a "special" need
for an intrusive search and seizure policy unless there is some
minimal indication that a drug problem exists at the local level." 6 A
committed empiricist truly interested in acquiring knowledge about
445. By the same token, a national evil should require a national context, not an
isolated group of incidents. But, the Court must be realistic about the legislative process,
and the legislative competence to generate records beyond that which was produced in
cases like Garrett. Congressional findings must be considered, in addition to concrete
instances of discrimination, anecdotal accounts, and surveys. Again, the narrow legal filter
prevents courts from gaining the necessary understanding of the evil Congress seeks to
confront.
446. This assumes, of course, that courts would apply empiricism in such contexts. In a
sense, the Supreme Court has already done so-it has both invalidated searches for lack of
evidence of a special need, and it has upheld searches based upon national data. What is
generally missing is any consistency of application; this should be high on the list of
improvements if empiricism is to be retained as a method of review in constitutional cases.
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local context could not, as the Supreme Court currently does, rely
solely upon national data to answer this foundational question. 447
Similarly, "secondary effects" are peculiarly local speech
externalities. Judicial decisions which allow regulation based solely
on extra-jurisdictional effects are simply not based upon any
knowledge of local social context.
Thus, from an empirical
perspective, permitting local regulation based solely on national or
extra-jurisdictional data must necessarily be considered a "bad"
empirical result. The locus of inquiry problem is only one specific
instance in which we can begin to speak in terms of "good" versus
"bad" empirical results.
Constitutional empiricism raises much larger methodological
concerns. Empiricism proceeds on the apparent assumption that
courts need sufficient knowledge of the external world to resolve
constitutional issues. As a means of acquiring knowledge, science and
empiricism may have few peers. But as the foregoing discussion
demonstrates, we have substantial reason to be skeptical of a
naturalist approach to constitutional law, particularly one which is
based on judicial notions of "novelty" and "plausibility." Empiricism
is useful only insofar as it is utilized in a manner that is consistent and
coherent, and that allows observers, legislators, and others to compile
empirical proofs, to predict outcomes, and to confirm or reject
judicial claims to empirical truths and falsities.
Thus, empiricism is only a valid means of ascertaining
constitutional meaning if empirical benchmarks are both (1) welldefined and (2) realistically attainable. Constitutional empiricism
fails on both counts. We certainly have good reason now to believe
that heightened empiricism will apply in specific contexts, such as
where Congress exercises its Section 5 power (at least where a
classification that does not merit heightened scrutiny is involved) or
where a legislature seeks to regulate speech in a new medium. But
legislators could not have known this at the start of the 1990s, and we
still have no idea which other enactments or policies will be
considered "novel" and "implausible" by courts in the future.
Although it seems inherently logical, we cannot merely use the level
of scrutiny as a proxy for heightened empiricism. Many speech
restrictions subject to strict scrutiny have received an empirical pass,
while those subject to lesser scrutiny have failed to meet newly

447. This is not to say that the existence of a national drug problem is irrelevant, but
only to suggest that data concerning a national evil cannot be dispositive where the locality
constitutes the relevant unit under examination.
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announced empirical markers." 8 Heightened empiricism, in other
words, does not always follow heightened scrutiny. Predicates,
theories, and causal claims that receive an empirical pass in one
context, or have been accepted on prior occasions, have been

empirically invalidated on later occasions for largely unstated
reasons. Thus, to at least begin to remove the subjectivity inherent in
constitutional empiricism, heightened empiricism should follow more
precisely heightened scrutiny.
In addition, even if regulators could accurately predict

heightened empiricism, there is little guidance on how much data is
considered "substantial," or presents a "strong basis," or
demonstrates "congruence" and "proportionality." This problem is,
of course, hardly limited to constitutional empiricism; a great many
legal standards-"preponderance" and "reasonable doubt" to name

two of the best known-suffer from the same sort of vagueness.
Here we are talking about fundamental separation of powers
issues and the scope of basic constitutional rights. There is special

cause for alarm and skepticism where constitutionally determinative
empirical benchmarks are so vaguely expressed. An empiricism as
murky as we now have cannot helpfully delimit the boundaries of

legislative power. It cannot tell Congress, for example, when it has
reached a "good" empirical result. Hibbs, the Court's most recent
treatment of Section 5, highlights this problem."9 The record in
Hibbs did not come near that compiled in Garrett,yet it was deemed
sufficient to uphold the exercise of congressional power. Perhaps that

was because the classification (gender) involves a less rigorous
legislative proof, but the data the Court relied upon was tantamount
to no empirical record at all, at least by its own recent standards.
448. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199-200, 208-09 (1992) (upholding,
under strict scrutiny, restrictions on activity near polling place despite absence of empirical
evidence of harm); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390-91 (2000)
(upholding limitations on contributions in campaigns for state office, despite absence of
substantial evidence indicating corruption or its appearance). In Nixon, the Court was
convinced that Missouri's limits did not suppress political speech because, prior to the
enactment of contribution limits, "97.62 percent of all contributors to candidates for state
auditor made contributions of $2,000 or less." Id. at 369. The dissenters countered that
there was no data regarding the percentage of funds provided by large contributors. See
id. at 426 (Thomas, J., dissenting). They also pointed to the quantitative data in the record
demonstrating that the contribution limits diminished political speech, including data on
aggregate spending in elections, and the diminution post-spending cap of contested
elections. See id. at 426 n.10 (indicating that "overall spending in statewide primary
elections plummeted 89 percent, falling from $14,249,000 to $1,625,000," and noting that
before caps, each of ten statewide primaries was contested, while after caps only one of
ten was contested).
449. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
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Something else, then, must explain why the record in Hibbs was a
"good" empirical compilation; it is troubling that the Court does not
tell us what that something is.
It is important, as well, to recognize that empiricism marks a
radical departure from the traditional legislative model. The notion
that legislatures need empirical proof-beyond findings, committee
hearings, and the like-to sustain enactments represents a shift in
institutional dynamics and the separation of powers. Constitutional
empiricism is necessarily pushing legislatures toward an
empirical/administrative model of legislative power, but without
providing any real guidance on important qualitative or quantitative
issues.45 ° Without some basis for foresight, governmental bodies find
themselves laboring under empirical benchmarks they had no reason
to believe were applicable to the legislation or policy under
consideration.451 Or, they compile mountains of data only to be told
that it is "not enough," or that it does not identify a "real" evil
sufficient, in the courts' view, to merit governmental concern. A
useful empirical dynamic must spell out more clearly what is required;
it must enable legislators and their aides to separate good from "bad"
empirical results as they legislate.
The same goes for empirical proxies-the formulas, equations,
and ratios which are now used to define certain constitutional rights.
Legislatures should know in advance that directional change will be
dispositive of "evolving standards," and they should have some
explanation for why this is so. It is a simple matter to verify the
number of enactments within a specific time frame which prohibit a
specific practice. It is also easy enough to verify the direction of
change. But we cannot assess the significance of the shift in direction
unless we are told why the direction of change is considered
empirically significant in the first place. Nor can we have an
Establishment Equation without standards to guide which data are
relevant to the equation's denominator. Nor should judges or juries
labor under a 9:1 due process ratio with regard to punitive and
compensatory damages without some explanation as to why the ratio
has been assembled as it has, and why the Court has drawn the line
where it has. Without some guidance, or at least some discussion, of
450. See generally Frickey & Smith, supra note 1 (discussing in detail the Court's
legislative record analysis in Section 5 cases).
451. Colker & Brudney, supra note 1, at 85-86, refer to this phenomenon in the Section
5 context as the "crystal ball" legislative record requirement. The same moniker might be
applied as well to the other contexts in which the Court has recently announced empirical
benchmarks.
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these methodological issues, an empirical approach brings us no
closer to defining or verifying constitutional norms than a statement
of judicial "common sense."
Of course, if it is based on a search for constitutional truths,
empiricism has to set realistic and attainable standards. It must take
into consideration the empirical limitations under which Congress, for
example, operates. The Section 5 cases, in particular, seem to ignore
these limitations. Congress may well be institutionally incapable of
compiling the sort of "legislative record" the Court requires. And
one wonders how, in cases like Bartnicki, the government is expected
to prove to the Court's satisfaction that restrictions on upstream
dissemination will dry up the downstream market for intercepted
communications.
Even if data on Title III's application and
enforcement were available, and systematically collected, lawyers
cannot simply "experiment" with Title III's application to determine
the effects changes in certain variables might produce.
A
government-commissioned study of up and down-stream behaviors in
light of certain incentives and disincentives would seem to be a very
poor proxy for how the statute is working in real contexts." 2
Similarly, the Turner cases demonstrate the difficulties inherent in
requiring Congress to prove the empirical validity of its predictions.
Finally, recall that constitutional empiricism follows
constitutional balancing as a scientific exegesis of constitutional
meaning. Ultimately, however, empiricism fails to save constitutional
balancing from conventional charges of empirical indeterminacy.
One of the principal criticisms of balancing is that the private and
public interests being weighed cannot be placed on a common scale.453
Empiricism only exacerbates the problem. Until recently, courts
generally weighed abstract interests when they balanced. The right to
expression, for example, was weighed against the government's right
to protect children from harmful materials. These are, of course,
apples and oranges, but at least they are both abstract fruits.
Empiricism, by demanding that the government prove the existence
of a "real" harm, requires a balancing of abstract apples with
empirical carrots. The right to expression, for example, remains one
452. Given the rising empirical competence of the courts, one can well imagine the
judicial critique of such a study's methodology; courts would almost certainly challenge,
among other things, the generalizability of any findings and conclusions.
453. There have been occasional attempts to improve upon the imprecision of the
balancing calculus.
See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality
Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 754-55 (1994) (describing algebraic model to

portray relationship between liberty and governmental interests).
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of only abstract analysis, while the government's predicate, whether
in the nature of a present perceived harm, a prediction, or a theory, is
subject to empirical measurement and objective verification. Unless
and until there is a way to quantify and empirically operationalize the
private end of the scale as well, balancing, it seems, only becomes less
determinate as a measure of constitutionality.
Perhaps, despite all of these limitations, empiricism at least
forces the courts to confront empirical realities, thereby constraining
them from making constitutional law that is based on bad empirical
results. Indeed, some have claimed that empirical data plays an
important role in restraining and guiding the law, by forcing courts in
particular "to confront empirical realities, or at least to articulate
'
more explicitly the normative rationale underlying legal decisions."454
This view assumes that courts, once they adopt empiricism and
its quasi-scientific methods, will give empirical data due consideration
and respect. My own examination of constitutional empiricism,
however, strongly suggests that this is an overly optimistic view. No
matter what kind of data is at issue, courts do not seem to be
constrained by the empirical record. Indeed, if anything, courts are
even more willing to manipulate narrowly defined empirical data than
other, more traditional sources of constitutional construction, such as
text, history, and precedent. Data have yet to engender anything
approaching the respect of these other sources. Until they do, courts
will likely continue to manipulate data as they sometimes do other
forms of evidence.
In the scientific community, studies are often undertaken
expressly to falsify previous efforts, and scientists cannot afford to
ignore significant studies in their fields. Constitutional empiricism is
not similarly constrained, as courts are not using data to falsify their
own notions of what the law should be, but to support their claims of
what the law is, or to selectively "falsify" legislative enactments based
upon a lack of empirical support. Courts simply define for themselves
which empirical results and conclusions are considered "good" and
which are deemed "bad." The discussion of the forms and functions
of constitutional empiricism in Part II attests to the judiciary's flexible
use of data and other external observations. At present, empirical
data in constitutional cases appear to constrain judges only insofar as
454. Richard E. Redding, Reconstructing Science Through Law, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 585,

604 (1999) (internal citation omitted); see also Faigman, supra note 1, at 611-12 (noting
that although empirical research might "complicate litigation and engender unexpected
legal outcomes," a "broader view, however suggests an essential role for empirical
research in forcing the Court to tackle the difficult normative issues before it").
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they wish to be constrained. Only substantial judicial attention to the
generation and utilization of clear empirical benchmarks will reverse
this course.
3. Legal Certainties and Empirical Probabilities
Science accepts, even celebrates, uncertainties. As an evolving
process, science proceeds based upon probabilities and generalities.
Unlike law, it does not make claims to universal truth. Thus, a truly
empirical and scientific approach to constitutional law would not
focus on or demand certainties or the absence of all doubt.
Empiricism would not demand a "mathematical demonstration" of
discriminatory treatment, for example. And it would be satisfied, in
cases like Playboy, with estimates of the probability that children
would be exposed to signal bleed, rather than demanding that the
legislature present a national survey of actual exposure to the harm.
Thus far, however, the narrow conception of legal "knowledge" has
dominated empirical constitutional decision-making. Courts search
for constitutional certainties. Not surprisingly, they find very few
absolutes lurking in legislative records.
The dominance of the legal paradigm with regard to knowledge
acquisition is most apparent where courts purport to test legislative
predictions as hypotheses.
Knowledge of underlying facts is
particularly important, and increasingly difficult to come by, in an age
of rapid scientific and technological advance. In this era of science
and technology, proactive governance is something of an accepted
reality.
Congress and other legislatures can either get out ahead of
problems by predicting how the world will look, or miss important
opportunities to shape regulatory environments.
Treating proactive enactments as hypotheses which are
amenable to determinate empirical verification exposes additional
problems with an empirical approach to constitutional review of
legislation. Requiring that legislatures demonstrate that predictions
or causal theories are "correct" as an empirical-legal matter, rather
than sufficiently probable as an empirical-scientific matter to permit
regulation, is tantamount to demanding the impossible. The question
should not be whether the prediction is actually "correct" in some
absolute sense, but whether it is sufficiently probable under the

455. As some scholars have noted, proactive legislating is on the rise, particularly in
areas involving rapid technological advances, like telecommunications. See Benjamin,
supra note 286, at 282-83 (citing examples of recent proactive legislation in
communications area).
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circumstances, taking into account both the deference due to
legislative predictions and the inherent uncertainty of the regulatory
environment, to permit the desired regulation. As the Turner cases
demonstrate, probabilities and generalizations are the best courts can
hope to discover when they seek to "verify" legislative hypotheses
that are based upon predicted events.456
Surely it is neither wise nor even possible to test each
governmental prediction in this manner. A governmental hypothesis
that restricting campaign contributions is necessary to control
political corruption cannot be meaningfully tested without reference
to how the pre-restriction world looked. Suppose, for example, that
there is no present evidence that the harm or evil exists. It is possible
that the absence of the evil demonstrates that the governmental
prediction is accurate. It is, of course, equally plausible that the harm
the government targeted simply never existed. Empiricism cannot
tell us anything meaningful about the validity of these legislative
hypotheses for the simple reason that we do not know what the
regulatory environment would look like absent the regulation.
Even if courts were to receive all of the data they seek with
respect to legislative predictions, including that which is created postenactment, empiricism necessarily will fall short of any absolute
certainty. Even with the counter-factual data, causal or correlative
claims cannot be meaningfully analyzed without a consideration of
data concerning a host of variables that might have some relationship
to the predicate. The judicial process has no means of controlling for
these disparate variables, and no scientific means of isolating causal
factors. For this additional reason, then, the search for absolute
''correctness" or "truth" is hopelessly misguided.
In addition to the absence of counter-factual evidence and the
absence of methods for isolating causal factors, there is no agreedupon temporal reference point for testing legislative predictions.
When does the government have to be "correct" as an empirical
matter-at the time of enactment, or the time of review, or at some
other time? Here is one place that the Supreme Court appears to
456. For one thing, there is no counter-factual data by which to test legislative
predictions. How can Congress know whether broadcast stations will fail without "mustcarry" regulations? Congress can make a prediction based upon available evidence, which
in rapidly changing environments can be ephemeral. In Turner the Court, while touting
the virtues of deference, twice tested Congress's hypothesis, first with reference to the
data available when Congress acted, and then again with a "supplemented" record. See
Turner Broad Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994). Only after this massive
empirical undertaking was the Court apparently satisfied that Congress's prediction was
"correct." The inefficiencies of the Court's approach are patently apparent.

HeinOnline -- 82 N.C. L. Rev. 213 2003-2004

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

have adopted the flexibility of the scientific program. By allowing in
Turner II for the "supplementation" of the record, the Court
indicated that the temporal inquiry was flexible enough to sustain a
legislative prediction that had little or no empirical support when it
was originally made.457
The temporal issue is a delicate one for the acquisition of
knowledge regarding the scope of legislative powers. If Congress was
empirically "correct" initially, can empirical evidence produced a day
after enactment invalidate its predicate?
Conversely, can
subsequently developed and discovered evidence validate a oncefalse or non-existent predicate?
Empiricism raises the rather
unsettling possibility that an enactment that is empirically valid one
day may be invalid the next.45 This may be an acceptable state of
affairs for the scientific project, even an invited one, given the
scientific focus on the continuous evolution of knowledge. But here is
one place where legal certainty is constitutionally significant. The
temporal question, at the least, must be finally settled in some fashion
if empiricism is to apply to legislative predictions and other
predicates.
All of these considerations bring to the fore certain foundational
differences between constitutional and scientific knowledge. As the

457. If constitutional empiricism is primarily concerned with identifying "real" harms,
the relevant empirical pool would appear to be that which was available to the
government when it acted. If the goal is decisional accuracy, however, then it seems that
the courts must sift all of the evidence, even that which is created post-enactment. While
the path of constitutional empiricism generally seems to suggest a focus on originating
harms that are "real" and not speculative, Turner at the same time suggests that ultimate
empirical verification is pivotal. Again, however, this focus on absolute verification, while
well-suited to the law, is fundamentally at odds with scientific notions of the acquisition of
knowledge.
458. A hypothetical congressional prohibition on the practice of "reproductive
cloning" illustrates the concern. Suppose the law is quickly debated and enacted amidst
scientific uncertainty regarding the harm, if any, associated with reproductive cloning,
which has yet to be attempted. Congress predicts or theorizes, based on the available
evidence, of animal studies for example, that reproductive cloning will cause harm to
human beings. Some years later the enactment is challenged on the ground that it violates
a fundamental right, say of privacy. Courts will have no basis for assessing the counterfactual, since cloning has not yet been permitted. The government would point to studies
of animal cloning to support its predicate. But let us complicate matters. How should the
courts proceed if, sometime between enactment and judicial review, cloning is successfully
attempted in other countries, and the evidence demonstrates that cloning has no adverse
effects on human beings? Conversely, suppose there were in fact no studies when
Congress acted, but that a number of subsequently conducted studies indicate that cloning
strongly correlates with certain diseases and adverse conditions? What is even more
likely, suppose the evidence is entirely equivocal? At what point is the truth of the matter
to be established?
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Daubert Court noted: "There are important differences between the
quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the
laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision.
'
Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly."459
This observation has direct implications for constitutional empiricism,
particularly insofar as it seeks to test legislative hypotheses. While
constant testing of empirical propositions is an essential virtue of
scientific inquiry and growth, constitutional inquiry gains little from
mere empirical experiments.
Congress surely does not undertake legislative action as an
experiment to test the empirical limits of its powers. "False starts"
are common in science, indeed imperative for its functioning. By
contrast, constitutional law gains nothing from opinions like Garrett,
which indicate only that Congress failed to demonstrate a predicate
empirically, or Bartnicki, which is premised on the failure to prove a
negative. It seems apparent that no amount of empirical work would
have saved the legislation in either case. In an artificial sense, these
legislative predicates have been "falsified" by the Court, but how
does that expand our knowledge of constitutional limits?
The foregoing discussion clarifies the limitations of constitutional
empiricism as a means to acquiring constitutional knowledge or
learning constitutional truths. In many respects, the empirical and
legal programs are incompatible. For all of its empirical trappings,
constitutional empiricism, at least as it is currently implemented,
remains captive to legal filters on evidence, fails to distinguish "good"
from "bad" empirical results, and demands unattainable absolute
truths. As a method of judicial review, constitutional empiricism
focuses on the acquisition of legal knowledge, not knowledge about
the external world. It causes courts to observe and quantify, at least
in some contexts, but ultimately does not depart from the
constraining and narrowing influences of the legal process. If it is to
serve other than its current formalist agenda, constitutional
empiricism must become a great deal more scientific.
B.

Empirical ConstitutionalDiscourse: Expounding a Constitution

. Even if courts could somehow bring the methods and insights of
science to bear on constitutional questions, we should ask what effect
459. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1993).

Of course,

definitive resolution of constitutional claims is only one, not the only, purpose of
constitutional law. See generally Louis SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION
(2001) (arguing that constitutional decisions purposefully leave matters unsettled, thus

permitting litigants to continue pursuing goals).
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this approach might have on our constitutional discourse. Putting
aside the substantial pragmatic concerns with constitutional truthseeking, should constitutional adjudication and construction emulate
natural inquiry? Where is this particular form of "juriscience"
leading constitutional discourse? 4"
Constitutional empiricism is a new phenomenon; its path is not
yet determined. But three general observations arise out of what has
transpired thus far. The first is that empiricism leaves the impression
that certain results are, more or less, beyond judicial control.46 ' Thus,
an empirical discourse permits courts to claim that empirical
standards, rather than conceptualism or normative choices, account
for their constitutional decisions. The discourse lacks any explanation
for empirical choices; it fails to explain, for example, why a legislative
record is insufficient, or how formulas and ratios originate or operate.
The second concern is that empiricism, like early Langdellian science,
threatens to remove values and conceptions of justice from
constitutional discourse.
Decisions look more and more
mathematical, and less and less constitutional. The third general
observation is that constitutional empiricism threatens to leave
constitutional rights and powers at the mercy of empirical
462
demonstrations .
As to the first general criticism, the ascendance of judicial power
is masked with the most superficial empirical discourse. Congress is
essentially told that had it only compiled more empirical evidence, its
Section 5 enactments would have survived scrutiny. Claimants in
discrimination cases are similarly informed that if only their empirical
evidence had been more compelling, their rights could have been
vindicated. Empiricism, the courts seem to be saying, demanded that
we decide against you. But in truth, none of this is in fact outside
judicial control. The rejection of legislative expertise, legislative
power, and claimants' rights flows from decisions that have little to do
with empirical demonstrations as such. The courts are far from
passive empirical observers; they should acknowledge as much.
We have seen evidence that empiricism stunts constitutional
discourse, and serves as a pretext for battles that courts are not
willing to have in non-empirical terms. Thus, for example, with the
460. The term is from Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudenceor "Juriscience"?,25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 525 (1984).
461. For a similar critique of the Burger Court's utilization of economics, particularly
in Fourth Amendment cases, see Tribe, Constitutional Calculus,supra note 4, at 599-614.
462. See id. at 606-09 (advancing similar critique with regard to search and seizure
economics).
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aura of a scientific panel, the majority in Stenberg carefully examined
the medical and scientific evidence regarding the safety of various
abortive methods.463 The examination was hardly necessary; unless
the State was able to prove that partial birth procedures were never
required for maternal safety, the majority was going to invalidate the
statute. The Court effectively pre-determined that patient and
physician autonomy should prevail over state interests in the event of
the inevitable empirical stalemate. But, the Court never explained
that normative choice. As a medical review board, the Court may
have been obligated to do no more than pronounce the medical
authority to be in conflict, and allow physicians to proceed as they
saw fit. As a court, it was required to do more, to provide us with an
explanation and a defense of striking the balance this way.4
As to the second general criticism, the courts' "fixation on the
' is leading
tangible"465
to thinner and thinner constitutional discourse.
Laurence Tribe's critique of various Burger Court decisions that were
driven by cost-benefit analyses applies with equal force to the
Rehnquist Court's empiricism: "The Court's current approach has a
tendency to flatten issues, to squeeze the living complexity out of
them[.] ' ' 46 6 Constitutional truths or realities, if they exist, do not lie
about waiting for constitutional scientists to "discover" them. They
cannot be divined by technocratic counting and parsing.
In Atkins, the appearance is that experiments in state
laboratories were conducted, data compiled, and the Court, like a
scientist at the bench, reported the results. It all looks sterile, valuefree, and "scientific."
But to declare the limits of the Eighth
Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" clause is surely to do
more than observe a national test tube and make notations on
outputs, directional change, and proportionality.
It cheapens
constitutional discourse to suggest that less than an eighteen-point
swing in legislative outputs determines whether the mentally retarded
should live or die at the hands of the State. And where is the
explanation in State Farm for the rule that where compensatory
463. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 924 (2000).
464. Roe, which helped launch the first empirical turn in constitutional law, is subject to
this same criticism. The focus on medical evidence ultimately leaves us with the
impression that medical expertise determines the scope of constitutional rights, that it is
the physician's right to determine the course of care that is most important. That is what
can occur when empirical discourse pushes everything else to the side. Some have argued
that the Court should have justified the decision not in terms of physician autonomy, but
rather in terms of gender equality. See Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins, supra note 4, at 161.
465. Id.
466. Id.
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damages are "substantial" (a term itself left undefined), a ratio of 1:1
is presumptively valid? By what magic does the Court render the 9:1
ratio? Obviously, important normative constitutional choices are
being made about jury discretion. Wholly lacking is any form of
"reasoned elaboration" for those choices. There is no mention of the
usual factors-constitutional structure, text, history; but more
egregious still, there is no explanation at all for how the lines and
equations have been drawn and assembled. With constitutional
empiricism, too much is left unspoken.
The Court seems constantly to fear for its own legitimacy.
Judicial review seems to be so controversial that courts would rather
drape themselves in data than judge the practice of executing the
mentally retarded on its merits. Will such executions deter or grant
retribution? If not, as it appears, and no other valid reason suggests
itself for engaging in this practice, is that not a sufficient reason to
pronounce the practice "cruel and unusual," particularly in light of
the condition of the accused? Even if such executions do deter, is
there some other moral or ethical reason to reject this practice as
unjust and unconstitutional? If there are moral and juridical bases for
decision, then the Court should give voice to them. This is not to
suggest that legislative outputs ought not be considered. It is, rather,
to suggest that life and death should rest as well on considerations of
fairness and justice.
Similarly, how can the Establishment Equation tell us which
programs invidiously breach the church-state divide? At best, a
simple equation can yield only the simplest of answers to undeniably
normative questions. There is no hope that any mathematical
operation, no matter how complex, can do justice to the historical and
normative considerations that give substance to the Establishment
Clause. The more courts rely upon data and equations, the less they
concern themselves with constitutional history, values, norms, and
structure. The more they calculate, it seems, the less they describe
and articulate. If values are being enforced and normative choices
made, it is better that they should be forthrightly acknowledged than
hidden under a pile of cold data or obscured by empiricism's
deceptively simple "new" mathematics.
Rendering "objective" constitutional decisions should not mean
that courts count data to the exclusion of all else, that they in effect
stop considering broad normative, foundational, and constitutive
issues. Surely we want courts to do more in determining the contours
of the Constitution than this. Surely there is more to constitutional
rights and powers than simple mathematics or surveys. Indeed, one
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of the reasons some social scientists have rejected the model of the
natural sciences is that the approach sterilizes too much; purely
empirical work lacks a "human" element. Constitutional empiricism
manifests this same weakness. But at least scientific truths are
supposed to be free of moral claims and considerations of justice.
Indeed, claims to scientific objectivity are premised on the absence of
these very things. Constitutional law, at least in what might be
considered its "natural" state, is not similarly situated. Constitutional
issues cannot be divorced from consideration of broad notions of
value and justice.
Once empiricized and naturalized, constitutional discourse, as we
have seen, becomes narrowed and limited by the data. We need only
read opinions like McCleskey, Zelman, Adarand, Atkins, and State
Farm to realize just how narrow our constitutional discourse has
become. Data can contribute to constitutional knowledge. But, they
cannot serve as a proxy for constitutional meaning. As an indicator
of constitutional meaning, a single page of robust, honest discourse
about the constitutional choices and issues at stake is worth more
than twenty pages of formulas, ratios, or citations to empirical studies.
Empiricism may be comforting to judges, a salve for the
indeterminacy of constitutional meaning. But, mere formulas cannot
fix meaning. To the extent that there are values that do not "fit"
formulas like the Establishment Equation, empiricism narrows and
"flattens" constitutional discourse by failing to consider them.
Finally, we should also be concerned that the strength of
constitutional rights and powers has become coterminous with the
strength of the empirical data that support them.467 Plessy v. Ferguson
was no doubt supported by the social Darwinism of its day. The 113page "Brandeis Brief" in Muller was utilized to demonstrate that
women were simply too frail to withstand the rigors of extended work
hours. Thus, empiricism seemingly could come to validate all manner
of conduct that is presently considered to clash with constitutional
norms. -Turning Atkins around, would we want the Constitution to
permit execution of the mentally retarded, or juvenile offenders,
simply because a handful of state legislatures have moved in that
direction? This becomes a more pressing concern as science gains
momentum and prestige, as is likely to occur. Would we want
governments to use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on
gender if stronger social science evidence supported our stereotyped
467. See generally Tribe, Constitutional Calculus, supra note 4, at 599-614 (critiquing
the Court's recent trend of performing cost-benefit analysis in areas of constitutional law).
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inclination to believe that men and women think and reason a certain
way? 468 Empiricism may even encourage the notion that evidence
tending to demonstrate that sexual orientation is chosen, rather than
in some measure biologically determined, should dictate the contours
of the equality guarantee.
In sum, detailed consideration of empirical evidence should not
be allowed to displace more normative and robust constitutional
discourse. 469 That is precisely the direction in which constitutional
empiricism is currently headed. More and more, it is a calculation,
rather than a constitution, that is being expounded.47 ° One need not

be a supporter of judicial "activism" to support a constitutional
discourse that is not centered on empiricism. Neither normative,
value-bound nor empirical discourse will ever prove entirely
satisfactory. But at least with the former, we may have an honest
debate about our constitutional choices. Empiricism may make
judges feel better about their constitutional choices, but on its current
path, it will only weaken constitutional foundations and first
principles, which seem already to have been obscured beneath a
mountain of data.
CONCLUSION

In order to gain legitimization, objectivity, and neutrality, law has

historically sought to emulate scientific and empirical processes.
Constitutional law has done so only reluctantly, preferring traditional
sources, like text and history, to external indicators of
constitutionality. As in other areas, an outward, scientific turn was
perhaps inevitable in constitutional interpretation. Constitutional
empiricism represents that turn. Empiricism is only the latest judicial
effort to decide constitutional issues with reference to neutral
principles.

Constitutional empiricism borrows liberally from the

principles and methods of scientific and empirical inquiry to provide a
purportedly neutral dynamic for constitutional adjudication and
construction.
Constitutional empiricism boasts the ability to discern "real"
468. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140-41 (1994)
classification used during peremptory challenges).

(invalidating gender

469. See Serena Stier, Privileging Empiricism in Legal Dialogue: Death and
Dangerousness, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271, 273 (1988) (asserting that "[e]mpiricism

elevates the values of objectivity and verifiability over the value of justice, which can only
be achieved through normative discourse").
470. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (noting "we must never
forget that it is a constitutionwe are expounding" (emphasis in original)).
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legislative predicates and to empirically test legislative hypotheses,
theories, and causal claims. It pretends to provide neutral and
objective content to normative constitutional concepts like "cruel and
unusual punishment" and "due process." Constitutional empiricism
makes these claims because it is based upon a positivist view of
scientific and empirical inquiry which accepts the notion of value-free
fact-finding and determinate data. This Article has used the debates
concerning the objectivity of science to examine and critique these
claims to neutrality. Like any empirical endeavor, constitutional
empiricism is susceptible to a host of subjective choices that affect not
only the collection and categorization of data, but its ultimate
interpretation. Empiricism thus cannot function as a set of neutral
principles.
Constitutional empiricism has been utilized to draw attention
away from a subtle return to the formalism and conceptualism of
earlier eras. Although empiricism looks like an earnest attempt to
gain knowledge of the external world, in fact it serves as the new face
of constitutional formalism. The attention to data is mere pretext for
specific conceptualist agendas, an empirical show meant to deflect
criticism of judicial aggrandizement and conceptualism in
constitutional jurisprudence.
Although empiricism adopts some of the trappings of scientific
inquiry, it is a poor process for arriving at scientific or empirical truths
about the limits of legislative power and the substance of
constitutional rights. Empiricism remains captive to legal conceptions
of knowledge and knowledge acquisition. Because it filters evidence,
fails to provide standards for separating "good" empirical results
from "bad" results, and demands that hypotheses be legally "correct,"
empiricism does not advance constitutional knowledge as much as its
scientific trappings would predict.
This Article offers some potential solutions to improve upon
empiricism's methods and outcomes. But, the Article also raises
some concerns about the notion of empirically determined
constitutional rights and powers. Data are crowding out not only the
traditional sources of constitutional interpretation, but most other
concerns as well. Viewing science and empiricism as having all the
power, and all the rationality, portends an imminent conflict between
empiricism and larger values in constitutional law. We must decide
now how clinical and how empirical constitutional law should be.
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